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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20220121T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20220121T110000
DTSTAMP:20260503T163442
CREATED:20211101T123117Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211101T123607Z
UID:10000099-1642759200-1642762800@cisrul.blog
SUMMARY:CISRUL/POLITICO Reading Seminar - Community 3
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://cisrul.blog/event/cisrul-politico-reading-seminar-community-3/
CATEGORIES:Seminar
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://cisrul.blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/books-bookstore.jpeg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211215T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211215T113000
DTSTAMP:20260503T163442
CREATED:20211101T122943Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211209T163200Z
UID:10000098-1639562400-1639567800@cisrul.blog
SUMMARY:CISRUL/POLITICO Reading Seminar - Community 2
DESCRIPTION:Deer hunting\, fiestas\, and the people without history \n\n\n\nLed by Denisse Román-Burgos \n\n\n\nThis is the second reading group in a series to prepare us for the Conceptualising Community conference in 2022. \n\n\n\nAre communities tied to a specific place or can we think about them as ubiquitous? \n\n\n\nIn this seminar we will reflect on the concept of community from an anthropological perspective by discussing two texts. Firstly\, we will read the introduction of the seminal work by Eric R. Wolf “Europe and the people without history”\, and secondly\, chapter 8 of “In the name of El Pueblo” a historical ethnography by Paul Eiss about the reproduction of the community and of communal identity in Yucatan\, Mexico. \n\n\n\nWolf reflects on the historical connections between the so-called global north and the so-called global south\, whilst Eiss discusses certain practices that contribute to re-shape and enact the community. Considering both texts\, the discussion will be framed by questions such as: Can a community be defined empirically? What role does ritual play in defining a community?  Is it possible to identify cultural practices that are specific to a community? Do these contribute to the reproduction of the community? \n\n\n\nReadings\n\n\n\nWolf\, Eric (1982) Europe and the people without history. Berkeley University Press. Introduction \n\n\n\nEiss\, Paul (2010) In the name of El Pueblo. Place\, Community\, and the Politics of History in Yucatan. Chapter 8\, Duke University Press\, 218-243.
URL:https://cisrul.blog/event/cisrul-politico-reading-seminar-community-2/
CATEGORIES:Seminar
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://cisrul.blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/aberdeen.jpeg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20211119T100000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20211119T233000
DTSTAMP:20260503T163442
CREATED:20211101T122750Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211101T123833Z
UID:10000097-1637316000-1637364600@cisrul.blog
SUMMARY:CISRUL/POLITICO Reading Seminar - Community 1
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://cisrul.blog/event/cisrul-politico-reading-seminar-community-1/
CATEGORIES:Seminar
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://cisrul.blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/session-3-3452886786-1635770253600.jpeg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20200512
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20200513
DTSTAMP:20260503T163442
CREATED:20210819T171213Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211027T092953Z
UID:10000046-1589241600-1589327999@cisrul.blog
SUMMARY:Semester 2\, Reading seminar 3: Secularism
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://cisrul.blog/event/semester-2-reading-seminar-3-secularism/
CATEGORIES:Seminar
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://cisrul.blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/cisrul-logo.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20200428
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20200429
DTSTAMP:20260503T163442
CREATED:20210819T171642Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211027T093014Z
UID:10000048-1588032000-1588118399@cisrul.blog
SUMMARY:PhD Presentations - Session II
DESCRIPTION:
URL:https://cisrul.blog/event/phd-presentations-session-ii/
CATEGORIES:PhD Presentations
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://cisrul.blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/radical_democratic.jpeg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20190924
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20190925
DTSTAMP:20260503T163442
CREATED:20210819T180737Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211027T093215Z
UID:10000056-1569283200-1569369599@cisrul.blog
SUMMARY:The Ghost of Hitler in South Africa
DESCRIPTION:Roundtable discussion with Shirli Gilbert and John de Gruchy\nThe memory of Nazi Germany as a source of religious complicity and resistance in apartheid South Africa — A roundtable discussion with John de Gruchy and Shirli Gilbert\nThe rise of right wing populist and political movements has meant that memories of Nazism are once again being used as a touchstone to frame discussions of contemporary politics. The same was true in the internal Jewish and Christian debates that occurred about the apartheid regime in South Africa. For both groups these debates centred on questions of particularity and universality\, both in terms of how universal the lessons to be learned from the Nazi horror were and the extent of their obligations in light of those lessons. Both Christians and Jews were divided on these questions and those divisions shaped their willingness to participate in or resist the apartheid regime.\n\nThis roundtable discussion will focus on the work of two influential South African scholars\, John de Gruchy and Shirli Gilbert. De Gruchy is a theologian who was a central member of a church movement that framed its opposition to apartheid in part through explicit analogy to Confessing Church movement in Nazi Germany. Gilbert is a historian of the Jewish community in South Africa and writes about\, among other things\, the complicated role of the memory of the Holocaust played in shaping Jewish politics and identity in South Africa.\n\nThe roundtable discussion will be held on Tuesday\, September 24th 2019\, 10am at the Sir Duncan Rice Library\, Room 3 on the 7th floor.\n\nThe event is jointly hosted by CISRUL and the Divinity Department at the University of Aberdeen\n\n\n\n\n\nBoth Gilbert and De Gruchy will also give individual lectures at the University of Aberdeen. Shirley Gilbert\, historian of the Jewish community in South Africa\, will give the Hay of Seaton lecture on September 23rd at 6.30pm. The following day\, John de Gruchy will give a lecture on “A Life-Changing Conversation: Doing theology in dialogue with Bonhoeffer” on September 24th at 5pm\, in the King’s College Chapel.
URL:https://cisrul.blog/event/the-ghost-of-hitler-in-south-africa/
CATEGORIES:Seminar
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://cisrul.blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/cisrul-logo.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=UTC:20190613T000000
DTEND;TZID=UTC:20190616T235959
DTSTAMP:20260503T163442
CREATED:20210819T165526Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211027T093243Z
UID:10000040-1560384000-1560729599@cisrul.blog
SUMMARY:Conceptualizing “Political”
DESCRIPTION:Workshop and PhD summer school\nConceptualizing “Political”\nTHURSDAY 13TH – FRIDAY 14TH JUNE 2019PHD SUMMER SCHOOL\, SATURDAY 15TH – SUNDAY 16TH JUNE\nHosted by theCentre for Citizenship\, Civil Society and Rule of Law (CISRUL)University of Aberdeen \nTopic\nThe term “political” is generally used as loosely by scholars as by the public. This workshop does not aim to agree on a common definition of “political”. Instead\, the goal is to map different ways in which the term gets used\, within and across debates\, and to consider how it might be used more reflectively and productively. \nFor example: \n\nScholars have observed that the idea that “religion” and “economics” are domains that should be kept separate from “politics” has appeared in modern times. How can we explain the emergence of distinctions between religion\, economics and politics\, does the separation still hold fast in the world today\, and how if at all should scholars make such distinctions? For example\, what rides on the claim that politics (and religion) should be kept out of education?\nWhat do people mean when they accuse others of “politicizing” or “depoliticizing” an issue? What have feminists meant when they claim that “the personal is political”? In democracies\, should everything be “political”? What does it mean to argue\, for example\, that “juridification” is a form of “depoliticization”? And how productive is the call of philosophers like Rancière and Mouffe to rethink “the political” in distinction to “politics”?\nConcepts like citizenship\, civil society and rule of law are often referred to as political concepts. What makes concepts themselves “political”\, and what concepts are not? For example\, are legal concepts necessarily “political”\, and if so\, in what sense?\n\nAlthough the objective is not to achieve a common definition\, nevertheless by mapping these debates and thinking around them\, we were interested in drawing new links between uses of the term in different debates. \nWe divided the workshop into three sessions\, to focus on the following (overlapping) themes: \n\nPhilosophies of “the political”Recent decades have seen philosophical debates\, spilling into other disciplines\, distinguishing “politics” and “the political”\, usually referring back to the work of Carl Schmitt and Hannah Arendt.\nGenealogies of “political”Scholars from a range of disciplines have shown how the term “political” has changed its meaning over the centuries\, not only in relation to closely-related terms such as “politics” but also to terms like “religious” and “economic” with which it is often juxtaposed.\nDeployments of “political”As well as taking genealogical approaches\, scholars have considered instances of how the term “political” is deployed in ordinary language\, as well as how it is used strategically.\n\nFormat: workshop followed by PhD summer school\nThe workshop was held at the beautiful Old Aberdeen campus of the University of Aberdeen on Thursday 13th and Friday 14th June. Confirmed speakers included: \n\nShelley Budgeon is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Birmingham\, and specializes in gender and feminist theory. Her books include Third Wave Feminism and the Politics of Gender in Late Modernity (2011) and Choosing a Self: Young Women and the Individualization of Identity (2003)\nTimothy Fitzgerald was Reader in Religion at the University of Stirling. Among many other publications\, he has authored The Ideology of Religious Studies (2004) and co-edited Religion as a Category of Government and Sovereignty (2015)\nOliver Marchart is Professor of Political Theory at the University of Vienna. His books include Post-Foundational Political Thought (2007) and Thinking Antagonism (2018).\n\nAfter the workshop finished on Friday 14th\, most of the workshop speakers decamped with a select group of PhD students to The Burn\, a country house and estate near Aberdeen\, where we held the PhD summer school. We began by reflecting together on the workshop discussions and by participating in small-group discussions on a number of related readings\, before responding to presentations on the topic by the PhDs. There was also time to walk around the beautiful estate\, and to enjoy the company in the house. \n\nThis project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research & Innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 754326.
URL:https://cisrul.blog/event/conceptualizing-political/
CATEGORIES:Seminar,Workshop
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://cisrul.blog/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/abdn_campus.jpeg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20171020
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20171023
DTSTAMP:20260503T163442
CREATED:20210819T193453Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211027T093940Z
UID:10000074-1508457600-1508716799@cisrul.blog
SUMMARY:Civil Sphere and Radicalization
DESCRIPTION:HOSTED BY THE CENTRE FOR CITIZENSHIP\, CIVIL SOCIETY AND RULE OF LAW (CISRUL)\,\nUNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN\nFRIDAY 20TH – SUNDAY 22ND OCTOBER\, 2017\nCONFERENCE SUMMARY\nConstitutional democracies by definition afford a range of opportunities for political expression including protest. Why\, then\, do some movements choose to engage in more radical forms of protest\, such as civil disobedience\, hacktivism and jihadi terrorism\, and to what effect? Our conference will transform understanding of radical protest\, first by cross-fertilizing existing debates through comparing species of radical protest\, and second\, by explaining radical protest not only in terms of the perceived inadequacy of existing institutional channels for dissent\, but also and crucially\, drawing on Jeffrey Alexander’s The Civil Sphere\, in terms of the lack of response from the mainstream social movements which Alexander dubs the “civil sphere”. For Alexander\, Northern media’s response to Martin Luther King’s civil disobedience shows how civil spheres can respond sympathetically to radical protest\, recognizing a movement’s causes as “civil”.  Our speakers will focus on the role of established civil spheres in producing as well as responding to radical protest. \nTerms of participation in conference\nThere is no conference fee and lunches will be provided for all attendees. In return\, all attendees are expected to read in advance the draft conference papers. At the conference\, speakers will only give a 5-minute summary of their written papers\, leaving 55 minutes for discussion of each paper\, thus it is essential to have read the papers in advance. Non-speaker attendees should register with Eve Hayes de Kalaf as soon as possible in order to receive the draft papers. \nClick for the full conference program..
URL:https://cisrul.blog/event/civil-sphere-and-radicalization/
CATEGORIES:Conference,Guest Lecture
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://cisrul.blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/cisrul-logo.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20171018
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20171019
DTSTAMP:20260503T163442
CREATED:20210819T194003Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211027T094000Z
UID:10000076-1508284800-1508371199@cisrul.blog
SUMMARY:Iconic Objects and the New Middle Class
DESCRIPTION:Seminar by Professor Jeffrey Alexander (Yale)\n\n\n\n\nWed 18th October at 2-4 in EWF61\n\nWhat’s striking about the now-global discourse of “middle class” is that it references people who would once have been described\, not as middle\, but as working class. They are called “workers” and described as “hard working” and “struggling\,” whether or not they actually labor in manual occupations. The notion of buying things by choice rather than by necessity gets to the heart of the matter. To be in the new middle class is to be able to consume\, and this ability\, at least in the emerging economies\, has definitely been on the increase. In his book Africa Rising\, Vijay Mahajan discusses three Africas. Africa One is the small segment of earners who are on par with western earners. Africa Two is the middle class\, and Africa Three earn less than $2/ day. Crucially\, Africa Two is the largest: “In Africa Two\, we are talking about 300 to 500 million people\,” Mahajan writes. “They may not be rich\, but collectively they have immense buying power.”  “The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development estimates that the global middle class comprised 1.8 billion people in 2009. By 2020\, just 11 years later\, it will have grown to 3.2 billion”. How can we conceptualize such an elusive\, even counter-intuitive compound of relative poverty and discretionary wealth? Cultural sociology can provide some clarification. Clearly\, the new middle class is not just an objective economic status\, but also a symbolic structure\, a sign. Its signifiers reference income and consumption\, its signifieds are iconic objects. New middle class marks a position in the social structure that allows access to a certain conception of meaningful life\, one whose contours are shaped by the sensations of contact with powerfully expressive\, semiotically coded\, market-produced objects.
URL:https://cisrul.blog/event/iconic-objects-and-the-new-middle-class/
CATEGORIES:Guest Lecture,Workshop
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://cisrul.blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/jeffrey.jpeg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20170508
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20170512
DTSTAMP:20260503T163442
CREATED:20210819T193853Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211027T094151Z
UID:10000075-1494201600-1494547199@cisrul.blog
SUMMARY:CISRUL Lecture Series: Prof. William E. Connolly
DESCRIPTION:The Centre for Citizenship\, Civil Society & the Rule of Law (CISRUL) presents Prof. William E. Connolly\, Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University \n \n\n\n\nUniversity of Aberdeen 8-11 May 2017 \nIn a poll of American political theorists published in Political Science in 2010\, William E. Connolly was ranked the fourth most influential political theorist over the last twenty years\, after Rawls\, Habermas and Foucault. \nProf. Connolly has taught as a visiting professor at numerous schools including The University of Exeter\, European University Institute\, Oxford University\, and Boston College. He has been a Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study and the Stanford Center for Behavioral Studies. His book The Terms of Political Discourse won the Benjamin Evans Lippincott Award in 1999 and remains widely held to be a major work of political theory. He is co-moderator of the Blog ‘The Contemporary Condition’\, where he also posts regularly. \nProf. Connolly’s work focuses on the issues of pluralism\, capitalism\, inequality and imbrications between nonhuman\, self-organizing forces and contemporary life. His books include Why I Am Not A Secularist (1999); Pluralism (2005); A World of Becoming (2011); The Fragility of Things: Self-Organizing Systems\, Neoliberal Fantasies and Democratic Activism; and Facing the Planetary: Entangled Humanism and the Politics of Swarming (2017). His current work focuses on how to rethink freedom\, belonging and activism during the era of rapid climate warming. \n* For more information about this event\, please contact: Prof. Chris Brittain\, c.brittain@abdn.ac.uk Tel. (0)1224 272 374 or click here.
URL:https://cisrul.blog/event/cisrul-lecture-series-prof-william-e-connolly/
CATEGORIES:Guest Lecture
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://cisrul.blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/willliam-e-connelly.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20160606
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20160608
DTSTAMP:20260503T163442
CREATED:20210819T170308Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211027T094259Z
UID:10000043-1465171200-1465343999@cisrul.blog
SUMMARY:Radical Protest in Constitutional Democracy
DESCRIPTION:(FOLLOWED BY PHD SUMMER SCHOOL: WEDNESDAY 8 – THURSDAY 9 JUNE)\nProtest is a hallowed right within constitutional democracy\, allowing for political expression outside the electoral process and established public sphere channels such as the media. But to what extent and in what ways can and/or should constitutional democracy accommodate more radical forms of protest\, and particularly illegal forms? What do particular varieties of protest reveal (empirically and normatively) about the scope and limits of constitutional democracy? And how do organizations which use radical protest in a constitution relate to those which choose not to? These are some of the empirical and normative questions that we pose for the workshop. \nFOR MORE INFORMATION\, PLEASE VIEW THE RADICAL PROTEST WORKSHOP PROGRAMME.  
URL:https://cisrul.blog/event/radical-protest-in-constitutional-democracy/
CATEGORIES:Conference
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/jpeg:https://cisrul.blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/radicalprotest.jpeg
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20160527
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20160528
DTSTAMP:20260503T163442
CREATED:20210819T195354Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211027T094308Z
UID:10000003-1464307200-1464393599@cisrul.blog
SUMMARY:Political Community in Historical Perspectives
DESCRIPTION:Medieval and Early Modern\nWORKSHOP\nFRIDAY 27 MAY\, 9:00-18:00\nCraig Suite\, Floor 7\, Sir Duncan Rice Library \nSpeakers: Speakers include Professor Crawford Gribbon\, Dr Ian Campbell (both Queen’s University Belfast)\, Dr Clare Hawes (St Andrews) and Dr Christian Liddy (Durham) \nAn all-day workshop highlighting the historical developments and implications of political community. \nThis event is co-hosted by the Centre for Citizenship\, Civil Society and the Rule of Law (CISRUL) in cooperation with the Centre for Early Modern Studies (CEMS) by CISRUL Faculty member\, Chair of Early Modern History\, and Co-director of CEMS Karin Friedrich and CISRUL PhD candidate Alexander Crawford. This one-day workshop will debate political community with medieval and early modern historians.  Our guest speakers will highlight key theories for discussion. \nThe discussion will start with a focus on the volume entitled Political Community: The Idea of the Self-Governing People\, prepared by members of CISRUL. Previous workshops on the topic and the volume have had a contemporary focus\, but CISRUL would now like\, in partnership with the Centre for Early Modern Studies (CEMS)\, to include medieval and early modern historians in the debate. Not only will this broaden the empirical scope of the debates\, but it will enrich the theoretical approach\, since historians have arguably given more thought to political community than other disciplines. Meanwhile\, we expect that historians will find it valuable to debate and reflect on other approaches to the topic. \n\n\n\n\n 
URL:https://cisrul.blog/event/political-community-in-historical-perspectives/
CATEGORIES:Seminar,Workshop
ATTACH;FMTTYPE=image/png:https://cisrul.blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/political_community.png
END:VEVENT
BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20140624
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20140626
DTSTAMP:20260503T163442
CREATED:20210819T194710Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211027T094345Z
UID:10000080-1403568000-1403740799@cisrul.blog
SUMMARY:Political Community Workshop 2014
DESCRIPTION:Political Community:\nAuthority in the Name of Community\nhosted by the \nCentre for Citizenship\, Civil Society and Rule of Law (CISRUL) \nat the \nUniversity of Aberdeen \nTuesday 24-Wednesday 25 June 2014\nAcademic coordinator: Trevor Stack (t.stack@abdn.ac.uk) \nPlease join the online debate which followed the workshop.\nSpeakers (see below for summaries) included Margaret Somers\, Stephen Tierney\, Ajay Gudavarthy\, Gurpreet Mahajan\, Dejan Stjepanovic\, Chris Brittain\, Jan Kotowski\, Andreea Udrea\, Katinka Weber\, Rivke Jaffe\, Martijn Koster\, Marc Kruman\, Balazs Majtenyi\, David Thunder and Camille Walsh. \nFollowing our successful Political Community workshop in June 2013 (summaries) CISRUL held a second workshop on Political Community in June 2014. We had confirmed in the 2013 workshop that the term “political community” was appropriate for identifying a core set of issues that interest us at CISRUL\, even though it was evident that no term will ever carry all the right connotations and none of the wrong ones. Our use of the term is explained in the opening statements by Trevor Stack and Matyas Bodig (see below). \nSpeakers presented on Scotland\, Netherlands\, Hungary and SE Europe\, USA\, Bolivia\, Jamaica and India\, as well as on political community in philosophy\, post-colonial studies\, and constitutional and international law. \nTuesday 24th June\nIntroduction – Why “political community” now?\nTrevor Stack\nA. What proposing to study under rubric of “political community” \n1. Suggest take “political” to mean relations or structures of authority and especially those that are somehow institutionalised\, or stabilised \n2. Anthropologists\, archaeologists\, historians have found vast array of relations of authority across human societies\, but we suggest taking “political community” to mean a particular relation of authority \n> political community is one \na. whose members feel somehow represented within its structures of authority \n> some kind of “vertical” representation \nb. though also feel somehow obliged to their fellow-members to follow authority’s norms and accept its decisions \n> some kind of “horizontal” obligation \nB. We are open to debate on every aspect of authority in name of community of members actually works \n1. Been having debates about \na. representation e.g. “crisis of representation” \nb. some discussion  about horizontal or mutual obligation between members \n2.  We also acknowledge that both “relations or structures of authority” and “membership of community” can take many different forms \n3. Under rubric of “community of members”\, we are interested in \na. nations as the (arguably) paramount political communities of the contemporary world \nb. but also interested in possibility of other forms of political community e.g. indigenous communities\, municipalities\, churches etc. \nC. We proposed in workshop blurb\, following discussion last year\, that we… \n1. Reserve the term “political community” for those that claim to be in some sense self-standing\, and to exercise broad-ranging authority over much of what we do \n2. Use instead term political collectives for entities such as trade unions or churches or football clubs which \na. …are also communities of members\, often with some kind of vertical structures of representation and horizontal obligation \nb. yet in an important sense are different from nations\, for example\, in that they see themselves as players in a broader political community \n3. Though useful to make distinction\, still very much interested in \na. how authority is exercised internally in the name of members of such entities \nb. as well as in how they position themselves in relation to the political communities that host them \nMatyas Bodig\nConvergence between CISRUL members \n\nPolitical communities related to institutions that claim particular kinds of authority\nRelations of membership: mutual responsibility or ethical integration\n\nAt 2013 workshop spoke much about vertical representation but less about horizontal ties \nWhen deal with concept\, soon glimpse darker side: political community is not essentially inclusive but built on contrast between members and non-members > those who not represented by political institutions \n\nhow to develop concept so not guise for oppression covered by democratic ideology?\nalso to avoid essentialising community of political community? important to stress\n\ncontestation of membership and its boundaries\, as well as responsibilities implied in membership and\ndialectic relationship between institutions and community that claim to represent > not that community there to begin with but constituted in process\n\n\n\nContexts in which important \n\nReferendum\nCrisis of representation > may need new imagery of political community\, or come up with different idea e.g. multitude – generates itself and without institutional scaffolding\n\nMB own interest: how term “people” figures in international law \n\nFinding solid conceptual ground for normative development\n\nDiscussion\nDejan: UK already embedded in EU – is this political community? \n> MB Scotland is political community embedded in UK political community: if Referendum succeeds\, will lose this duality \nAndreea: elaborate on ethical integration? \n> MB comes from Dworkin: responsibility to fellow members and belief that institutions making decisions in your name \nHanifi: how do we reconcile membership\, mutual benefit\, etc. with essentialism and exclusion? \n> MB duality of integration and exclusion is fundamental to all community\, including family – owe family members loyalty to those outside community > tends to create status equality inside (e.g. Hungarian nobility in early modern) but hierarchical from outside (nobility ever more oppressive) \nChris: relationship between vertical and horizontal? \n> MB what owe to fellow members is linked to institutional force – complying with common laws that were authenticated by institutions \nCamille: in relation to vertical representation – members should feel somehow represented? but how about those who don’t feel represented? \n> TS always contestation of representative claims of institutions – this is key to political community \nDavid Thunder: political community would be encompassing – over many domains > but does this not beg question? multiple centres of authority e.g. just as national\, international\, regional law\, could not be differentiated and exercised by different institutions \n> TS yes always criss-crossing authority and may be also true of authority in name of communities of members – as my example of Mexican municipalities\, may be embedded within each other and overlapping \n> MB typically there has always been authority that claims to be ultimate and takes ultimate responsibility \nAndrea Teti \n\nuseful to distinguish between resistance against and in system – accepted relations of contestation\nnot just formal conditions but also substantive conditions including material that allow authorities to do their job\n\nChuck \n\ndifferent people within community have different relations to each other > not just matter of who is inside and who is outside – key question is who decides\n\nMargaret: how did CISRUL get from concepts in world to heuristic use of concepts – what happens when patently in opposition? e.g. recent work by Paige et al. that in US Congress little effective representation of anyone except 10% elite \n> MB institutions claim to be representative – institutions develop to ensure that this is in fact the case e.g. Congress system – in US though strong claims that “our” Constitution etc. \nNigel \n\nMay be forms of exclusion that are positive and others that negative\nIs ethical integration good term or risks of too strong integration?\n\nPolitical Community in Context: Scotland\nStephen Tierney “The Constitution of an Independent Scotland: A Retreat from Politics?”\nAbstract: This paper will give a brief introduction to the Referendum process\, before looking at the Scottish Government’s proposal of a written constitution for an independent Scotland. That a written constitution would provide overarching authority for the parliament and government of an independent Scotland\, as well as a detailed list of citizens’ rights\, has been a long-standing commitment of the SNP. The detail of this proposal has gradually been elaborated in the course of the referendum campaign\, culminating in a draft Scottish Independence Bill\, unveiled on 16 June 2014 in an address by Nicola Sturgeon\, Deputy First Minister to the Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law. I will set out the background to this proposal\, look at the terms of the proposed interim constitution contained within the Scottish Independence Bill (‘the SIB’)\, and consider the process by which it a permanent constitution might be drafted. I will conclude by asking whether highly elaborate and detailed constitutions are really needed in a healthy parliamentary democracy\, or whether in fact an independent Scotland would be better served by an open political process in which important decisions are left to parliament or to citizens acting directly in referendums. \nIn previous book\, noted that democracy theory objects to referendums because \n\nElite control – more easily manipulated than electoral\nNot deliberative – aggregating pre-formed wills\nPathology of majoritarian decisions\n\nFinds that problems of practice rather than principle > can overcome through institutional design \ne.g. law: can take out elite control through determining \n\nwho sets out issue\, question\nindependent oversight\ncampaign finance\ncitizen assemblies etc.\n\nWhat harder is minority rights and especially in deeply divided\, e.g. Belfast – earlier Referendum Republicans refused to take part which was disaster\, but better in 1998 > essential to get Referendum right (similarly in Bosnia) \nAbout Scottish Referendum\, there is process people can trust in such that people will agree to even if not with \nAbout Interim Constitution\, paradoxical that rush to produce detailed Constitution putting all sorts of issues (incl. healthcare etc.) beyond reach of deliberation\, effectively handing all of this to judges \n> 3 demoi \n\nPeople\nGovernment\nJudges\n\nDiscussion\nDavid Thunder: what criteria should guide what should be in Constitution? \n> ST should be democracy-enabling and facilitating – but should not put policy choices based on current values\, including human rights (which are effectively civil privileges)\, within Constitutions \nGurpreet: though danger with judges\, important to protect rights for diverse groups for people\, needs constitutional mechanism \n> ST speaking primarily about Scotland which not divided society – need for more constitutional detail when deeply divided\, though even rights should still be open for debate \nAdam Fusco: need some precondition of social justice\, to avoid powerful political actors setting agenda e.g. in Scotland\, might be appropriate to write in welfare etc. in Constitution for first 10-15 years \n> ST but seems curious to give people vote in Referendum but then not on these other issues: clarifies that not against these values but thinks should be open to debate \nChristopher Brittain “Political Community and the Bonds of Love: Theology and Scottish Nationalism”\nAbstract: Scholarly writing on nationalism frequently makes much of two important considerations. The first concern highlights the fact that nationalism has a tendency to encompass powerful emotions\, and is both dangerous and valuable for that very fact. Such a consideration focuses on nationalism as an expression of profound attachment to the communities of which individuals are a part. The second concern points to the reliance of political collectives on shared symbols and images to represent their ‘imagined community’.  This dimension raises questions about the foundation for such symbolic representations\, and the extent to which they neglect diversity and difference within the community. This paper explores these issues as they emerge in the thought of Christian theologians writing on the issue of Scottish independence.  Contemporary Christian theology is frequently suspicious and critical of nationalism and patriotic sentiment for both historic (post-Christendom) and theological reasons.  This makes it all the more curious to observe how prominent the ‘Scottish question’ is among some Scottish theologians\, and how engaged contemporary Scottish churches are in the lead-up to the referendum of September 2014. An analysis of theological writing on Scottish independence helps illuminate how key elements (emotional\, aspirational\, historical) fuel passions that may well be an inherent element of any substantive expression of ‘political community’. \nSince WWII\, churches suspicious of nationalism and 1979 Scottish Independence denounced by Scottish theologian\, but now being debated within church \nInterest in what happens when structures of authority challenged by national identity \nDefinitions of nation \n\nHistoric: Ethnic etc. identity\nPolitical (which seems more closely aligned to “political community”): here draws on Quebecois Catholic theologian Gramezon on Quebecois nationalism – critical of early wave but in 1960s shift from historical to political nationalism (popular sovereignty\, self determination) which is rational and moral agenda\n\nIn Scotland similar shift from historic to political (issues incl. immigration policy\, anti-nuclear etc.) but elements of historical nationalism not far from surface \nSimilarly\, in churches’ debate: tendency among church leaders to stress political ethos in Scotland which claimed different to shallower ethos in England \n\nDoug Gay: ethical nationalism\, cleaned of dark side of nationalism > Independence could allow common objects of love that currently stifled in UK\nAssumption of different political culture: objects of love not phrased in terms of ethnicity but yet of different “moral and religious culture”\, which arguably reintroduce historic nationalism\n\nChurches’ version of nationalism has often depended on how can influence government \ne.g. Free Church has urged members to vote No because Christian churches currently privileged in Scotland and might lose this in independent Scotland\, being written out of Constitution \n> tend to share presupposition of difference between Scottish and English ethos – here in terms of place given to churches \nQuotes other theologian Jacobs: admits danger in emotive aspects of nationalism (which echoed in CISRUL’s rubric for “political community” – “one whose members feel somehow represented”) \n> how to avoid emotive aspects which can construct borders \nNadia Kiwan\, Rachel Shanks and Trevor Stack “Schooling in Political Community”\nAbstract: We will report on CISRUL’s collaborative project to gauge what we are calling “political community” in schools in the Aberdeen region. For the purposes of the project\, we understand “political” in terms relations of authority and especially how these are institutionalised (or stabilised); “political community” is a particular relation of authority – authority is exercised in name of some kind of community. Through focus group discussion among 16 and 17 year old pupils\, we set out to a) construct a profile of the relations of authority in the lives of the pupils\, both in and beyond school\, and b) determine to what extent pupils justified those relations of authority on the grounds they felt represented as members of community. We included questions about voting in the Scottish Independence referendum – the voting age was lowered from 18 to 16 for the 18 September 2014 poll. Our provisional conclusions are as follows: \n\nBeyond parents\, pupils associate rules and authority primarily with schools (before government\, police and employers)\, at least a third feel they could at least potentially have a say in school rules\, while several say that they owe it to teachers to obey the rules (vertical obligation) though often qualifying this with a fear of consequences if they do not follow the rules.\nAfter schools (and family) pupils view government\, police and employers as authorities in their lives\, but don’t feel represented by MPs or MSPs or have much of a say in anything\, although they do say rules outside school are more binding (while school is good training for learning to obey) and some feel obliged to others (vertical and horizontal) to obey rules and authority outside school.\nAbout voting in Referendum\, most agree that non-temporary residence in Scotland should make eligible and most intend to vote because they feel it will affect their (individual) futures\, while in terms of age\, only a few share critics’ fears that 16/17 year olds will be unduly influenced or uninformed and most feel confident of knowing what to vote\, although many don’t yet feel sufficiently informed and look especially to schools to help.\n\nClick for the Powerpoint slides. \nDiscussion\nJan Kotowski: does theologians’ distinction correspond to civic versus ethnic nationalism? \nMichael Keating: not exclusion that controversial but criteria for it\, and culture doesn’t have to be primordial but constructed through as basis for public sphere \n\ncounterfactual tends to be other national project rather than cosmopolitanism\, in this case English project\ntypically appeal is to universal values\, starting with US constitution\, but being repackaged\n\n> CB agrees that culture in itself not problem but how becomes essentialised? in case of Gaelic\, for example\, curious that goes on signs in Aberdeenshire instead of Doric \nGurpreet Mahajan \n\nto NK et al.: schools are way in which we initiate people into political community in that learn to obey authority\, therefore if fear of punishment or cost of disobeying\, can’t be good training ground into political community > best not to assume that really being initiated into political community?\n\n\nto CB: in relation to Quebecois\, why not separate “cultural” of shared way of life from deeper “historical”\n\n> CB queries whether distinction between them is useful \nShira: phrasing of Referendums can be extremely manipulative \n> ST agrees e.g. under de Gaulle \nMartijn Koster: realizes that political community closely related to debates on sovereignty (despite Foucault: we still act as though there were sovereign) \nDavid Thunder: seems problematic to ground political community in national identity\, e.g. conscious effort in Basque Country to inculcate Basque values in schools etc. \nCanglong Wang: contradiction between homogenised emotional process and disparity of emotions e.g. in China: nationalised “Chinese dream” which government urges on individual Chinese\, but oppressing disparity of emotions and experiences in different Chinese lives \n> CB political nationalism gets away from cultural nationalism by highlighting deliberation \nMargaret Somers: referenda in state of Michigan \n\nAnti-affirmative action referendum: many understood as pro-affirmative action but in fact Right has taken over civil rights language of colour blindness\nFinancial managers appointed in cities that bankrupt: referendum against this which successful\, but Republican legislature tweaked bill and re-passed new bill with coda that may not be subjected to future referenda > corrupting attempt at resistance\n\n> ST doing direct democracy in very cold climate \nMatyas Bodig to ST: about constitution making after Referendum \n\nshares concerns about what putting beyond deliberation\, but also necessary to have constitutional framework in place quickly\, though could have temporary constitution in South African style\nin relation to human rights (which ST said would not include)\, MB insists that articulate minimum content of membership in political community\, systematic violation of which would lead to breaking moral [?] ties between government and citizens > defines where we stand in relation to each other and government\, ensuring there can be ethical integration\n\n> ST yes important to have framework e.g. that prisoners can vote (which in US excludes 20% of young black males) and proposes minimalist package of civil liberties (vote\, criminal justice)\, but other things should be left open to political debate; and how possible to enforce right to healthcare etc.? \nAndrea Teti \n\nto MB: just talking about civic and political rights?\nto ST: civil and political rights often used to marginalise and exclude\, but we don’t dismiss as easily as social and economic\n\n> ST civil and political are within realm of what judges can do \nKatinka Weber: did schools project ask about community? \n> RS preferred not to include in questionnaire\, but schools were homogenous in terms of ethnicity \nPolitical Community in Context: USA\nMarc Kruman “Race\, Property and Gender in the Early U.S. Republic: Reconfiguring the American Political Community”\nAbstract: Historians of the emerging political community in post-Revolutionary America traditionally have depicted a linear progression from a political community composed of white propertied men to all white men. This account is partially accurate of course. Property as a marker distinguishing white men did erode in the half century after independence. But the story was far more complicated. In my presentation\, if it is accepted\, I will examine how and why property as a qualifier for membership in the political community began to disappear much sooner than suggested by scholars and how and why a racist democracy emerged later than is usually posited. I will examine the ways in which changing understandings of representation—in particular the idea that broad political participation was essential to protect the citizenry from a potentially dangerous government–    helped to reconfigure the American political community from a hierarchy of property to a hierarchy of race and gender. I will conclude with a discussion of how Alexis de Tocqueville sought to solve the problems caused by a broad (if still delimited) democracy. If civic virtue rested in the propertied at the onset of the Revolution\, by the mid-nineteenth century all white males were deemed worthy participants in public life. How could political community be secured in the face the centrifugal forces unleashed by a broad democracy? \nIn US transition from property holders to race rather than wealth which opened up participation for women \nIn 1831 citizens of Newboro\, NC wrote letter complaining of free black men voting in local elections \n\nthey used to dominate local trade as ship captains\, and vote solicited since held balance\nletter writers argue that founders couldn’t have intended to empower blacks\, arguing that only whites had been allowed to vote\n\nBy 1850s hard to imagine that anyone could ever in 1830s have defended black suffrage \n> Revolution different to what gave birth to in end: \n\nbegan with classical republican thought – economic independence freeing men to act for public good and giving stake in society’s well-being\, but…\nimperial authorities argued that acted for good of empire even if those outside Britain voted\, i.e. that political community\, but not kind that US colonists embraced\n\nmade right to vote primary issue for full membership\n\n\n\n\nshift from property as measure of personal independence to allowing all tax payers to vote for all or some elected officials\, thus no longer economic independence\, instead citizens needing right to vote to protect against oppression of rapacious assembly\n\nThus only if assumed that representatives will represent you\, don’t need to constrain them\, but if create interest apart from you\, need to place constraints on what could or could not do \n\npresumed loyalty was marker\, and Revolution tends to privilege loyalty to cause – thus women voting in New Jersey (in 1790 NJ refers to voters as he and she)\, militiamen including 16 year olds had right to vote > “opening up Pandora’s Box”\ntypically when women or free blacks then began to influence outcome of election\, they get disfranchised > racist democracy in North as well as in South\n\nPolitical community is malleable > what discuss as normative needs to be historically contextualised \nMargaret Somers “A Political Community—Divided?”\nAbstract: If defined as “one whose members have a shared stake in political institutions and\, for that reason\, subject themselves to the norms and decisions of those institutions\,” what is the theoretical\, political\, or sociological question to which political community is the answer?  Does its implication that there is a unified normative political order adhered to by a body of members serve as a historical counterfactual to the fact that in the U.S. over the last four decades there has been the largest transfer of wealth\, income\, and public resources from middle and low income sectors to the upper-most echelons of the top 1% (which captured 95% of all gains in economic growth from 2009 to 2012)?  The concept sits uneasily with the reality that it has not been a return to “free markets” or deregulation that has generated what Picketty dubs the rise of a new patrimonial capitalism and its yawning gaps of inequality. Rather it has been deliberate government policies that have built this ever-widening divide by coddling investments and punishing wages\, starving public goods\, and undermining the meager citizenship rights of the social state—all in the work of steadily moving wealth upward. And if a political community entails a culture of shared stake holding\, and a collective willingness of its members to mutually “subject themselves” to its rules–i.e. give up a degree of autonomy and freedom for the sake of the whole—then how do we reconcile that desiderata with what Pope Francis in his recent apostolic exhortation calls “An economy of exclusion\,” which he tells us is “no longer…about exploitation and oppression…[T]hose excluded are no longer society’s underside or its fringes or its disenfranchised—they are no longer even a part of it. The excluded are …the outcast\, the ‘leftovers’.”  As products of the “killing fields of inequality” (Therborn)\, these undeserving poor are not recognized as moral equals\, and so are excluded from membership in any community or nation\, and even from human fellowship itself. No longer subjects of empathy\, the socially excluded are a surplus population\, forced to exist entirely outside of any even notional political community\, and with the exception of the police and the criminal law\, outside of contact with and access to the very political institutions that define a community.  As the “internally stateless\,” they are not just unnecessary and disposable; they are inconvenient aggravants.  Their existence poses no moral friction against policies that withhold health care (Medicaid)\, eradicate food stamps\, eliminate unemployment benefits\, and legislate the unconstitutionality of the minimum wage. Critics of these socio-economic realities attribute it to the rise of unfettered free markets and deregulation. But money\, like water\, does not flow upward; these sociological accomplishments have been actively achieved by political practices and institutions that serve no “community” but a narrow patrimonial elite. These observations raise deep questions about the sociological meaning of a political community with any “shared stakes” or mutually recognized political authority.  Perhaps there is an alternative conception of political community that can be mobilized as a countervailing power to this divisive engine of inequality? \nSkepticism vs. “political community” as defined here \n1. False universality of vertical integration > certainly not case in US: maybe shared norms but not mutual stake-holding > explicit mechanisms of exclusion\, not just accidental \n2. Site of horizontal naturalised relations: typically now in “social capital” churches etc. \n3. Absence of rights in definition \nPope Francis: argues complete exclusion (shows slide of exclusion in New Orleans: floating body) \n> argued in New Atlantic article that Pope owes to Polanyi rather than Marx \nPolanyi: self-regulating society is utopic for several reasons: \n1. Assumptions of market fundamentalists of self-regulating entity stem from “social naturalism” in Hobbes and then through Joseph Townsend to Malthus – social organisation operates on laws of Nature\, with humans are biological rather than moral being \n> Polanyi: market fundamentalism requires social naturalism as ontology > social exclusion justified in terms of pre-political undistorted state: distribution of resources \nHayek: market society must be treated as natural state of mankind \n2. Because impossible – economy dependent on social engineering… \n3. …by political power: markets enormously increase range of government regulation > not just infrastructure but land\, labour are only possible through government intervention \nMassive redistribution of wealth and income since 70s which is not natural workings but deliberate government policy \n> free market capitalism not about free markets but transferring upward through policy etc. \nThough “deregulation” is coded as return to natural outcomes > but deregulation is in fact policy to transfer wealth upwards\, while “regulation” is improving conditions for middle and lower classes \nEnd of power of social state and social citizenship\, not end of power at such – world without public goods\, which are criteria for membership in any community\, which have as their correlative rights giving protection from state commodification \nMarshall: it is only access to public goods that make us recognizable to each other as citizens > this is why health care etc. are social rights \nZones of right-lessness – show slide of black man with child faced by National Guard in New Orleans: though FEMA took days\, NG there within hours \n> human rights never frees from police and army \nProblems with CISRUL definition of political community: \n\nFalse universality: no vertical integration\nNot autonomous markets but directed\n\n> MS preferred definition: civil society and communities in alliance with social state\, turning communities into sites of rights bearing citizens (to dismay of communitarians)\, requiring Power of social state\, rights and institutions \nJan Michael Kotowski “A Territorialization of U.S. National Identity? The Politics and Discourses of the U.S.-Mexico Border”\nAbstract:  The Obama administration has not only not reversed the decade-old militarization of the US-Mexico border\, but instead heavily increased spending on so-called “border security” and immigration enforcement. This paper aims to describe and analyze the interplay between the seemingly never-ending policies of intensified immigration enforcement (even within frameworks of “comprehensive immigration reform”) and broader public discourses centered on the southern border. It shall be argued that the border with Mexico has become the chief manifestation of a territorialization of U.S. national identity\, meaning that the rather abstract ideological aspects of the complex U.S. national identity formation have become concretized through a territorial dimension. Furthermore\, within the self-proclaimed American “nation of immigrants\,” the territorialization of the border is accompanied by racialized discourses of “Mexican otherness” that attempt to keep certain aliens excluded from the socio-political community of the United States. This “identity shift” can be seen not only in the political willingness to actually fortify the border\, but also in various public discourses\, ranging from talk-radio to TV series such as “Border Wars” and\, of course\, political rhetoric from various political alliances and lobby groups. The proposed paper will commence with a theoretical discussion of the relationship between borders\, political community\, and national identity and include an empirical part focused on current discourses of “border security.” \nMilitarization of border leads to territorialisation of US identity in past 25 years – adds to repertoire of US identity \n> legitimizes deeply exclusionary citizenship practices though concretization of “the law” into political category\, with border as faultline of this discourse\, making clear to Americans who can rightfully belong to political and national community \nTwo sides of US Immigration discourse \n\nNation of immigrants\nExclusivity\n\n> but Roger Smith: not distinct but have developed together (Honig: nationalist xenophilia produces xenophobia at same time) \nImmigrant policy: \n\nonly seen enforcement with doubled budget in 10 years\, increase in border guards and border fence extending across most of border except Rio Grande\nbut Republicans claim border still not secure in order to stymie CIR\, even if in fact reversed border flow\nmeanwhile 1994-2009 5607 migrants died in border acc. to SRA\nthus year 50K+ minors have tried to enter and held in legal limbo of detention centres\, unclear whether can stay or will be deported\n\nCultural manifestations e.g. “Borders Wars” on National Geog showing Border Patrol catching illegals \nKaufman optical model: Referent > Ideological lens > Symbolic resources > National image \n> is territory the referent? Or is it symbolic resource that needs to be defended by state? \nConclusion \n\nFortified border concretizes eligible political community\, including in voluntary terms – choosing not to break law\nGiven that US citizenship tied to abstract notion of “law”\, seemingly stable\, works to articulate boundary between legal and illegal\nInside and outside heavily racilsied but appear as natural outcomes of enforcing law: Latino underclass seen through lens of law\, especially at time of “color blindness”\n\nDiscussion\nST: territory was in 19th century always important like Euro nation-state e.g.US-Mexico\, Louisiana Purchase \n> JK in 20th century territory becomes secondary [or that diff notions of territory] \n> MK agrees important in 19th century though agrees that receded \n> MS argues that Republicans in 1980s aggregated conservative Evangelicals with Wall Street etc. combining anti-abortion etc. with tax cuts for rich; but also deeper liberal-Anglo anti-statism despite conflation with drug-seeking dog stat \n>> ST political mobilization has tended to play key role and often against Supreme Court – it seems that Constitution is no solution \nDavid Thunder \n\nTo MS “community” can still be aspirational even if  not actual\nTo JK referent it created by ideological lens\, not just filtered through it > dialectical process: perhaps referent is simply “we” or “our community”\n\nAjay: in global South seems different story\, at heart of neoliberal era\, massive expansion of rights discourse and welfare programmes etc. > capitalism is justifying itself in terms of public goods in compensation\, including for primitive accumulation \nJames King: \n\ndoes “homeland” (Homeland Security) mean different sense of territory?\nalso UK Border Force programme that’s looking for drugs\, immigrants\, etc.\n\nJMK: IRCA started fortification but only later that criminalisation of immigration \n\nthough MK there is counter-narrative to criminalisation: it is politically contested\n\nMK queries Ajay’s comment that different narrative in global South – treatment of minorities that extraordinarily exploitative socio-economic system\, e.g. recent documentary on leather-workers in India \n> MS – finds case of India to be anomalous\, giving example of Pinochet ending social welfare \nGurpreet: if political community undertakes task of redistribution and rights of people\, then need JMK’s boundaries around it? \n> JMK agrees\, giving ex. of left-wing anti-immigration who want to keep resources for own people \nNigel: deregulation especially in international sphere\, e.g. WTO\, and tax havens are regulated in favour of wealth \nDejan: is racist democracy since 1850s just US phenomenon? \nPablo Marshall to MS: suspicious about possibilities of rebelling against universality\, rather than ideal political community \n> MS doesn’t want to discard universality: UDHR is full of socioeconom rights is universal aspirational document\, problem is Republicans trying to condition \nJames King: liked internal statelessness – is this just experience of racialised underclass? \n? liberals would argue that don’t need stake in power but only to be protected\, e.g. women don’t need in own right but to be protected by men \nPolitical Community in Context: India\nGurpreet Mahajan “Ideas of Political Community: A Contextual Exploration”\nAbstract: Although the concept of political community has a long history\, going back to ancient Greece\, its meaning has to be understood contextually. In the modern world\, the idea of political community was employed by Hegel to suggest that the state may possess legal authority but it gains legitimacy only when the subjective will of the citizens coincides with the objective law. Since then the notion of political community has been employed to argue that a sense of being a community is necessary to hold the members together; in fact\, without it the state cannot perform its essential functions or create the conditions necessary for good life. Yet\, the notion of political community that emerged as a critique of the Weberian and liberal conceptions of the state had the possibility of furthering cultural majoritarianism.  It was to minimize this risk that the republicans argued that members of a political community would share only commitment to a set of political ideals or values\, perhaps in the form that they are enshrined in the constitution of that polity. The case of the indigenous people in North America reveals that even this understanding can be a source of disadvantage for the minorities; but the point I wish to emphasize here is that this conception of political community\, with its universalist assumptions\, accounts for many of the difficulties that western democracies are today confronting while dealing with the concerns of minorities in their society. A comparison with India would highlight this even more sharply. From the struggle for political freedom to her journey after independence\, the political leadership in India was keen to nurture a political community but they were mindful of the possibility of it expressing the cultural ethos of the majority. Hence they constructed a new cultural narrative of peaceful co-existence of communities and a syncretic tradition. This was supplemented by a historical narrative comprising of a positive representation of different communities. It is this that made the public sphere more diverse and allowed for legal pluralism. While the Indian framework is not without its limitations it seems that even the republican conception of political community needs to be supplemented by such strategies of representation to accommodate minorities on equal terms. Unlike democracies in the west India did not\, however\, reflect on the nature of ties that bind citizens together. This space was occupied by social\, ascribed communities. It was easy to lapse into a situation where citizens began to relate to each other as members of different communities – a trend that has since taken deep roots in the functioning of its electoral democracy. \nHegel: political community involves people with set of institutions taking decisions about governing selves\, but also political community in which institutions don’t just exercise authority but seen as legitimate\, such that we feel realized as free\, self-determining individuals > what this means will is not fixed idea but will inevitably shift… legitimacy for Hegel is when voluntarily submit yourself to what law says\, because you think that does represent what doing yourselves \nIndia: aspiration to be seen as political community – something that have to achieve: sees itself as political community in making \n> in struggle against colonial powers\, sense of making of political community\, though not without internal dissent: different opinions across religious and caste lines \nKey moment at which get together and deliberate about shared aspirations > making constitutions is key process: in many contexts doesn’t get accepted\, so achievement when come to consensus and give themselves constitution\, giving basic structure of what polity will be \nWhat allowed consensus and what sustained it? \n\nElement of representation: India conscious that going to political community but with many communities within it\, which should all be represented – though never quite achieved\, what crucial is effort to move in this direction\n\n> Representational moment gives stake in political community\, important in nurturing and sustaining consensus \n\nBut needs to be nurtured and sustained > need to bring stronger notions of sharing: how to do without alienating some groups and other?\n\nConsensus has held well despite many challenges from groups\, since involvement in electoral process – you can influence outcome\, therefore gives people stake even when being pushed to peripheries \nAs soon as political community\, other forms of community and belonging come in\, strengthening ethnic bonds etc. which are in tension with political community\, but pushes to build ways in which different groups are involved in process \nAjay Gudavarthy “Invoking Community and Imposing Authority”\nAbstract:  Community is central to the way authority is imagined in India. There is a palpable tension between the way an idea of cultural/political community\, around caste\, religion\, ethnicity and region is invoked\, as against the understanding that in a democracy authority is truly `secular` when it moves beyond community and imagines the process as an interaction between individual-citizen and the political process or one that is trans-sectional\, rather than an enclosed community. This tension will be mapped through a debate around: \n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nthe (il)legitimacy of the practice of following what is referred to as `vote-bank` politics vis-a-vis religious minorities\, especially the Muslims\, as against the rational/informed choice made by the `general` electorate.\nSimilarly\, there is a tension between mobilizing identity and the need to move towards post-identity and post-ideology mobilization around development and governance.\nWith regard to caste\, there is a tension between caste-based parties\, and caste-based policies such as the affirmative action policies (referred to as reservations in India) and the need to have an affirmative action policies on the basis of economic (class) criterion.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nThe paper will look at the either side of the divide\, those for invoking the idea of entrenched community (essentially kinship-based) to mobilise the subaltern against the majoritarian and hegemonic power of the dominant groups on the state\,as against those opposed to the idea as this kind of community-based mobilisation is leading to weaker citizenship-rights and entrenched psyche that is resulting\, not in questioning the dominant authority but spurt in intra-subaltern conflicts. \nTension between ascriptive and civic community on other\, for long time\, but now reaching dead end \n> India now going toward majoritarian turn\, using language of civic solidarity and community (??)\, in as multiculturalist positions etc. getting exhausted \nBut post-colonial: intrinsic\, hidden resources within ascriptive communities\, which can make for civic community\, even when demanding special status etc. \nWhy doesn’t ascriptive vs. civic get resolved? \nTwo case studies \n1. Survey of Muslims in recent election when Muslim candidates not returned \n\nMuslims interviewed say that the more political representation\, the more problems will face > they say only want tickets when have majority and can vote en bloque\nHindu majority looks at as vote bank politics\, which weakening project of citizenship\, polarising along communal lines\, rather than “pseudo-secular” discourse of appeasing Muslims as minority\nMuslims interviewed by saying that when Hindus vote in block called secular while when Muslims vote in block called communal; and saying that Hindus will not vote for Muslim candidates\, nor Dalit candidates\n\no   Slogan: “justice for all\, appeasement of none” \n2. Defeat of post-colonial myth of ascriptive communities becoming included and transforming\, instead reproducing themselves \n\nin fact what produces is new social elites among Dalits and Muslims\, e.g. urban Dalits dropping discourse of land reform\, now instead affirmative action policies\nPatron-client relations (?)\nIntra-subaltern conflicts e.g. within Dalits\, between OBCs and Muslims\, etc. etc. now seems to replace conflict with upper castes etc.\n\n3. Affirmative action: opponents argue to move away from caste to class-based reservations in order to break old caste barriers \n\nThis is in Constitution though eventually decided that backward classes were backward castes\, so comes full circle\nNow all caste groups want to be recognized as backward\, disputing among themselves\, and Jat landed elite get declared backward by Congress\, because shift from status hierarchy to share in state resources\n\n> as ascriptive communities becoming internally fragmented\, now more attracted toward majoritarian civic solidarity\, not just for middle and upper class\, but for subaltern \n\nespecially since all castes are both oppressed and oppressors\n\nWhereas elsewhere\, turn toward difference in recent years\, this was starting point in India: India doesn’t have comfortable language\, which is where both liberal and post-colonial literatures have gone wrong\, thus need for new political language in India \nDiscussion\nHanifi for GM: she says representation is important for reaching consensus\, while Ajay sees ascriptive based representation creates new elites – how can consensus between elites help sort out our problems in political community? \n> GM tension exists – fact that is representation does help to assert symbolically that political community exists: even if elite representatives don’t speak for you all the time\, will do so at particular moment e.g. on land reform \nChuck: seems parallel to US in that Voting Rights Act meant to protect ability to vote en masse\, though SC argues that this just encourages voting along those lines\, proposing that not to use race to categorise votes \n> AG some similarities but in India argument has been that use caste to fight caste \nDavid Thunder: on ascriptive vs. civic\, sometimes only way communities can negotiate interests is by acting as community\, though liberal ethos that have rights as individuals \n> AG not being replaced by individualism even though groups or communities no longer stable \nRitu Vij \n\nfor GM often argued that Hegelian leads to communitarian notion but for Hegel this is also aspiration or end of history – but politics of Hegelian can only be status politics\, while Jean-Luc Nancy develops community in anti-statist understanding of politics\nfor AG\, may be that turn in India from caste to class? i.e. shift in capitalism\n\n> AG yes agrees that possible \nMartijn Koster: Are Muslims voting for Hindu candidates in return for resources? If so would Hindus vote for Muslims? \n> AG yes\, post-colonials feel that outside contract etc. but in fact often contractual negotiation\, despite language of good governance and development which stigmatises identity politics\, using  sheer numbers of voters as bargaining power; can include simply being promised protection e.g. from eviction of slums from “illegal” land \nRivke: Though can be Hindu and Indian\, seems not possible to be Muslim and Indian: are these competing? \n> GM yes\, majoritarian groups may put pressure to prove themselves as loyal citizens\, while Muslims and others may demand more than just recognition or symbolic presence \n> AG demanding place for inclusion e.g. through reservation and other claims\, also stigmatises and degrades (i.e. it is possible to make demands as Muslims but this degrades you in sphere of civil society) \nNigel: To GM\, Amartya Sen proposed if that have multiple identities\, less likely to be essentialist about single one \n> GM Constitution gives space for multiple identities\, esp. religious\, caste and class \nRaul Acosta: sometimes sounds like dichotomising community and individual\, though Ajay argues that turn away from ascriptive to communities but not toward individual – Raul quotes anthropologist in Africa who make virtue of dependence on others\, stressing sociality and need to act together \n> AG loosening of kinship ties but not clear where constructed communities will go \nKatinka Weber: possible that overlapping communities whereby inclining to local communities for certain issues and national community for others \n> GM yes\, and there are times when national is final and others times when cultural is final \n> AG communities in India always ahead of social scientists – when arguing that too structured\, suddenly alliance between Dalits and Muslims etc. > very hard to predict \n> GM going to be dilemma for much of world – find ways to make space for other community memberships: perhaps this is nature of political community that can never be all-encompassing\, universal\, but always need to find historical resources to forge political community \nRivke to GM: do you think Britain successful at accommodating diversity? \n> GM British were good at dress codes etc. but visible signs were not really issue \n> AG recent EU statement saying that need to learn from India how to deal with diversity – in Europe very codified diversity but in India is lived which is why codified segregated multiculturalism can never work in India \nWednesday 25th June\nPolitical Community in Context: Hungary and Southeast Europe\nBalazs Majtenyi “Authority in the Name of Nation”\nAbstract: The presentation examines the theoretical issues regarding the use of the term nation in constitutions and analyses the relationship between the identity of the state and the protection of human rights. The impact of international and transnational human rights documents have remained limited in the area of the identity of a political community so far. Yet\, the constitutional understanding of the nation directly effects the interpretation of fundamental rights and other constitutional principles. The presentation examines the different ways of institutionalizing the concept of nation in constitutions\, then it discusses what consequences may result if the principles of constitutionalism and national identity of the state are in conflict. The predominant use of an ethnic concept of the nation may cause legitimate concerns for domestic human rights protection. This hypothesis can be examined through the example of how the concept of the nation has changed in Central and Eastern European constitutions. The presentation compares the Constitution of 1989 of Hungary with the recent Hungarian Fundamental Law (2011)\, and it discusses the consequences of the different terminology on human rights protection. Similarly to most European democratic constitutions\, the 1989 Constitution used primarily a civic concept of nation\, while the Fundamental Law introduces an ethnic concept. The official definition of the ethnic majority can reveal a lot about a society\, including the status of minority groups\, but also about the state of constitutionalism. An analysis of the Hungarian Fundamental Law\, which uses the concept of an ethnic nation in an unconventional way\, can help to interpret the processes that lead to crises of new democracies. The presentation tackles the question how the primary use of the ethnic concept of the nation can be reconciled with the moral equality of citizens and how it is possible to interpret human rights institutions if the state identifies itself with the ethnic nation. \nNew Hungarian Constitution \n\nbegins “We Hungarians…with sense of responsibility for every Hungarian” > defines nation as spiritual and cultural community: ethnic concept of nation\n “we recognize role Christianity has played in preserving our nation”\n“testament between Hungarians past\, present and future”: refers to transcendent\, non-secular layer of contract\nno reference to equality\, instead to faith\, loyalty etc.\nsimilar to Jacobean: any social groups fragment national will (even though in Hungary will of ethnic nation as opposed to Jacobean will of public sphere)\ndefined as criminal organisations that betray nation\, meaning that government can restrict human rights\nprotecting family as basis of nation’s survival\, which restricts rights of childless couples etc.\ndistinguishes recognised and non-recognised minorities\, the latter becoming second- or third-rate citizens\, being indirectly discriminating against Roma minority\nright to decent housing but in same article possibility of punishing homelessness “in order to protect cultural values\, legal rules can punish homelessness” (also unusual to restrict fundamental rights to protect cultural values)\nto restrict freedom of speech\, protection of dignity of Hungarian nation (whereas dignity usually used for dignity of person\, rather than community or nation)\n\nCitizenship legislation creates inequalities in frame of citizenship \n\nEveryone has to vote\, but non-resident ethnic Hungarians have only one vote > argues really about government\n\nIn name of ethnic nation\, Hungarian government can limit human rights\, and constitution reflects interest of government rather than moral values \n\nAlso\, promotes traditional Christian family who not living in public area and not Communist\n\n> thus does not fulfil integrity condition of modern constitutions\, going against republican tradition of country \nAndreea Udrea“From Recognition to Non-Resident Citizenship: Hungary’s Kin-state Policies and Their Conceptions of Equality”\nAbstract: Even though the Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries became a legal standard in Europe following the evaluation of the legitimacy of a kin-state’s involvement carried out by the Council of Europe’s Commission for Democracy through Law\, the multiplication and diversification of European kin-state policies in the last decade has heightened the debate over the normative foundations of a kin-state’s intervention as responsibility for justice. The Hungarian legislation of 2001 sets a kin-state’s duties to be the responsibility to protect the cultural identity of its kin-minorities in the neighbouring states and to support their cultural flourishing. However\, by facilitating the access of the members of its kin-minorities to non-resident Hungarian citizenship\, the Act XLIV on Hungarian Nationality from 2010 extends Hungary’s kin-state responsibility from a duty of recognition to a constitutional commitment to equal citizenship. Focusing on the case of Hungary’s kin-state policies\, this paper discusses the articulation of its trans-domestic duties of recognition and equality\, and examines the relationship between a kin-state’s duty of identity recognition and that of equality. Contrary to dominant views in liberalism\, I show that in the case of the Hungarian legislation on kin-minorities\, identity recognition is not instrumental to achieving equality between resident and non-resident citizens. I argue that their lack of convergence weakens the inclusive and democratic value of citizenship putting a kin-state’s policies at odds with liberalism. \nKin-minorities: groups incorporated in one state but identifying with core group in other state \ne.g. Danish in Germany\, Italians in Croatia and Slovenia \nHer focus is on kin-state obligations \nPolitical community: her focus is on inclusion and accommodation – integration of new members in political community when members continue to live in other countries \n[but is inclusion really the primary function of political community: surely more fundamental questions] \nKin-state legislation extends state’s obligations beyond borders: shows that shared identities politically important beyond borders of state \nLiberal cosmopolitans in 2 camps \n1. reject shared identity: doesn’t capture individual experience (e.g. Woldron) \n2. defend moral and political importance of ties among citizens or groups of citizens: liberal nationalism does not contradict cosmopolitanism – depends on instance \n> she takes this position \nOn basis of case study of Hungarian Act of 2001\, no evidence that undermines human rights of Hungarians living abroad (beneficiaries) nor duties to rest of people beyond borders\, not against moral equality and may even promote it \n\nAct targets c. 3M citizens living in several countries offering assistance in education\, culture and science in Hungary and in home states\nDisassociates duty of identity recognition from citizenship of beneficiaries > independent of differences in status between citizens in Hungary and Hungarian minorities\nDoes  not address asymmetries between Hungarians within borders and those beyond\n\nNationality Act of 2010: non-resident citizenship policy > no longer requirement to reside in Hungary but instead showing genuine link with Hungary \n\nIncludes right to vote agreed in 2011\n\nBoth Acts create inequalities between resident and non-resident citizens \nDejan Stjepanović “Statehood alternatives: A comparative perspective on territorial politics in Europe”\nAbstract: Politics of historic regions in Western Europe have received significant scholarly attention. Much less has been said about their counterparts in other parts of the continent. There is a renewed tendency among certain sub-state regional political actors in Western Europe to focus on state building while their counterparts in Southeastern Europe are excluding the independent statehood option. I will examine the commonly asserted claim that most territorial political projects will ultimately lead to demands for the establishment of an independent state\, even if they are de-ethnicising (moving from ethnic towards civic claims) and stressing territorial criteria for membership. This is an innovative research as it compares territorial politics in sub-state historic territories from Southeastern and Western Europe. It offers an original contribution to the existing literature by rebutting teleological understandings of territorial political processes\, the assumption that there is a finality of territorial politics – the establishment of a sovereign nation state.According to Milward (2000)\, European integration strengthened the role of nation states in Europe. However\, European integration provides a number of ways in which the nationalities question can be accommodated. It provides mainly symbolic but also some practical opportunities that challenge the doctrine of unitary state sovereignty. EU integration provides a number of opportunities for stateless nations (and regions) to project themselves beyond state borders (Keating 2001) allowing them to by-pass the state as the only relevant locus of politics. Within this transformed sovereignty and the setting of multi-level politics\, nationality claims in the sub-state arena may be treated as a form of politics that can be accommodated within the existing boundaries\, rather than as claims that necessarily lead to separation. Claims for self-determination and various forms of (limited) independence in the sub-state historic territories such as Catalonia\, Flanders and Scotland have entered a new phase not witnessed in the last decades. Often out of the spotlight are cases of historic territories which just like their Western European counterparts are de-ethnicising and re-territorialising membership\, but unlike them are explicitly refuting any claims to independence. They are also frequently using the imagery of the European Union as a legimitising factor. In the last two decades\, the prominent examples are the sub-state regional polities of Istria in Croatia and Vojvodina in Serbia. These are the cases of what I call in my doctoral thesis and elsewhere (Stjepanović 2012) ‘plurinational’ and ‘multinational’ regionalisms rather than sub-state or stateless nationalisms. I will thus ask why political projects in Europe that are de-ethnicising their membership are manifested primarily as nationalisms that sometimes promote ‘total exit options’ (Bartolini 2005) in Western Europe and regionalisms that nearly always exclude independent statehood in Southeastern Europe\, despite many underlying similarities. \nWhy in W Europe de-ethnicising manifests as total exit options while in E Europe as regionalisms that do not support statehood? \nDebates on exit options: \n1. Institutional design: decides whether politicians will muster support for independence \n2. Regionalism precedes nationalism\, e.g. Catalunya – regionalist project over time becomes state-seeking nationalist project \n3. Autonomy is slippery slope to secession \n\ncultural but especially territorial autonomy (since autonomy typically for ethnic groups rather than territorial)\nespecially when made by regional political parties\nminority autonomy claim is on continuum from cultural to territorial to secessionist autonomy\n\n> though DS argues that theory actually feeds into practice when picked up by politicians: self fulfilling prophecy \nRegionalisms: takes as cases Vojvodina region of Slovenia and Istria region of Croatia \n+ if EU citizenship\, no longer any justification for claiming kin citizenship\, because minorities already provided protection\, e.g. N. Ireland \n\nthough I pointed out that Hungary\, Romania already EU members when extended citizenship – he says that EU saw Hungary as problem but not Italy because more powerful though perhaps also because fewer (and M2 thinks EU sees in context of authoritarian direction of Hungarian government)\nhe disagrees w Bieber that dual citizenship as insurance policy combined w exit policy is a good thing\, because typically makes state offload responsibilities – and same is true of EU citizenship\n\nNew regionalism – differs from traditional in that combining culture/identity\, economic development\, autonomy vs. bringing resources from centre to periphery \nCan we talk about new regionalism in W Europe? Argues that not\, e.g. of Scotland that Devo-Max is more extreme than claim for independence > originally Referendum was to include Devo Max but UK agreed only to independence \nExplanation: \n\nHistorical development\nProminence of history of conflict over territories\nNormative context influences territorial strategies\n\nDiscussion\nJan-Michael Kotowski \n\nto BM\, compares to Turkish case\nto DS\, are these small entities not really so different to Catalonia and Scotland that comparison is meaningless?\n\nST agrees that devolution is more radical than independence – independence doesn’t affect state itself > we don’t want to leave but want you to rethink what you are\, which more damaging to state; Barroso objects to nationalists for daring to think of entity beyond state \nDavid Thunder to AU: how is kin-state citizenship not in conflict with liberal cosmopolitanism\, respect for all humans\, given that distinguishing along lines of ethnicity? \n> AU kin minorities as opposed to diasporic minorities became so against their choice \n> AU mainly looking at symbolic recognition rather than distribution\, which unusual (though Germany gives substantial to Danish in Germany) \nMatyas: what happening in Hungary raises large questions for us \n\nAnti-liberal project which taken as achievement of current Prime Minister\, picking anti-liberal elements of other EU constitutions\, so others can’t object\nAchieved by manipulating boundaries of political community: defined in terms of ethnic nationalism\, filled up by substantive connotation of that ethnos\, e.g. Christianity\, creating stratified residential/non-residential citizenship\, leaving minorities in limbo\, and on that basis justifying authoritarian practices in state > state capable of protecting this identity in globalised world\nAre political communities free in constructing normative identity? Or should be restrictions in international HR law?\nInterplay between political community and institutions: state is institutional machinery through which identity that political community demands is protected > but here state becomes active agent setting terms for political community\, justifying authoritarian practices in that respect\n\nnot unique and closest example is Turkey: clamping down on minorities etc. in order to shore up stat\nin Hungary seemed developing away from this\, and since then other countries have found attractive\, even in EU\n\n\n\nBM Hungary is not longer constitutional democracy in his opinion\, since anti-egalitarian \nMB explains that anti-liberal in that trumping individual rights with community interests\, which is how Hungarian PM wanted to do it \n? What does Hungarian case say about political community especially in relation to authority? \n\nwhat is Hungarian is now political question\, being non-Hungarian means having liberal or socialist views\n\nEmilio: in what sense are values in Constitution pre-modern? For example\, 19th century Italian Constitution is blood\, and Hauerwas et al. argue that cultural belonging is main reference for political identity \nNigel: true that conflicts with Pogge-style cosmopolitanism but not Scheffler-type: all human beings have equal status must include concept of well-being to be substantial\, which must in turn include identity etc. to be meaningful given how important to well-being \nAndrea Teti: worried that too much focus on formal in discussions – asks again\, what is question to which political community is answer? seems from discussion that: how do we ignore questions of substantive claims\, e.g. in relation to inequality? In case of Hungary\, where is agency of population as well as material conditions that allowed constitutional changes to take place? \nCanglong: diversity being ignored in face of national fusion – can it respect citizenship of minorities? certainly debatable in context of China \nGurpreet: \n\nto DS\, explain why regional autonomy does more damage to state than secession\nwould citizenship more than state bring in concerns of fairness and justice? seems fairness and justice being placed outside in ambit of human rights\, because if do that\, citizenship will never address this\n\nMargaret Somers: what are socio-economic horizontal divisions mapped onto vertical categories by which belonging is established? who are people making decisions in ruling parties? seems inequality being left out of discussion? \nTamas Gyorgi: seems that shift from old fashioned liberal democracy toward electoral democracy \nThemes in Political Community: Relations of Duty\nDavid Thunder “What Do Citizens Owe Their Communities? A Critique of Duty-Based Approaches to Justice and Responsibility”\nAbstract: One of the hallmarks of modern theories of justice\, from Hobbes and Locke to Rawls and Habermas\, is that they tend to conceptualize a just social order less as the intentional\, ongoing\, and precarious achievement of just and virtuous individuals\, and more as the outcome of a set of institutional and moral constraints upon people’s behavior and projects. Social order\, on this view\, is at bottom an elaborate game\, and the task of the theorist is to determine which ground rules—whether moral or legal—can ensure (to the extent practicable) that economic and social interactions and outcomes are fair to all parties involved. This duty-based approach undoubtedly captures important truths about the practice of justice\, in particular the coordinating role of institutions and the need for clarity about citizens’ public obligations. Nonetheless\, as I shall argue in this paper\, duty-based approaches tend to offer an excessively minimalist picture of a citizen’s responsibilities toward his or her community. This minimalist picture is greatly facilitated by the fact that proponents of the duty-based approach conceptualize the problem of justice as one of limiting individual freedom rather than unleashing its full potential. Once the problem of justice is set up in this way\, an important fact about the practice of justice is effectively lost from view\, namely that the creative and prudential exercise of freedom plays a vital role in the promotion and maintenance of justice\, no less than the constraint of freedom by moral and institutional rules. In the first part of the paper\, I make a case for the centrality of free personal initiatives to the practice of justice. In the second part\, I argue that this observation compels us to reframe justice as a common project imposing open-ended responsibilities upon stakeholders\, rather than merely a system of duties narrowly construed. The upshot of my argument is that once we see the vital role of free personal initiatives in discharging the collective burdens of justice in community\, we are compelled to accept a broader and more demanding conception of the responsibilities of citizens than what what we typically find in standard liberal accounts. \nPolitical community wins allegiance of members when shows that giving to each due\, providing justice for all \nJustice can be analysed as \n\nPersonal virtue\nProperty of community relations: internal justice of community – on this will focus\n\nPolitical community bears collective responsibility for distributing justice among members \nIntending to critique narrative that says false hope in state-centered narrative because disables community and disenfranchises citizenship from their responsibility for justice \nIdealizing account of justice: Rawls defends liberal welfare state for basic liberties\, using tax revenue for producing goods for decent life \n\njustice society = well-ordered society\ncollective responsibility of justice in institutions\, to which citizens must comply – Rawlsian virtues are about compliance with just institutions (hard-working\, civil\, get on well with fellow-citizens\, etc.) > good citizen is compliant citizen – will do justice on our behalf provided we play our role as compliant citizens\n\nRealist\, non-ideal account of justice: building just social order against background of imperfectly working institutions \n\nRelies on uncoordinated initiatives from citizens to counter-balance imperfections\, e.g. Civil Rights in US which confronted resistant institutions [but surely this is civil society – although uncoordinated means unorganised? How about Church?]\nHas a cost and these costs may be disproportionately borne by some – even in Venezuela leaders are being killed – and fruits enjoyed by others\n\n> who is responsible citizen in non-ideal society? requires different sort of virtues: solidarity\, courage\, non-conformism\, generosity\, etc. \nMay be that civic leaders need to develop these more\, but other citizens need them too \nCamille Walsh “Duty and Community: Drawing the Lines of Exclusion in the 20th Century U.S.”\nAbstract: How do the obligations of citizenship generate and limit our imagination of political community?  Drawing on the work of Turner\, Kerber\, Fineman and other scholars of citizenship and vulnerability\, this paper traces the historical links between differences in the duties that particular groups have been permitted to engage in within the U.S. (gendered military service\, racialized taxation\, etc.) and the entitlements that those groups are then able to claim from the state – and perhaps from each other.  This paper will also take up the recent discussion of “polycentric constitutionalism” in U.S. legal scholarship to identify the different ways narratives and justifications of power are generated and framed through reference to robust participation in the duties of citizenship\, and the different ways of imagining the multiplicity of communities and constitutive authorities through diffuse constitutional lenses.  Two core historical examples inform this study.  First\, I look at the debate over the implementation of the G.I. Bill in the U.S. at the end of WWII\, in which a limited and constricted\, as well as gendered and raced\, welfare state was permitted through claims to the special form of political community created by the uniqueness of military service (despite the technically higher civilian casualty rate in industrial work on the U.S. home front).  This provides a sharp contrast to the experience of many European nations after the war and the creation of broader welfare state protections and ultimately\, inclusions.  Second\, I examine the use of “taxpayer” rhetoric to systematically exclude people of color from the perceived political community in the 20th century U.S. and the way in which that rhetoric has grown around and intertwined with anti-immigrant fervor in recent decades. \nRefers to The Wire: Omar says won’t raise gun to “citizen” and also says to “tax payer” \n> even though all paying sales tax in corner store\, strong symbolic association with citizenship \nTurner: worker citizen\, warrior citizen\, reproductive citizen > can all make particular claims on state [those this not really way that work] \n+ similarly Judith Sklar: if working is duty of citizen\, allows eventually to claim right to work \n+ consumer citizen: can make claims because bought X \nHer book focuses on racialisation of tax payer rights to claim education: how language of tax payer has been used by parents to exclude others from receiving schooling benefits \ne.g. new secessionism: Alabama etc. allowed to tax selves as \n> historically there was distinction between white and black taxes\, each going to different schools \nFinds blacks making argument that since paying taxes are entitled to school that not being burned down \n…while in second half of book\, whites arguing that paying more taxes and thus entitled to better provision \n> this has connotations of market relationship \nIn fact courts have consistently said that no case on grounds of tax-paying\, not because progressive but because judicial efficiency – don’t know how much tax has paid\, and also hard to determine e.g. whether includes sales taxes; but people are not aware of this and continue making claims to Congress etc. \nWhy no social welfare state? Moment when came close – FDR wanted GI Bill to apply across board\, but veteran groups manage to exclude civilians\, arguing that special nature of military service – though in fact in WWII highest casualty rate was on home front\, in factories etc. where predominantly women and also many blacks excluded [but this is political claim – this is what should have been done] even though women largely excluded from military service \n> language of duty and obligation used to exclude population on basis of race and gender \nAdds that as homebuyers typically make claims\, for example attempts to make home-owning criterion for voting on certain initiatives \nDiscussion\nAdam Fusco: are we arguing that democratic activity should be formal duty rather than activism with no institutional link? Otherwise hard to see how these virtues could come to be \n> DT agrees would have to provide more detailed proposal; acknowledges that Rawls mentions need for citizens to promote just community but if took this seriously\, might have led in different direction; initiatives themselves can’t be coordinated in advance but may response to institutional gap \nKatharina \n\nFor DT\, is there responsibility for citizens to counteract unjust institutions\, given costs?\n\n> DT Game theoretic: unfair to expect citizens to undertake high costs for collective goods\, but unsure about this \n\nFor CW\, Could jury duty be a substitute criterion? Or should let go of entitlement criteria altogether?\n\n> CW jury duty doesn’t have same aura of sacrifice of time and money as military service;  on grounds of cosmopolitanism\, wants to have everyone have same entitlements regardless of criteria \nMarek Szilvasi \n\nTo DT\, how ensure that individuals become virtuous without institutions such as schooling?\n\n> DT yes through schools and civic education should impart these virtues \n\nTo CW\, notes that currently EU placing stress on labour market integration as source of entitlement\n\nMargaret Somers \n\nJudith Sklar’s main point is that all US citizenship is based on inclusionary identity which is only opposed to chattel slavery > not right to work but to earn; and she also points out that most US voters don’t > not being excluded is what gives identity – citizenship practice itself is irrelevant\, what interests people is who is excluded from it\nNew Deal was white\, both in that FDR gets support by withdrawing anti-lynching law as well as by targeting\nClaims to social security is made in terms of earning it\, as opposed to poor people who haven’t earned it; and over $106K not paying social security taxes\n\nAjay \n\nFor CW\, thinks that not now tax payer that instantiates citizenship in modern democracy but right to speak for and about others > by looking at language of obligation\, we deny people opportunity to speak not just for selves but for others – blacks not derecognised because not tax payers but why not able to speak on behalf of whites >> how is political obligation linked to political participation?\n\n> CW agrees and white supremacists are speaking as if they know intuitively what whites and blacks are paying\, which doesn’t appear in black letter writers \n\nFor DT If alternative to institutions is human virtue\, virtue tends to presuppose social equality: how expect poor to be heroic\, women to make sacrifice\, blacks to be selfless\, etc.?\n\n> DT not alternative but simply counter to intuition that institutions represent me therefore I have to do nothing; would be patronising not to expect these things of oppressed groups – gives example of autodefensas who stand up to mafias in controlled communities\, exhibiting courage \nJan-Michael Kotowski: notes that US allowing more non-citizens in army\, while military service in Dream Act can be pathway to citizenship \nMark Kruman: \n\ntax-paying becomes means to claim full citizenship\non consumer citizenship\, GW Bush after 9/11 asked how could be good citizens and he answered go shopping\nfor DT\, observes that sounds like modern form of civic republicanism – volunteers coming in to do public service >these are more broadly conceptualised than citizen initiatives\n\n> DT possibly version of civic republicanism yes\, and finds that stop at level of volunteering and service\, rather than challenging institutional structures \nThemes in Political Community: Within and Beyond the State\nMartijn Koster “New spaces of brokerage: active citizens and the informalization of political communities in the Netherlands”\nAbstract:  While the state continues its retreat from welfare provision\, it deliberately leaves spaces in the political domain to citizens and their local communities. In the Netherlands\, the current government has coined the notion of the “participatory society” [participatiesamenleving]\, for which it needs a high level of voluntary citizen participation so as to guarantee a certain quality of welfare provision. Especially in underprivileged neighbourhoods\, where many residents rely upon public welfare\, people are summoned to participate in both policy-making and execution in domains that range from social housing to care for the elderly and from social work to health care. The participatory society has provided spaces to new and existing political brokers: active citizens who fill the gap between the retreating state and their fellow citizens. These brokers are\, in the Dutch context\, referred to as ‘active citizens’ or ‘best persons’. In this paper\, I like to explore how these brokers become part of new governmental assemblages\, in which public institutions\, corporate actors and volunteering citizens “co-function”. A central question is what kind of political communities these assemblages produce and what authority they (may) gain. I will discuss how a particular community rationale gains more ground in policy-making and implementation when the state summons citizens to take a more active part in it. Political domains that used to be highly formalized\, are now being infiltrated by a more informal community rationale. This community rationale centers upon local knowledge\, personal connections and an exchange of favors. Political brokers co-direct decision-making regarding public services\, while employing this community rationale. These brokers are in a privileged position. In specific\, they may have the personal phone numbers of aldermen or housing corporation managers and\, by contacting them\, ‘bypass’ formal procedures while making the policy-making more “community-based”\, more efficient and less costly. They are sought by organizational representatives (e.g. social workers\, nurses\, municipal officials\, housing corporation employees) for information\, advice and\, where possible\, for carrying out certain tasks. In this paper\, I will explore some answers to the next pressing questions: What will be the impact of new spaces of brokerage and informal community rationality on welfare provision? What political communities are formed in these new governmental assemblages and what authority will they have? What will be the impact of (new) informalized political communities on conceptualizations of citizenship? \nShows poster of “best person” police officer who started project in Hague with volunteers on crime prevention\, who says (in interview?) tension between what can do officially and what can do informally \nMK’s project: How do residents experience political community in Utrecht? And changing with retreating state and new spaces for brokers? \n> argues that leading to informalisation of political community \n“Participatory society”: King said recently that shift from welfare state to participatory\, in which people give value not just to own lives but to society as whole > looking for \n\nActive citizens\nParticipation\nSelf organization\n\nBrokers – \n\ninvited to share local knowledge and special expertise > in between government and residents of underprivileged neighbours\, know how to speak both languages\nbut also know how to get things moving\, so also known was “urban specialists”\, some are voluntary but others are street-level professionals\, and may also know how to bend the rules\ngovernment has been funding this phenomenon of “best persons”: also known as policy entrepreneurs\, fixers\, fitters (looking for right fit)\, etc. [in Mexico known as “lideres sociales”]\nnot connected to government though may be at later stage\nasked to persuade residents to eat healthily etc.\ngovernment views in Durkheimian way – gap that needs to be filled to make society whole\n\nIn Brazilian context\, much talk of informality by researchers but usually confined to South > his colleagues in School of Governance struggle to see informality in Netherlands \n\nauthority has face > person of mayor\, while in Netherlands often don’t know name of mayor; but this may be changing in Netherlands with brokers\n\nConclusion \n\nInformalisation of political community\nDurkheimian view obscures differences and conflicts – just seen as gaps needing filled\, though brokers also translate aspirations back to institutions\, which can be valuable\nNot sure whether multilayered political community\, or distinct overlapping\, entwined political communities\n\nKatinka Weber “‘Political Communities’ without States? Exploring Processes of State Expansion in the Amazon”\nAbstract: This paper suggests that we may shed further light on the notion of “political community” by considering it in the light of processes of state expansion. More specifically\, this paper focuses on the experiences of Amazonian peoples who have escaped the influence of colonial or republican state-building projects\, and who generally maintained less hierarchical forms of organisation. This is not to disregard that experiences of Amazonian peoples vary greatly\, and many peoples had contact with traders\, missionaries\, or those seeking to extract natural resources\, but nevertheless many Amazonian groups maintained more egalitarian authority structures and a ‘rhizomic model’ of self-other distinction which contrasts with the ‘Western’ ‘taproot model’ (hierarchical\, or state-like) organisational forms (Rosengreen\, 2003). However\, the increased interaction with “state” actors (Abrams 1988; Fried 1967; Scott 1998) especially since mid-twentieth century has meant that many Amazonian peoples have adopted “taproot” organisational forms\, reflected in the formation of their ethnic movements or governing bodies. Legal recognition of such organisations\, as well as indigenous communities\, has led to the formalisation of political authority and the expansion and multiplication of political communities. In this context\, the emergence of political communities is closely linked to processes of state expansion or rather\, the manipulation of spatial and social boundaries at different\, and nested\, scales (Rubenstein 2001).  In this context\, the paper debates whether “political communities” which are roughly defined as “one whose members feel somehow represented within its structures of authority” and within which “authority is exercised in the name of some kind of community of members” can only exist in relation to “states”. \nKey players in colonial world of nomadic egalitarian were Jesuits\, Dominicans and others\, who treats as state actors\, promoting ethnogenesis > Chiquitano come to share identity as such\, especially through mission system \n> groups found themselves articulating community boundaries in variety of ways\, including in relation to mestizo and white others\, using language of citizenship and indigenous rights\, for recognition of self determination \n> Bolivia recognises legal personality of indigenous communities and organisations\, as well as certain rights to land\, even though alien to Amazonian concept of self and other \nEven though subordinated in Constitution\, she argues that political community in own rights [which is precisely what these people are arguing for] \n…with “civil sociality” norms even though not enshrined in law \nBut also constitutes state as well as seeking autonomy for itself \n> though political communities typically allowed to exist to extent that facilitate state functions and development programmes e.g. only limited recognition as long as indigenous citizens fit into governmental agenda > typically passing resource allocation to private individuals \nNevertheless still identify these organisations as getting things for them from state\, representing them \nWe tend to talk of political communities as rigid whereas labour goes into creating them > leaders actively promote Chiquitano movement otherwise rumours that witchcraft or pocketing resources\, thus more fragile and temporary than may sometimes appear \nConclusions \n\nNations may not be paramount political community (following Sian Lazar) and people may be part of multitude of overlapping political communities\nThough also likeness to state\, in furthering state project as well as more vertical structures\n\nRivke Jaffe “Between Ballots and Bullets: Electoral Politics and Political Community in and beyond the State”\nAbstract: This paper approaches elections as a site for negotiations of political community both in and beyond the state. Beyond established political institutions such as political parties\, other less formal structures of authority play an important role in mediating the relationship of citizens to the state. I focus on Jamaican “garrison politics”\, a type of electoral turf politics that is achieved through communal clientelism and that has historically relied on brokers known as “dons”. These dons\, area leaders who are often involved in criminal organizations\, have longstanding connections to Jamaica’s two political parties. However\, in recent decades they have become increasingly independent from politicians and have developed relationships with inner-city residents that are structured by notions of rights and responsibilities\, and by forms of political participation. In the “garrison communities” where dons’ authority is strongest\, voting behavior is affected by a mix of deeply felt party-political loyalty and the sometimes violent pressure exerted by dons and their organizations. Drawing on fieldwork in inner-city Kingston\, I discuss how different forms of political community are enacted and performed through the act of voting and electoral politics more broadly. Rather than understanding inner-city residents as belonging to multiple\, distinct political communities\, I focus on the entanglement of allegiances to the don\, the party and the nation-state. By focusing on the role of don-based structures of rule and belonging in mediating state-citizen relationships\, I explore the entangled nature of contemporary political communities that function across different levels of scale (the nation-state\, the neighborhood\, and transnational criminal networks) and that draw on different registers of formality and legality. \nAlso looking at overlapping political communities \nObserves in Jamaican elections\, flouting electoral code of conduct\, graffiti refers to parties and to gangs affiliated to them \n> can we understand elections as affirming more than citizens’ relations to nation-state? \nCitizenship can develop in and beyond nation-state: \n\ngarrison politics – communal clientelism where criminal leaders known as dons\, who linked to political parties\npolitical tribalism – deeply held allegiances to parties\n\nMarshall et al. place voting at heart of political rights\, but Lazar (collective bargaining – offers space for negotiating with state)\, Banerjee (voting not for ideology but neither just votes-for-goods instrumental clientelism > seen as dignified means of asserting belonging to modern nation) etc. describe elections as performances\, which reflect reproduce and contest state-citizen elections \n> not just centrality to political rights but important symbolic momen \nHow hybrid governance don’t just connect citizens to state but also negotiation of political community beyond state \nAfter Independence\, political parties start building housing schemes for followers\, while dons are to deliver votes > garrison communities \nFrom 1980s less public resources while dons become more independent because of transnational drug trade\, thus now uneasy relationship more like colluding in government and maybe competing \n> parties not ethnic\, not class-based\, though JOP did once associate with US capitalism and PNP with Cubans\, getting guns to wage electoral warfare \nOne informant said better to be in battleground because parties then competing\, while diehard neighbourhood is taken for granted > when she suggests saying might vote for others\, they reply that impossible and would create division and repercussions – owe it to rest of community to not cause tension\, while owing also to leaders \nWhat can elections reveal beyond political rights? Finds that looking at community in and beyond the state > entangled governmental actors (she adds trade unions\, \n> “political collectives” implies horizontal within all-encompassing state\, trhefore \nDiscussion\nAlena to KW: is state only other source of political organisation or also collectives etc.? \n> KW agrees that others\, too \nMB to KW: wonders whether as well as engaging with state\, indigenous communities are also aware of taking to international level e.g. ILO conventions\, which railroad into development agenda of performing certain government functions (Decl of Rights of Ind Peoples mentions development 30 times) > logic of indigenous autonomy is that this is best way that developmental needs can be met \n> KW yes though understands NGOs to begin with as governmental actors since perpetuating state agenda; also acknowledges importance of ILO etc. \n(MK mentions that bureaucrats often disliked working with these “citizen leaders” because saw as unpredictable) \nRaul \n\nto MK: are brokers not just diffusing outright conflicts between communities and government? depoliticizing third sector?\n\n> MK yes\, harder to justify remaining outside government and government cannot justify leaving outside; also creates new politics in which\, for example\, rules get bent [how liberating is this?] \n\nto KW: read book on Jesuit missions as vanguard of modern state in centralising power\n\n> KW still maintain cabildo system though more complex than vanguard of modern state \n\nto RJ: she made people look rather passive\n\n> RJ they do draw on both political communities\, even though not democratic and not nice\, people brought into political community through extortion\, which is caused “taxes”\, people also saying that dons provide equal rights \nChuck: liked fact that juxtaposing Jamaica\, Bolivia and Netherlands\, and found what saying in Netherlands is \n\nfor RJ\, is it that these other places don’t do democracy well\, or that also goes on in W Europe and US?\n\n> RJ not specific\, gives example of mining enclaves that are also corporations in own right\, etc. and in US politicians going to churches to get donations \n> KW democracy wasn’t working well for Chiquitano peoples \nShura for MK: do these include non-citizens? \n> MK not really – finds Chatterjee’s political community hard to apply to Netherlands because most do have access to range of services as citizens (and for this reason also feels that multilayered political community rather than multiple political communities) \nAndreea Undrea: For MK\, is brokerage not job of MPs or local councillors? \nAndrea Teti \n\nfor MK: when combine increasing cuts and taxation\, tend to get decrease obligations > would be surprising if doesn’t make for patronage\, thus challenging government based on rule of law >> step toward undermining welfare and outsourcing welfare provision is what put Muslim Brotherhood in position of power\n\n> MK says that may be possible to combine rule of law with friendship; and patronage is everywhere (though AT – that is mafia) \n\nfor JR\, agrees that nothing new in combination of state and private power\n\nGurpreet \n\nfor MK\, surprised that referred to as participatory\, since surely participation is about deliberation etc. and not this kind of brokerage\n\n> MK participatory in ideal sense\, as King puts it\, should have collective dimension \n\nfor KW\, surely inner compulsion toward association with land thus want to control who has access to this land (i.e. not just about state etc.)\n\n> KW yes though in process getting shaped \n\nfor RJ\, what if group loses\, are there penalties imposed? In India understood that much of show on streets is for hire\n\n> RJ yes this might happen if lose elections \nAjay: For MK\, this is classic case of “political society” > brokerage\, even though Chatterjee argues that his model does not work in W Europe and US because lack communitarian traditions – so how to explain? \nDavid Thunder: \n\nFor RJ dependency or clientelism in all contexts\nFor KW could they do fine without being incorporated into state?\nFor MK how are citizen initiatives funded?\n\n> MK can apply for funding to municipality
URL:https://cisrul.blog/event/political-community-workshop-2014/
CATEGORIES:Conference
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20140624
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20140626
DTSTAMP:20260503T163442
CREATED:20210819T170422Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211027T094356Z
UID:10000044-1403568000-1403740799@cisrul.blog
SUMMARY:Political Community: Authority in the Name of Community
DESCRIPTION:Workshop\nPolitical Community:\nAuthority in the Name of Community\nhosted by the \nCentre for Citizenship\, Civil Society and Rule of Law (CISRUL) \nat the \nUniversity of Aberdeen \n\nTuesday 24-Wednesday 25 June 2014\nAcademic coordinator: Trevor Stack (t.stack@abdn.ac.uk) \n\nPlease join the online debate which followed the workshop.\nSpeakers (see below for summaries) included Margaret Somers\, Stephen Tierney\, Ajay Gudavarthy\, Gurpreet Mahajan\, Dejan Stjepanovic\, Chris Brittain\, Jan Kotowski\, Andreea Udrea\, Katinka Weber\, Rivke Jaffe\, Martijn Koster\, Marc Kruman\, Balazs Majtenyi\, David Thunder and Camille Walsh. \nFollowing our successful Political Community workshop in June 2013 (summaries) CISRUL held a second workshop on Political Community in June 2014. We had confirmed in the 2013 workshop that the term “political community” was appropriate for identifying a core set of issues that interest us at CISRUL\, even though it was evident that no term will ever carry all the right connotations and none of the wrong ones. Our use of the term is explained in the opening statements by Trevor Stack and Matyas Bodig (see below).\n\nSpeakers presented on Scotland\, Netherlands\, Hungary and SE Europe\, USA\, Bolivia\, Jamaica and India\, as well as on political community in philosophy\, post-colonial studies\, and constitutional and international law.\nTuesday 24th June\nIntroduction – Why “political community” now?\nTrevor Stack\nA. What proposing to study under rubric of “political community”\n\n1. Suggest take “political” to mean relations or structures of authority and especially those that are somehow institutionalised\, or stabilised\n\n2. Anthropologists\, archaeologists\, historians have found vast array of relations of authority across human societies\, but we suggest taking “political community” to mean a particular relation of authority\n\n> political community is one\n\na. whose members feel somehow represented within its structures of authority\n\n> some kind of “vertical” representation\n\nb. though also feel somehow obliged to their fellow-members to follow authority’s norms and accept its decisions\n\n> some kind of “horizontal” obligation\n\nB. We are open to debate on every aspect of authority in name of community of members actually works\n\n1. Been having debates about\n\na. representation e.g. “crisis of representation”\n\nb. some discussion  about horizontal or mutual obligation between members\n\n2.  We also acknowledge that both “relations or structures of authority” and “membership of community” can take many different forms\n\n3. Under rubric of “community of members”\, we are interested in\n\na. nations as the (arguably) paramount political communities of the contemporary world\n\nb. but also interested in possibility of other forms of political community e.g. indigenous communities\, municipalities\, churches etc.\n\nC. We proposed in workshop blurb\, following discussion last year\, that we…\n\n1. Reserve the term “political community” for those that claim to be in some sense self-standing\, and to exercise broad-ranging authority over much of what we do\n\n2. Use instead term political collectives for entities such as trade unions or churches or football clubs which\n\na. …are also communities of members\, often with some kind of vertical structures of representation and horizontal obligation\n\nb. yet in an important sense are different from nations\, for example\, in that they see themselves as players in a broader political community\n\n3. Though useful to make distinction\, still very much interested in\n\na. how authority is exercised internally in the name of members of such entities\n\nb. as well as in how they position themselves in relation to the political communities that host them\nMatyas Bodig\nConvergence between CISRUL members\n\n 	Political communities related to institutions that claim particular kinds of authority\n 	Relations of membership: mutual responsibility or ethical integration\n\nAt 2013 workshop spoke much about vertical representation but less about horizontal ties\n\nWhen deal with concept\, soon glimpse darker side: political community is not essentially inclusive but built on contrast between members and non-members > those who not represented by political institutions\n\n 	how to develop concept so not guise for oppression covered by democratic ideology?\n 	also to avoid essentialising community of political community? important to stress\n\n 	contestation of membership and its boundaries\, as well as responsibilities implied in membership and\n 	dialectic relationship between institutions and community that claim to represent > not that community there to begin with but constituted in process\n\n\n\nContexts in which important\n\n 	Referendum\n 	Crisis of representation > may need new imagery of political community\, or come up with different idea e.g. multitude – generates itself and without institutional scaffolding\n\nMB own interest: how term “people” figures in international law\n\n 	Finding solid conceptual ground for normative development\n\nDiscussion\nDejan: UK already embedded in EU – is this political community?\n\n> MB Scotland is political community embedded in UK political community: if Referendum succeeds\, will lose this duality\n\nAndreea: elaborate on ethical integration?\n\n> MB comes from Dworkin: responsibility to fellow members and belief that institutions making decisions in your name\n\nHanifi: how do we reconcile membership\, mutual benefit\, etc. with essentialism and exclusion?\n\n> MB duality of integration and exclusion is fundamental to all community\, including family – owe family members loyalty to those outside community > tends to create status equality inside (e.g. Hungarian nobility in early modern) but hierarchical from outside (nobility ever more oppressive)\n\nChris: relationship between vertical and horizontal?\n\n> MB what owe to fellow members is linked to institutional force – complying with common laws that were authenticated by institutions\n\nCamille: in relation to vertical representation – members should feel somehow represented? but how about those who don’t feel represented?\n\n> TS always contestation of representative claims of institutions – this is key to political community\n\nDavid Thunder: political community would be encompassing – over many domains > but does this not beg question? multiple centres of authority e.g. just as national\, international\, regional law\, could not be differentiated and exercised by different institutions\n\n> TS yes always criss-crossing authority and may be also true of authority in name of communities of members – as my example of Mexican municipalities\, may be embedded within each other and overlapping\n\n> MB typically there has always been authority that claims to be ultimate and takes ultimate responsibility\n\nAndrea Teti\n\n 	useful to distinguish between resistance against and in system – accepted relations of contestation\n 	not just formal conditions but also substantive conditions including material that allow authorities to do their job\n\nChuck\n\n 	different people within community have different relations to each other > not just matter of who is inside and who is outside – key question is who decides\n\nMargaret: how did CISRUL get from concepts in world to heuristic use of concepts – what happens when patently in opposition? e.g. recent work by Paige et al. that in US Congress little effective representation of anyone except 10% elite\n\n> MB institutions claim to be representative – institutions develop to ensure that this is in fact the case e.g. Congress system – in US though strong claims that “our” Constitution etc.\n\nNigel\n\n 	May be forms of exclusion that are positive and others that negative\n 	Is ethical integration good term or risks of too strong integration?\n\nPolitical Community in Context: Scotland\nStephen Tierney “The Constitution of an Independent Scotland: A Retreat from Politics?”\nAbstract: This paper will give a brief introduction to the Referendum process\, before looking at the Scottish Government’s proposal of a written constitution for an independent Scotland. That a written constitution would provide overarching authority for the parliament and government of an independent Scotland\, as well as a detailed list of citizens’ rights\, has been a long-standing commitment of the SNP. The detail of this proposal has gradually been elaborated in the course of the referendum campaign\, culminating in a draft Scottish Independence Bill\, unveiled on 16 June 2014 in an address by Nicola Sturgeon\, Deputy First Minister to the Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law. I will set out the background to this proposal\, look at the terms of the proposed interim constitution contained within the Scottish Independence Bill (‘the SIB’)\, and consider the process by which it a permanent constitution might be drafted. I will conclude by asking whether highly elaborate and detailed constitutions are really needed in a healthy parliamentary democracy\, or whether in fact an independent Scotland would be better served by an open political process in which important decisions are left to parliament or to citizens acting directly in referendums.\n\nIn previous book\, noted that democracy theory objects to referendums because\n\n 	Elite control – more easily manipulated than electoral\n 	Not deliberative – aggregating pre-formed wills\n 	Pathology of majoritarian decisions\n\nFinds that problems of practice rather than principle > can overcome through institutional design\n\ne.g. law: can take out elite control through determining\n\n 	who sets out issue\, question\n 	independent oversight\n 	campaign finance\n 	citizen assemblies etc.\n\nWhat harder is minority rights and especially in deeply divided\, e.g. Belfast – earlier Referendum Republicans refused to take part which was disaster\, but better in 1998 > essential to get Referendum right (similarly in Bosnia)\n\nAbout Scottish Referendum\, there is process people can trust in such that people will agree to even if not with\n\nAbout Interim Constitution\, paradoxical that rush to produce detailed Constitution putting all sorts of issues (incl. healthcare etc.) beyond reach of deliberation\, effectively handing all of this to judges\n\n> 3 demoi\n\n 	People\n 	Government\n 	Judges\n\nDiscussion\nDavid Thunder: what criteria should guide what should be in Constitution?\n\n> ST should be democracy-enabling and facilitating – but should not put policy choices based on current values\, including human rights (which are effectively civil privileges)\, within Constitutions\n\nGurpreet: though danger with judges\, important to protect rights for diverse groups for people\, needs constitutional mechanism\n\n> ST speaking primarily about Scotland which not divided society – need for more constitutional detail when deeply divided\, though even rights should still be open for debate\n\nAdam Fusco: need some precondition of social justice\, to avoid powerful political actors setting agenda e.g. in Scotland\, might be appropriate to write in welfare etc. in Constitution for first 10-15 years\n\n> ST but seems curious to give people vote in Referendum but then not on these other issues: clarifies that not against these values but thinks should be open to debate\nChristopher Brittain “Political Community and the Bonds of Love: Theology and Scottish Nationalism”\nAbstract: Scholarly writing on nationalism frequently makes much of two important considerations. The first concern highlights the fact that nationalism has a tendency to encompass powerful emotions\, and is both dangerous and valuable for that very fact. Such a consideration focuses on nationalism as an expression of profound attachment to the communities of which individuals are a part. The second concern points to the reliance of political collectives on shared symbols and images to represent their ‘imagined community’.  This dimension raises questions about the foundation for such symbolic representations\, and the extent to which they neglect diversity and difference within the community. This paper explores these issues as they emerge in the thought of Christian theologians writing on the issue of Scottish independence.  Contemporary Christian theology is frequently suspicious and critical of nationalism and patriotic sentiment for both historic (post-Christendom) and theological reasons.  This makes it all the more curious to observe how prominent the ‘Scottish question’ is among some Scottish theologians\, and how engaged contemporary Scottish churches are in the lead-up to the referendum of September 2014. An analysis of theological writing on Scottish independence helps illuminate how key elements (emotional\, aspirational\, historical) fuel passions that may well be an inherent element of any substantive expression of ‘political community’.\n\nSince WWII\, churches suspicious of nationalism and 1979 Scottish Independence denounced by Scottish theologian\, but now being debated within church\n\nInterest in what happens when structures of authority challenged by national identity\n\nDefinitions of nation\n\n 	Historic: Ethnic etc. identity\n 	Political (which seems more closely aligned to “political community”): here draws on Quebecois Catholic theologian Gramezon on Quebecois nationalism – critical of early wave but in 1960s shift from historical to political nationalism (popular sovereignty\, self determination) which is rational and moral agenda\n\nIn Scotland similar shift from historic to political (issues incl. immigration policy\, anti-nuclear etc.) but elements of historical nationalism not far from surface\n\nSimilarly\, in churches’ debate: tendency among church leaders to stress political ethos in Scotland which claimed different to shallower ethos in England\n\n 	Doug Gay: ethical nationalism\, cleaned of dark side of nationalism > Independence could allow common objects of love that currently stifled in UK\n 	Assumption of different political culture: objects of love not phrased in terms of ethnicity but yet of different “moral and religious culture”\, which arguably reintroduce historic nationalism\n\nChurches’ version of nationalism has often depended on how can influence government\n\ne.g. Free Church has urged members to vote No because Christian churches currently privileged in Scotland and might lose this in independent Scotland\, being written out of Constitution\n\n> tend to share presupposition of difference between Scottish and English ethos – here in terms of place given to churches\n\nQuotes other theologian Jacobs: admits danger in emotive aspects of nationalism (which echoed in CISRUL’s rubric for “political community” – “one whose members feel somehow represented”)\n\n> how to avoid emotive aspects which can construct borders\nNadia Kiwan\, Rachel Shanks and Trevor Stack “Schooling in Political Community”\nAbstract: We will report on CISRUL’s collaborative project to gauge what we are calling “political community” in schools in the Aberdeen region. For the purposes of the project\, we understand “political” in terms relations of authority and especially how these are institutionalised (or stabilised); “political community” is a particular relation of authority – authority is exercised in name of some kind of community. Through focus group discussion among 16 and 17 year old pupils\, we set out to a) construct a profile of the relations of authority in the lives of the pupils\, both in and beyond school\, and b) determine to what extent pupils justified those relations of authority on the grounds they felt represented as members of community. We included questions about voting in the Scottish Independence referendum – the voting age was lowered from 18 to 16 for the 18 September 2014 poll. Our provisional conclusions are as follows:\n\n 	Beyond parents\, pupils associate rules and authority primarily with schools (before government\, police and employers)\, at least a third feel they could at least potentially have a say in school rules\, while several say that they owe it to teachers to obey the rules (vertical obligation) though often qualifying this with a fear of consequences if they do not follow the rules.\n 	After schools (and family) pupils view government\, police and employers as authorities in their lives\, but don’t feel represented by MPs or MSPs or have much of a say in anything\, although they do say rules outside school are more binding (while school is good training for learning to obey) and some feel obliged to others (vertical and horizontal) to obey rules and authority outside school.\n 	About voting in Referendum\, most agree that non-temporary residence in Scotland should make eligible and most intend to vote because they feel it will affect their (individual) futures\, while in terms of age\, only a few share critics’ fears that 16/17 year olds will be unduly influenced or uninformed and most feel confident of knowing what to vote\, although many don’t yet feel sufficiently informed and look especially to schools to help.\n\nClick for the Powerpoint slides.\nDiscussion\nJan Kotowski: does theologians’ distinction correspond to civic versus ethnic nationalism?\n\nMichael Keating: not exclusion that controversial but criteria for it\, and culture doesn’t have to be primordial but constructed through as basis for public sphere\n\n 	counterfactual tends to be other national project rather than cosmopolitanism\, in this case English project\n 	typically appeal is to universal values\, starting with US constitution\, but being repackaged\n\n> CB agrees that culture in itself not problem but how becomes essentialised? in case of Gaelic\, for example\, curious that goes on signs in Aberdeenshire instead of Doric\n\nGurpreet Mahajan\n\n 	to NK et al.: schools are way in which we initiate people into political community in that learn to obey authority\, therefore if fear of punishment or cost of disobeying\, can’t be good training ground into political community > best not to assume that really being initiated into political community?\n\n\n 	to CB: in relation to Quebecois\, why not separate “cultural” of shared way of life from deeper “historical”\n\n> CB queries whether distinction between them is useful\n\nShira: phrasing of Referendums can be extremely manipulative\n\n> ST agrees e.g. under de Gaulle\n\nMartijn Koster: realizes that political community closely related to debates on sovereignty (despite Foucault: we still act as though there were sovereign)\n\nDavid Thunder: seems problematic to ground political community in national identity\, e.g. conscious effort in Basque Country to inculcate Basque values in schools etc.\n\nCanglong Wang: contradiction between homogenised emotional process and disparity of emotions e.g. in China: nationalised “Chinese dream” which government urges on individual Chinese\, but oppressing disparity of emotions and experiences in different Chinese lives\n\n> CB political nationalism gets away from cultural nationalism by highlighting deliberation\n\nMargaret Somers: referenda in state of Michigan\n\n 	Anti-affirmative action referendum: many understood as pro-affirmative action but in fact Right has taken over civil rights language of colour blindness\n 	Financial managers appointed in cities that bankrupt: referendum against this which successful\, but Republican legislature tweaked bill and re-passed new bill with coda that may not be subjected to future referenda > corrupting attempt at resistance\n\n> ST doing direct democracy in very cold climate\n\nMatyas Bodig to ST: about constitution making after Referendum\n\n 	shares concerns about what putting beyond deliberation\, but also necessary to have constitutional framework in place quickly\, though could have temporary constitution in South African style\n 	in relation to human rights (which ST said would not include)\, MB insists that articulate minimum content of membership in political community\, systematic violation of which would lead to breaking moral [?] ties between government and citizens > defines where we stand in relation to each other and government\, ensuring there can be ethical integration\n\n> ST yes important to have framework e.g. that prisoners can vote (which in US excludes 20% of young black males) and proposes minimalist package of civil liberties (vote\, criminal justice)\, but other things should be left open to political debate; and how possible to enforce right to healthcare etc.?\n\nAndrea Teti\n\n 	to MB: just talking about civic and political rights?\n 	to ST: civil and political rights often used to marginalise and exclude\, but we don’t dismiss as easily as social and economic\n\n> ST civil and political are within realm of what judges can do\n\nKatinka Weber: did schools project ask about community?\n\n> RS preferred not to include in questionnaire\, but schools were homogenous in terms of ethnicity\nPolitical Community in Context: USA\nMarc Kruman “Race\, Property and Gender in the Early U.S. Republic: Reconfiguring the American Political Community”\nAbstract: Historians of the emerging political community in post-Revolutionary America traditionally have depicted a linear progression from a political community composed of white propertied men to all white men. This account is partially accurate of course. Property as a marker distinguishing white men did erode in the half century after independence. But the story was far more complicated. In my presentation\, if it is accepted\, I will examine how and why property as a qualifier for membership in the political community began to disappear much sooner than suggested by scholars and how and why a racist democracy emerged later than is usually posited. I will examine the ways in which changing understandings of representation—in particular the idea that broad political participation was essential to protect the citizenry from a potentially dangerous government–    helped to reconfigure the American political community from a hierarchy of property to a hierarchy of race and gender. I will conclude with a discussion of how Alexis de Tocqueville sought to solve the problems caused by a broad (if still delimited) democracy. If civic virtue rested in the propertied at the onset of the Revolution\, by the mid-nineteenth century all white males were deemed worthy participants in public life. How could political community be secured in the face the centrifugal forces unleashed by a broad democracy?\n\nIn US transition from property holders to race rather than wealth which opened up participation for women\n\nIn 1831 citizens of Newboro\, NC wrote letter complaining of free black men voting in local elections\n\n 	they used to dominate local trade as ship captains\, and vote solicited since held balance\n 	letter writers argue that founders couldn’t have intended to empower blacks\, arguing that only whites had been allowed to vote\n\nBy 1850s hard to imagine that anyone could ever in 1830s have defended black suffrage\n\n> Revolution different to what gave birth to in end:\n\n 	began with classical republican thought – economic independence freeing men to act for public good and giving stake in society’s well-being\, but…\n 	imperial authorities argued that acted for good of empire even if those outside Britain voted\, i.e. that political community\, but not kind that US colonists embraced\n\n 	made right to vote primary issue for full membership\n\n\n\n\n 	shift from property as measure of personal independence to allowing all tax payers to vote for all or some elected officials\, thus no longer economic independence\, instead citizens needing right to vote to protect against oppression of rapacious assembly\n\nThus only if assumed that representatives will represent you\, don’t need to constrain them\, but if create interest apart from you\, need to place constraints on what could or could not do\n\n 	presumed loyalty was marker\, and Revolution tends to privilege loyalty to cause – thus women voting in New Jersey (in 1790 NJ refers to voters as he and she)\, militiamen including 16 year olds had right to vote > “opening up Pandora’s Box”\n 	typically when women or free blacks then began to influence outcome of election\, they get disfranchised > racist democracy in North as well as in South\n\nPolitical community is malleable > what discuss as normative needs to be historically contextualised\nMargaret Somers “A Political Community—Divided?”\nAbstract: If defined as “one whose members have a shared stake in political institutions and\, for that reason\, subject themselves to the norms and decisions of those institutions\,” what is the theoretical\, political\, or sociological question to which political community is the answer?  Does its implication that there is a unified normative political order adhered to by a body of members serve as a historical counterfactual to the fact that in the U.S. over the last four decades there has been the largest transfer of wealth\, income\, and public resources from middle and low income sectors to the upper-most echelons of the top 1% (which captured 95% of all gains in economic growth from 2009 to 2012)?  The concept sits uneasily with the reality that it has not been a return to “free markets” or deregulation that has generated what Picketty dubs the rise of a new patrimonial capitalism and its yawning gaps of inequality. Rather it has been deliberate government policies that have built this ever-widening divide by coddling investments and punishing wages\, starving public goods\, and undermining the meager citizenship rights of the social state—all in the work of steadily moving wealth upward. And if a political community entails a culture of shared stake holding\, and a collective willingness of its members to mutually “subject themselves” to its rules–i.e. give up a degree of autonomy and freedom for the sake of the whole—then how do we reconcile that desiderata with what Pope Francis in his recent apostolic exhortation calls “An economy of exclusion\,” which he tells us is “no longer…about exploitation and oppression…[T]hose excluded are no longer society’s underside or its fringes or its disenfranchised—they are no longer even a part of it. The excluded are …the outcast\, the ‘leftovers’.”  As products of the “killing fields of inequality” (Therborn)\, these undeserving poor are not recognized as moral equals\, and so are excluded from membership in any community or nation\, and even from human fellowship itself. No longer subjects of empathy\, the socially excluded are a surplus population\, forced to exist entirely outside of any even notional political community\, and with the exception of the police and the criminal law\, outside of contact with and access to the very political institutions that define a community.  As the “internally stateless\,” they are not just unnecessary and disposable; they are inconvenient aggravants.  Their existence poses no moral friction against policies that withhold health care (Medicaid)\, eradicate food stamps\, eliminate unemployment benefits\, and legislate the unconstitutionality of the minimum wage. Critics of these socio-economic realities attribute it to the rise of unfettered free markets and deregulation. But money\, like water\, does not flow upward; these sociological accomplishments have been actively achieved by political practices and institutions that serve no “community” but a narrow patrimonial elite. These observations raise deep questions about the sociological meaning of a political community with any “shared stakes” or mutually recognized political authority.  Perhaps there is an alternative conception of political community that can be mobilized as a countervailing power to this divisive engine of inequality?\n\nSkepticism vs. “political community” as defined here\n\n1. False universality of vertical integration > certainly not case in US: maybe shared norms but not mutual stake-holding > explicit mechanisms of exclusion\, not just accidental\n\n2. Site of horizontal naturalised relations: typically now in “social capital” churches etc.\n\n3. Absence of rights in definition\n\nPope Francis: argues complete exclusion (shows slide of exclusion in New Orleans: floating body)\n\n> argued in New Atlantic article that Pope owes to Polanyi rather than Marx\n\nPolanyi: self-regulating society is utopic for several reasons:\n\n1. Assumptions of market fundamentalists of self-regulating entity stem from “social naturalism” in Hobbes and then through Joseph Townsend to Malthus – social organisation operates on laws of Nature\, with humans are biological rather than moral being\n\n> Polanyi: market fundamentalism requires social naturalism as ontology > social exclusion justified in terms of pre-political undistorted state: distribution of resources\n\nHayek: market society must be treated as natural state of mankind\n\n2. Because impossible – economy dependent on social engineering…\n\n3. …by political power: markets enormously increase range of government regulation > not just infrastructure but land\, labour are only possible through government intervention\n\nMassive redistribution of wealth and income since 70s which is not natural workings but deliberate government policy\n\n> free market capitalism not about free markets but transferring upward through policy etc.\n\nThough “deregulation” is coded as return to natural outcomes > but deregulation is in fact policy to transfer wealth upwards\, while “regulation” is improving conditions for middle and lower classes\n\nEnd of power of social state and social citizenship\, not end of power at such – world without public goods\, which are criteria for membership in any community\, which have as their correlative rights giving protection from state commodification\n\nMarshall: it is only access to public goods that make us recognizable to each other as citizens > this is why health care etc. are social rights\n\nZones of right-lessness – show slide of black man with child faced by National Guard in New Orleans: though FEMA took days\, NG there within hours\n\n> human rights never frees from police and army\n\nProblems with CISRUL definition of political community:\n\n 	False universality: no vertical integration\n 	Not autonomous markets but directed\n\n> MS preferred definition: civil society and communities in alliance with social state\, turning communities into sites of rights bearing citizens (to dismay of communitarians)\, requiring Power of social state\, rights and institutions\nJan Michael Kotowski “A Territorialization of U.S. National Identity? The Politics and Discourses of the U.S.-Mexico Border”\nAbstract:  The Obama administration has not only not reversed the decade-old militarization of the US-Mexico border\, but instead heavily increased spending on so-called “border security” and immigration enforcement. This paper aims to describe and analyze the interplay between the seemingly never-ending policies of intensified immigration enforcement (even within frameworks of “comprehensive immigration reform”) and broader public discourses centered on the southern border. It shall be argued that the border with Mexico has become the chief manifestation of a territorialization of U.S. national identity\, meaning that the rather abstract ideological aspects of the complex U.S. national identity formation have become concretized through a territorial dimension. Furthermore\, within the self-proclaimed American “nation of immigrants\,” the territorialization of the border is accompanied by racialized discourses of “Mexican otherness” that attempt to keep certain aliens excluded from the socio-political community of the United States. This “identity shift” can be seen not only in the political willingness to actually fortify the border\, but also in various public discourses\, ranging from talk-radio to TV series such as “Border Wars” and\, of course\, political rhetoric from various political alliances and lobby groups. The proposed paper will commence with a theoretical discussion of the relationship between borders\, political community\, and national identity and include an empirical part focused on current discourses of “border security.”\n\nMilitarization of border leads to territorialisation of US identity in past 25 years – adds to repertoire of US identity\n\n> legitimizes deeply exclusionary citizenship practices though concretization of “the law” into political category\, with border as faultline of this discourse\, making clear to Americans who can rightfully belong to political and national community\n\nTwo sides of US Immigration discourse\n\n 	Nation of immigrants\n 	Exclusivity\n\n> but Roger Smith: not distinct but have developed together (Honig: nationalist xenophilia produces xenophobia at same time)\n\nImmigrant policy:\n\n 	only seen enforcement with doubled budget in 10 years\, increase in border guards and border fence extending across most of border except Rio Grande\n 	but Republicans claim border still not secure in order to stymie CIR\, even if in fact reversed border flow\n 	meanwhile 1994-2009 5607 migrants died in border acc. to SRA\n 	thus year 50K+ minors have tried to enter and held in legal limbo of detention centres\, unclear whether can stay or will be deported\n\nCultural manifestations e.g. “Borders Wars” on National Geog showing Border Patrol catching illegals\n\nKaufman optical model: Referent > Ideological lens > Symbolic resources > National image\n\n> is territory the referent? Or is it symbolic resource that needs to be defended by state?\n\nConclusion\n\n 	Fortified border concretizes eligible political community\, including in voluntary terms – choosing not to break law\n 	Given that US citizenship tied to abstract notion of “law”\, seemingly stable\, works to articulate boundary between legal and illegal\n 	Inside and outside heavily racilsied but appear as natural outcomes of enforcing law: Latino underclass seen through lens of law\, especially at time of “color blindness”\n\nDiscussion\nST: territory was in 19th century always important like Euro nation-state e.g.US-Mexico\, Louisiana Purchase\n\n> JK in 20th century territory becomes secondary [or that diff notions of territory]\n\n> MK agrees important in 19th century though agrees that receded\n\n> MS argues that Republicans in 1980s aggregated conservative Evangelicals with Wall Street etc. combining anti-abortion etc. with tax cuts for rich; but also deeper liberal-Anglo anti-statism despite conflation with drug-seeking dog stat\n\n>> ST political mobilization has tended to play key role and often against Supreme Court – it seems that Constitution is no solution\n\nDavid Thunder\n\n 	To MS “community” can still be aspirational even if  not actual\n 	To JK referent it created by ideological lens\, not just filtered through it > dialectical process: perhaps referent is simply “we” or “our community”\n\nAjay: in global South seems different story\, at heart of neoliberal era\, massive expansion of rights discourse and welfare programmes etc. > capitalism is justifying itself in terms of public goods in compensation\, including for primitive accumulation\n\nJames King:\n\n 	does “homeland” (Homeland Security) mean different sense of territory?\n 	also UK Border Force programme that’s looking for drugs\, immigrants\, etc.\n\nJMK: IRCA started fortification but only later that criminalisation of immigration\n\n 	though MK there is counter-narrative to criminalisation: it is politically contested\n\nMK queries Ajay’s comment that different narrative in global South – treatment of minorities that extraordinarily exploitative socio-economic system\, e.g. recent documentary on leather-workers in India\n\n> MS – finds case of India to be anomalous\, giving example of Pinochet ending social welfare\n\nGurpreet: if political community undertakes task of redistribution and rights of people\, then need JMK’s boundaries around it?\n\n> JMK agrees\, giving ex. of left-wing anti-immigration who want to keep resources for own people\n\nNigel: deregulation especially in international sphere\, e.g. WTO\, and tax havens are regulated in favour of wealth\n\nDejan: is racist democracy since 1850s just US phenomenon?\n\nPablo Marshall to MS: suspicious about possibilities of rebelling against universality\, rather than ideal political community\n\n> MS doesn’t want to discard universality: UDHR is full of socioeconom rights is universal aspirational document\, problem is Republicans trying to condition\n\nJames King: liked internal statelessness – is this just experience of racialised underclass?\n\n? liberals would argue that don’t need stake in power but only to be protected\, e.g. women don’t need in own right but to be protected by men\nPolitical Community in Context: India\nGurpreet Mahajan “Ideas of Political Community: A Contextual Exploration”\nAbstract: Although the concept of political community has a long history\, going back to ancient Greece\, its meaning has to be understood contextually. In the modern world\, the idea of political community was employed by Hegel to suggest that the state may possess legal authority but it gains legitimacy only when the subjective will of the citizens coincides with the objective law. Since then the notion of political community has been employed to argue that a sense of being a community is necessary to hold the members together; in fact\, without it the state cannot perform its essential functions or create the conditions necessary for good life. Yet\, the notion of political community that emerged as a critique of the Weberian and liberal conceptions of the state had the possibility of furthering cultural majoritarianism.  It was to minimize this risk that the republicans argued that members of a political community would share only commitment to a set of political ideals or values\, perhaps in the form that they are enshrined in the constitution of that polity. The case of the indigenous people in North America reveals that even this understanding can be a source of disadvantage for the minorities; but the point I wish to emphasize here is that this conception of political community\, with its universalist assumptions\, accounts for many of the difficulties that western democracies are today confronting while dealing with the concerns of minorities in their society. A comparison with India would highlight this even more sharply. From the struggle for political freedom to her journey after independence\, the political leadership in India was keen to nurture a political community but they were mindful of the possibility of it expressing the cultural ethos of the majority. Hence they constructed a new cultural narrative of peaceful co-existence of communities and a syncretic tradition. This was supplemented by a historical narrative comprising of a positive representation of different communities. It is this that made the public sphere more diverse and allowed for legal pluralism. While the Indian framework is not without its limitations it seems that even the republican conception of political community needs to be supplemented by such strategies of representation to accommodate minorities on equal terms. Unlike democracies in the west India did not\, however\, reflect on the nature of ties that bind citizens together. This space was occupied by social\, ascribed communities. It was easy to lapse into a situation where citizens began to relate to each other as members of different communities – a trend that has since taken deep roots in the functioning of its electoral democracy.\n\nHegel: political community involves people with set of institutions taking decisions about governing selves\, but also political community in which institutions don’t just exercise authority but seen as legitimate\, such that we feel realized as free\, self-determining individuals > what this means will is not fixed idea but will inevitably shift… legitimacy for Hegel is when voluntarily submit yourself to what law says\, because you think that does represent what doing yourselves\n\nIndia: aspiration to be seen as political community – something that have to achieve: sees itself as political community in making\n\n> in struggle against colonial powers\, sense of making of political community\, though not without internal dissent: different opinions across religious and caste lines\n\nKey moment at which get together and deliberate about shared aspirations > making constitutions is key process: in many contexts doesn’t get accepted\, so achievement when come to consensus and give themselves constitution\, giving basic structure of what polity will be\n\nWhat allowed consensus and what sustained it?\n\n 	Element of representation: India conscious that going to political community but with many communities within it\, which should all be represented – though never quite achieved\, what crucial is effort to move in this direction\n\n> Representational moment gives stake in political community\, important in nurturing and sustaining consensus\n\n 	But needs to be nurtured and sustained > need to bring stronger notions of sharing: how to do without alienating some groups and other?\n\nConsensus has held well despite many challenges from groups\, since involvement in electoral process – you can influence outcome\, therefore gives people stake even when being pushed to peripheries\n\nAs soon as political community\, other forms of community and belonging come in\, strengthening ethnic bonds etc. which are in tension with political community\, but pushes to build ways in which different groups are involved in process\nAjay Gudavarthy “Invoking Community and Imposing Authority”\nAbstract:  Community is central to the way authority is imagined in India. There is a palpable tension between the way an idea of cultural/political community\, around caste\, religion\, ethnicity and region is invoked\, as against the understanding that in a democracy authority is truly `secular` when it moves beyond community and imagines the process as an interaction between individual-citizen and the political process or one that is trans-sectional\, rather than an enclosed community. This tension will be mapped through a debate around:\n\n 	\n\n 	\n\n 	\n\n 	the (il)legitimacy of the practice of following what is referred to as `vote-bank` politics vis-a-vis religious minorities\, especially the Muslims\, as against the rational/informed choice made by the `general` electorate.\n 	Similarly\, there is a tension between mobilizing identity and the need to move towards post-identity and post-ideology mobilization around development and governance.\n 	With regard to caste\, there is a tension between caste-based parties\, and caste-based policies such as the affirmative action policies (referred to as reservations in India) and the need to have an affirmative action policies on the basis of economic (class) criterion.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nThe paper will look at the either side of the divide\, those for invoking the idea of entrenched community (essentially kinship-based) to mobilise the subaltern against the majoritarian and hegemonic power of the dominant groups on the state\,as against those opposed to the idea as this kind of community-based mobilisation is leading to weaker citizenship-rights and entrenched psyche that is resulting\, not in questioning the dominant authority but spurt in intra-subaltern conflicts.\n\nTension between ascriptive and civic community on other\, for long time\, but now reaching dead end\n\n> India now going toward majoritarian turn\, using language of civic solidarity and community (??)\, in as multiculturalist positions etc. getting exhausted\n\nBut post-colonial: intrinsic\, hidden resources within ascriptive communities\, which can make for civic community\, even when demanding special status etc.\n\nWhy doesn’t ascriptive vs. civic get resolved?\n\nTwo case studies\n\n1. Survey of Muslims in recent election when Muslim candidates not returned\n\n 	Muslims interviewed say that the more political representation\, the more problems will face > they say only want tickets when have majority and can vote en bloque\n 	Hindu majority looks at as vote bank politics\, which weakening project of citizenship\, polarising along communal lines\, rather than “pseudo-secular” discourse of appeasing Muslims as minority\n 	Muslims interviewed by saying that when Hindus vote in block called secular while when Muslims vote in block called communal; and saying that Hindus will not vote for Muslim candidates\, nor Dalit candidates\n\no   Slogan: “justice for all\, appeasement of none”\n\n2. Defeat of post-colonial myth of ascriptive communities becoming included and transforming\, instead reproducing themselves\n\n 	in fact what produces is new social elites among Dalits and Muslims\, e.g. urban Dalits dropping discourse of land reform\, now instead affirmative action policies\n 	Patron-client relations (?)\n 	Intra-subaltern conflicts e.g. within Dalits\, between OBCs and Muslims\, etc. etc. now seems to replace conflict with upper castes etc.\n\n3. Affirmative action: opponents argue to move away from caste to class-based reservations in order to break old caste barriers\n\n 	This is in Constitution though eventually decided that backward classes were backward castes\, so comes full circle\n 	Now all caste groups want to be recognized as backward\, disputing among themselves\, and Jat landed elite get declared backward by Congress\, because shift from status hierarchy to share in state resources\n\n> as ascriptive communities becoming internally fragmented\, now more attracted toward majoritarian civic solidarity\, not just for middle and upper class\, but for subaltern\n\n 	especially since all castes are both oppressed and oppressors\n\nWhereas elsewhere\, turn toward difference in recent years\, this was starting point in India: India doesn’t have comfortable language\, which is where both liberal and post-colonial literatures have gone wrong\, thus need for new political language in India\nDiscussion\nHanifi for GM: she says representation is important for reaching consensus\, while Ajay sees ascriptive based representation creates new elites – how can consensus between elites help sort out our problems in political community?\n\n> GM tension exists – fact that is representation does help to assert symbolically that political community exists: even if elite representatives don’t speak for you all the time\, will do so at particular moment e.g. on land reform\n\nChuck: seems parallel to US in that Voting Rights Act meant to protect ability to vote en masse\, though SC argues that this just encourages voting along those lines\, proposing that not to use race to categorise votes\n\n> AG some similarities but in India argument has been that use caste to fight caste\n\nDavid Thunder: on ascriptive vs. civic\, sometimes only way communities can negotiate interests is by acting as community\, though liberal ethos that have rights as individuals\n\n> AG not being replaced by individualism even though groups or communities no longer stable\n\nRitu Vij\n\n 	for GM often argued that Hegelian leads to communitarian notion but for Hegel this is also aspiration or end of history – but politics of Hegelian can only be status politics\, while Jean-Luc Nancy develops community in anti-statist understanding of politics\n 	for AG\, may be that turn in India from caste to class? i.e. shift in capitalism\n\n> AG yes agrees that possible\n\nMartijn Koster: Are Muslims voting for Hindu candidates in return for resources? If so would Hindus vote for Muslims?\n\n> AG yes\, post-colonials feel that outside contract etc. but in fact often contractual negotiation\, despite language of good governance and development which stigmatises identity politics\, using  sheer numbers of voters as bargaining power; can include simply being promised protection e.g. from eviction of slums from “illegal” land\n\nRivke: Though can be Hindu and Indian\, seems not possible to be Muslim and Indian: are these competing?\n\n> GM yes\, majoritarian groups may put pressure to prove themselves as loyal citizens\, while Muslims and others may demand more than just recognition or symbolic presence\n\n> AG demanding place for inclusion e.g. through reservation and other claims\, also stigmatises and degrades (i.e. it is possible to make demands as Muslims but this degrades you in sphere of civil society)\n\nNigel: To GM\, Amartya Sen proposed if that have multiple identities\, less likely to be essentialist about single one\n\n> GM Constitution gives space for multiple identities\, esp. religious\, caste and class\n\nRaul Acosta: sometimes sounds like dichotomising community and individual\, though Ajay argues that turn away from ascriptive to communities but not toward individual – Raul quotes anthropologist in Africa who make virtue of dependence on others\, stressing sociality and need to act together\n\n> AG loosening of kinship ties but not clear where constructed communities will go\n\nKatinka Weber: possible that overlapping communities whereby inclining to local communities for certain issues and national community for others\n\n> GM yes\, and there are times when national is final and others times when cultural is final\n\n> AG communities in India always ahead of social scientists – when arguing that too structured\, suddenly alliance between Dalits and Muslims etc. > very hard to predict\n\n> GM going to be dilemma for much of world – find ways to make space for other community memberships: perhaps this is nature of political community that can never be all-encompassing\, universal\, but always need to find historical resources to forge political community\n\nRivke to GM: do you think Britain successful at accommodating diversity?\n\n> GM British were good at dress codes etc. but visible signs were not really issue\n\n> AG recent EU statement saying that need to learn from India how to deal with diversity – in Europe very codified diversity but in India is lived which is why codified segregated multiculturalism can never work in India\nWednesday 25th June\nPolitical Community in Context: Hungary and Southeast Europe\nBalazs Majtenyi “Authority in the Name of Nation”\nAbstract: The presentation examines the theoretical issues regarding the use of the term nation in constitutions and analyses the relationship between the identity of the state and the protection of human rights. The impact of international and transnational human rights documents have remained limited in the area of the identity of a political community so far. Yet\, the constitutional understanding of the nation directly effects the interpretation of fundamental rights and other constitutional principles. The presentation examines the different ways of institutionalizing the concept of nation in constitutions\, then it discusses what consequences may result if the principles of constitutionalism and national identity of the state are in conflict. The predominant use of an ethnic concept of the nation may cause legitimate concerns for domestic human rights protection. This hypothesis can be examined through the example of how the concept of the nation has changed in Central and Eastern European constitutions. The presentation compares the Constitution of 1989 of Hungary with the recent Hungarian Fundamental Law (2011)\, and it discusses the consequences of the different terminology on human rights protection. Similarly to most European democratic constitutions\, the 1989 Constitution used primarily a civic concept of nation\, while the Fundamental Law introduces an ethnic concept. The official definition of the ethnic majority can reveal a lot about a society\, including the status of minority groups\, but also about the state of constitutionalism. An analysis of the Hungarian Fundamental Law\, which uses the concept of an ethnic nation in an unconventional way\, can help to interpret the processes that lead to crises of new democracies. The presentation tackles the question how the primary use of the ethnic concept of the nation can be reconciled with the moral equality of citizens and how it is possible to interpret human rights institutions if the state identifies itself with the ethnic nation.\n\nNew Hungarian Constitution\n\n 	begins “We Hungarians…with sense of responsibility for every Hungarian” > defines nation as spiritual and cultural community: ethnic concept of nation\n 	 “we recognize role Christianity has played in preserving our nation”\n 	“testament between Hungarians past\, present and future”: refers to transcendent\, non-secular layer of contract\n 	no reference to equality\, instead to faith\, loyalty etc.\n 	similar to Jacobean: any social groups fragment national will (even though in Hungary will of ethnic nation as opposed to Jacobean will of public sphere)\n 	defined as criminal organisations that betray nation\, meaning that government can restrict human rights\n 	protecting family as basis of nation’s survival\, which restricts rights of childless couples etc.\n 	distinguishes recognised and non-recognised minorities\, the latter becoming second- or third-rate citizens\, being indirectly discriminating against Roma minority\n 	right to decent housing but in same article possibility of punishing homelessness “in order to protect cultural values\, legal rules can punish homelessness” (also unusual to restrict fundamental rights to protect cultural values)\n 	to restrict freedom of speech\, protection of dignity of Hungarian nation (whereas dignity usually used for dignity of person\, rather than community or nation)\n\nCitizenship legislation creates inequalities in frame of citizenship\n\n 	Everyone has to vote\, but non-resident ethnic Hungarians have only one vote > argues really about government\n\nIn name of ethnic nation\, Hungarian government can limit human rights\, and constitution reflects interest of government rather than moral values\n\n 	Also\, promotes traditional Christian family who not living in public area and not Communist\n\n> thus does not fulfil integrity condition of modern constitutions\, going against republican tradition of country\nAndreea Udrea“From Recognition to Non-Resident Citizenship: Hungary’s Kin-state Policies and Their Conceptions of Equality”\nAbstract: Even though the Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries became a legal standard in Europe following the evaluation of the legitimacy of a kin-state’s involvement carried out by the Council of Europe’s Commission for Democracy through Law\, the multiplication and diversification of European kin-state policies in the last decade has heightened the debate over the normative foundations of a kin-state’s intervention as responsibility for justice. The Hungarian legislation of 2001 sets a kin-state’s duties to be the responsibility to protect the cultural identity of its kin-minorities in the neighbouring states and to support their cultural flourishing. However\, by facilitating the access of the members of its kin-minorities to non-resident Hungarian citizenship\, the Act XLIV on Hungarian Nationality from 2010 extends Hungary’s kin-state responsibility from a duty of recognition to a constitutional commitment to equal citizenship. Focusing on the case of Hungary’s kin-state policies\, this paper discusses the articulation of its trans-domestic duties of recognition and equality\, and examines the relationship between a kin-state’s duty of identity recognition and that of equality. Contrary to dominant views in liberalism\, I show that in the case of the Hungarian legislation on kin-minorities\, identity recognition is not instrumental to achieving equality between resident and non-resident citizens. I argue that their lack of convergence weakens the inclusive and democratic value of citizenship putting a kin-state’s policies at odds with liberalism.\n\nKin-minorities: groups incorporated in one state but identifying with core group in other state\n\ne.g. Danish in Germany\, Italians in Croatia and Slovenia\n\nHer focus is on kin-state obligations\n\nPolitical community: her focus is on inclusion and accommodation – integration of new members in political community when members continue to live in other countries\n\n[but is inclusion really the primary function of political community: surely more fundamental questions]\n\nKin-state legislation extends state’s obligations beyond borders: shows that shared identities politically important beyond borders of state\n\nLiberal cosmopolitans in 2 camps\n\n1. reject shared identity: doesn’t capture individual experience (e.g. Woldron)\n\n2. defend moral and political importance of ties among citizens or groups of citizens: liberal nationalism does not contradict cosmopolitanism – depends on instance\n\n> she takes this position\n\nOn basis of case study of Hungarian Act of 2001\, no evidence that undermines human rights of Hungarians living abroad (beneficiaries) nor duties to rest of people beyond borders\, not against moral equality and may even promote it\n\n 	Act targets c. 3M citizens living in several countries offering assistance in education\, culture and science in Hungary and in home states\n 	Disassociates duty of identity recognition from citizenship of beneficiaries > independent of differences in status between citizens in Hungary and Hungarian minorities\n 	Does  not address asymmetries between Hungarians within borders and those beyond\n\nNationality Act of 2010: non-resident citizenship policy > no longer requirement to reside in Hungary but instead showing genuine link with Hungary\n\n 	Includes right to vote agreed in 2011\n\nBoth Acts create inequalities between resident and non-resident citizens\nDejan Stjepanović “Statehood alternatives: A comparative perspective on territorial politics in Europe”\nAbstract: Politics of historic regions in Western Europe have received significant scholarly attention. Much less has been said about their counterparts in other parts of the continent. There is a renewed tendency among certain sub-state regional political actors in Western Europe to focus on state building while their counterparts in Southeastern Europe are excluding the independent statehood option. I will examine the commonly asserted claim that most territorial political projects will ultimately lead to demands for the establishment of an independent state\, even if they are de-ethnicising (moving from ethnic towards civic claims) and stressing territorial criteria for membership. This is an innovative research as it compares territorial politics in sub-state historic territories from Southeastern and Western Europe. It offers an original contribution to the existing literature by rebutting teleological understandings of territorial political processes\, the assumption that there is a finality of territorial politics – the establishment of a sovereign nation state.According to Milward (2000)\, European integration strengthened the role of nation states in Europe. However\, European integration provides a number of ways in which the nationalities question can be accommodated. It provides mainly symbolic but also some practical opportunities that challenge the doctrine of unitary state sovereignty. EU integration provides a number of opportunities for stateless nations (and regions) to project themselves beyond state borders (Keating 2001) allowing them to by-pass the state as the only relevant locus of politics. Within this transformed sovereignty and the setting of multi-level politics\, nationality claims in the sub-state arena may be treated as a form of politics that can be accommodated within the existing boundaries\, rather than as claims that necessarily lead to separation. Claims for self-determination and various forms of (limited) independence in the sub-state historic territories such as Catalonia\, Flanders and Scotland have entered a new phase not witnessed in the last decades. Often out of the spotlight are cases of historic territories which just like their Western European counterparts are de-ethnicising and re-territorialising membership\, but unlike them are explicitly refuting any claims to independence. They are also frequently using the imagery of the European Union as a legimitising factor. In the last two decades\, the prominent examples are the sub-state regional polities of Istria in Croatia and Vojvodina in Serbia. These are the cases of what I call in my doctoral thesis and elsewhere (Stjepanović 2012) ‘plurinational’ and ‘multinational’ regionalisms rather than sub-state or stateless nationalisms. I will thus ask why political projects in Europe that are de-ethnicising their membership are manifested primarily as nationalisms that sometimes promote ‘total exit options’ (Bartolini 2005) in Western Europe and regionalisms that nearly always exclude independent statehood in Southeastern Europe\, despite many underlying similarities.\n\nWhy in W Europe de-ethnicising manifests as total exit options while in E Europe as regionalisms that do not support statehood?\n\nDebates on exit options:\n\n1. Institutional design: decides whether politicians will muster support for independence\n\n2. Regionalism precedes nationalism\, e.g. Catalunya – regionalist project over time becomes state-seeking nationalist project\n\n3. Autonomy is slippery slope to secession\n\n 	cultural but especially territorial autonomy (since autonomy typically for ethnic groups rather than territorial)\n 	especially when made by regional political parties\n 	minority autonomy claim is on continuum from cultural to territorial to secessionist autonomy\n\n> though DS argues that theory actually feeds into practice when picked up by politicians: self fulfilling prophecy\n\nRegionalisms: takes as cases Vojvodina region of Slovenia and Istria region of Croatia\n\n+ if EU citizenship\, no longer any justification for claiming kin citizenship\, because minorities already provided protection\, e.g. N. Ireland\n\n 	though I pointed out that Hungary\, Romania already EU members when extended citizenship – he says that EU saw Hungary as problem but not Italy because more powerful though perhaps also because fewer (and M2 thinks EU sees in context of authoritarian direction of Hungarian government)\n 	he disagrees w Bieber that dual citizenship as insurance policy combined w exit policy is a good thing\, because typically makes state offload responsibilities – and same is true of EU citizenship\n\nNew regionalism – differs from traditional in that combining culture/identity\, economic development\, autonomy vs. bringing resources from centre to periphery\n\nCan we talk about new regionalism in W Europe? Argues that not\, e.g. of Scotland that Devo-Max is more extreme than claim for independence > originally Referendum was to include Devo Max but UK agreed only to independence\n\nExplanation:\n\n 	Historical development\n 	Prominence of history of conflict over territories\n 	Normative context influences territorial strategies\n\nDiscussion\nJan-Michael Kotowski\n\n 	to BM\, compares to Turkish case\n 	to DS\, are these small entities not really so different to Catalonia and Scotland that comparison is meaningless?\n\nST agrees that devolution is more radical than independence – independence doesn’t affect state itself > we don’t want to leave but want you to rethink what you are\, which more damaging to state; Barroso objects to nationalists for daring to think of entity beyond state\n\nDavid Thunder to AU: how is kin-state citizenship not in conflict with liberal cosmopolitanism\, respect for all humans\, given that distinguishing along lines of ethnicity?\n\n> AU kin minorities as opposed to diasporic minorities became so against their choice\n\n> AU mainly looking at symbolic recognition rather than distribution\, which unusual (though Germany gives substantial to Danish in Germany)\n\nMatyas: what happening in Hungary raises large questions for us\n\n 	Anti-liberal project which taken as achievement of current Prime Minister\, picking anti-liberal elements of other EU constitutions\, so others can’t object\n 	Achieved by manipulating boundaries of political community: defined in terms of ethnic nationalism\, filled up by substantive connotation of that ethnos\, e.g. Christianity\, creating stratified residential/non-residential citizenship\, leaving minorities in limbo\, and on that basis justifying authoritarian practices in state > state capable of protecting this identity in globalised world\n 	Are political communities free in constructing normative identity? Or should be restrictions in international HR law?\n 	Interplay between political community and institutions: state is institutional machinery through which identity that political community demands is protected > but here state becomes active agent setting terms for political community\, justifying authoritarian practices in that respect\n\n 	not unique and closest example is Turkey: clamping down on minorities etc. in order to shore up stat\n 	in Hungary seemed developing away from this\, and since then other countries have found attractive\, even in EU\n\n\n\nBM Hungary is not longer constitutional democracy in his opinion\, since anti-egalitarian\n\nMB explains that anti-liberal in that trumping individual rights with community interests\, which is how Hungarian PM wanted to do it\n\n? What does Hungarian case say about political community especially in relation to authority?\n\n 	what is Hungarian is now political question\, being non-Hungarian means having liberal or socialist views\n\nEmilio: in what sense are values in Constitution pre-modern? For example\, 19th century Italian Constitution is blood\, and Hauerwas et al. argue that cultural belonging is main reference for political identity\n\nNigel: true that conflicts with Pogge-style cosmopolitanism but not Scheffler-type: all human beings have equal status must include concept of well-being to be substantial\, which must in turn include identity etc. to be meaningful given how important to well-being\n\nAndrea Teti: worried that too much focus on formal in discussions – asks again\, what is question to which political community is answer? seems from discussion that: how do we ignore questions of substantive claims\, e.g. in relation to inequality? In case of Hungary\, where is agency of population as well as material conditions that allowed constitutional changes to take place?\n\nCanglong: diversity being ignored in face of national fusion – can it respect citizenship of minorities? certainly debatable in context of China\n\nGurpreet:\n\n 	to DS\, explain why regional autonomy does more damage to state than secession\n 	would citizenship more than state bring in concerns of fairness and justice? seems fairness and justice being placed outside in ambit of human rights\, because if do that\, citizenship will never address this\n\nMargaret Somers: what are socio-economic horizontal divisions mapped onto vertical categories by which belonging is established? who are people making decisions in ruling parties? seems inequality being left out of discussion?\n\nTamas Gyorgi: seems that shift from old fashioned liberal democracy toward electoral democracy\nThemes in Political Community: Relations of Duty\nDavid Thunder “What Do Citizens Owe Their Communities? A Critique of Duty-Based Approaches to Justice and Responsibility”\nAbstract: One of the hallmarks of modern theories of justice\, from Hobbes and Locke to Rawls and Habermas\, is that they tend to conceptualize a just social order less as the intentional\, ongoing\, and precarious achievement of just and virtuous individuals\, and more as the outcome of a set of institutional and moral constraints upon people’s behavior and projects. Social order\, on this view\, is at bottom an elaborate game\, and the task of the theorist is to determine which ground rules—whether moral or legal—can ensure (to the extent practicable) that economic and social interactions and outcomes are fair to all parties involved. This duty-based approach undoubtedly captures important truths about the practice of justice\, in particular the coordinating role of institutions and the need for clarity about citizens’ public obligations. Nonetheless\, as I shall argue in this paper\, duty-based approaches tend to offer an excessively minimalist picture of a citizen’s responsibilities toward his or her community. This minimalist picture is greatly facilitated by the fact that proponents of the duty-based approach conceptualize the problem of justice as one of limiting individual freedom rather than unleashing its full potential. Once the problem of justice is set up in this way\, an important fact about the practice of justice is effectively lost from view\, namely that the creative and prudential exercise of freedom plays a vital role in the promotion and maintenance of justice\, no less than the constraint of freedom by moral and institutional rules. In the first part of the paper\, I make a case for the centrality of free personal initiatives to the practice of justice. In the second part\, I argue that this observation compels us to reframe justice as a common project imposing open-ended responsibilities upon stakeholders\, rather than merely a system of duties narrowly construed. The upshot of my argument is that once we see the vital role of free personal initiatives in discharging the collective burdens of justice in community\, we are compelled to accept a broader and more demanding conception of the responsibilities of citizens than what what we typically find in standard liberal accounts.\n\nPolitical community wins allegiance of members when shows that giving to each due\, providing justice for all\n\nJustice can be analysed as\n\n 	Personal virtue\n 	Property of community relations: internal justice of community – on this will focus\n\nPolitical community bears collective responsibility for distributing justice among members\n\nIntending to critique narrative that says false hope in state-centered narrative because disables community and disenfranchises citizenship from their responsibility for justice\n\nIdealizing account of justice: Rawls defends liberal welfare state for basic liberties\, using tax revenue for producing goods for decent life\n\n 	justice society = well-ordered society\n 	collective responsibility of justice in institutions\, to which citizens must comply – Rawlsian virtues are about compliance with just institutions (hard-working\, civil\, get on well with fellow-citizens\, etc.) > good citizen is compliant citizen – will do justice on our behalf provided we play our role as compliant citizens\n\nRealist\, non-ideal account of justice: building just social order against background of imperfectly working institutions\n\n 	Relies on uncoordinated initiatives from citizens to counter-balance imperfections\, e.g. Civil Rights in US which confronted resistant institutions [but surely this is civil society – although uncoordinated means unorganised? How about Church?]\n 	Has a cost and these costs may be disproportionately borne by some – even in Venezuela leaders are being killed – and fruits enjoyed by others\n\n> who is responsible citizen in non-ideal society? requires different sort of virtues: solidarity\, courage\, non-conformism\, generosity\, etc.\n\nMay be that civic leaders need to develop these more\, but other citizens need them too\nCamille Walsh “Duty and Community: Drawing the Lines of Exclusion in the 20th Century U.S.”\nAbstract: How do the obligations of citizenship generate and limit our imagination of political community?  Drawing on the work of Turner\, Kerber\, Fineman and other scholars of citizenship and vulnerability\, this paper traces the historical links between differences in the duties that particular groups have been permitted to engage in within the U.S. (gendered military service\, racialized taxation\, etc.) and the entitlements that those groups are then able to claim from the state – and perhaps from each other.  This paper will also take up the recent discussion of “polycentric constitutionalism” in U.S. legal scholarship to identify the different ways narratives and justifications of power are generated and framed through reference to robust participation in the duties of citizenship\, and the different ways of imagining the multiplicity of communities and constitutive authorities through diffuse constitutional lenses.  Two core historical examples inform this study.  First\, I look at the debate over the implementation of the G.I. Bill in the U.S. at the end of WWII\, in which a limited and constricted\, as well as gendered and raced\, welfare state was permitted through claims to the special form of political community created by the uniqueness of military service (despite the technically higher civilian casualty rate in industrial work on the U.S. home front).  This provides a sharp contrast to the experience of many European nations after the war and the creation of broader welfare state protections and ultimately\, inclusions.  Second\, I examine the use of “taxpayer” rhetoric to systematically exclude people of color from the perceived political community in the 20th century U.S. and the way in which that rhetoric has grown around and intertwined with anti-immigrant fervor in recent decades.\n\nRefers to The Wire: Omar says won’t raise gun to “citizen” and also says to “tax payer”\n\n> even though all paying sales tax in corner store\, strong symbolic association with citizenship\n\nTurner: worker citizen\, warrior citizen\, reproductive citizen > can all make particular claims on state [those this not really way that work]\n\n+ similarly Judith Sklar: if working is duty of citizen\, allows eventually to claim right to work\n\n+ consumer citizen: can make claims because bought X\n\nHer book focuses on racialisation of tax payer rights to claim education: how language of tax payer has been used by parents to exclude others from receiving schooling benefits\n\ne.g. new secessionism: Alabama etc. allowed to tax selves as\n\n> historically there was distinction between white and black taxes\, each going to different schools\n\nFinds blacks making argument that since paying taxes are entitled to school that not being burned down\n\n…while in second half of book\, whites arguing that paying more taxes and thus entitled to better provision\n\n> this has connotations of market relationship\n\nIn fact courts have consistently said that no case on grounds of tax-paying\, not because progressive but because judicial efficiency – don’t know how much tax has paid\, and also hard to determine e.g. whether includes sales taxes; but people are not aware of this and continue making claims to Congress etc.\n\nWhy no social welfare state? Moment when came close – FDR wanted GI Bill to apply across board\, but veteran groups manage to exclude civilians\, arguing that special nature of military service – though in fact in WWII highest casualty rate was on home front\, in factories etc. where predominantly women and also many blacks excluded [but this is political claim – this is what should have been done] even though women largely excluded from military service\n\n> language of duty and obligation used to exclude population on basis of race and gender\n\nAdds that as homebuyers typically make claims\, for example attempts to make home-owning criterion for voting on certain initiatives\nDiscussion\nAdam Fusco: are we arguing that democratic activity should be formal duty rather than activism with no institutional link? Otherwise hard to see how these virtues could come to be\n\n> DT agrees would have to provide more detailed proposal; acknowledges that Rawls mentions need for citizens to promote just community but if took this seriously\, might have led in different direction; initiatives themselves can’t be coordinated in advance but may response to institutional gap\n\nKatharina\n\n 	For DT\, is there responsibility for citizens to counteract unjust institutions\, given costs?\n\n> DT Game theoretic: unfair to expect citizens to undertake high costs for collective goods\, but unsure about this\n\n 	For CW\, Could jury duty be a substitute criterion? Or should let go of entitlement criteria altogether?\n\n> CW jury duty doesn’t have same aura of sacrifice of time and money as military service;  on grounds of cosmopolitanism\, wants to have everyone have same entitlements regardless of criteria\n\nMarek Szilvasi\n\n 	To DT\, how ensure that individuals become virtuous without institutions such as schooling?\n\n> DT yes through schools and civic education should impart these virtues\n\n 	To CW\, notes that currently EU placing stress on labour market integration as source of entitlement\n\nMargaret Somers\n\n 	Judith Sklar’s main point is that all US citizenship is based on inclusionary identity which is only opposed to chattel slavery > not right to work but to earn; and she also points out that most US voters don’t > not being excluded is what gives identity – citizenship practice itself is irrelevant\, what interests people is who is excluded from it\n 	New Deal was white\, both in that FDR gets support by withdrawing anti-lynching law as well as by targeting\n 	Claims to social security is made in terms of earning it\, as opposed to poor people who haven’t earned it; and over $106K not paying social security taxes\n\nAjay\n\n 	For CW\, thinks that not now tax payer that instantiates citizenship in modern democracy but right to speak for and about others > by looking at language of obligation\, we deny people opportunity to speak not just for selves but for others – blacks not derecognised because not tax payers but why not able to speak on behalf of whites >> how is political obligation linked to political participation?\n\n> CW agrees and white supremacists are speaking as if they know intuitively what whites and blacks are paying\, which doesn’t appear in black letter writers\n\n 	For DT If alternative to institutions is human virtue\, virtue tends to presuppose social equality: how expect poor to be heroic\, women to make sacrifice\, blacks to be selfless\, etc.?\n\n> DT not alternative but simply counter to intuition that institutions represent me therefore I have to do nothing; would be patronising not to expect these things of oppressed groups – gives example of autodefensas who stand up to mafias in controlled communities\, exhibiting courage\n\nJan-Michael Kotowski: notes that US allowing more non-citizens in army\, while military service in Dream Act can be pathway to citizenship\n\nMark Kruman:\n\n 	tax-paying becomes means to claim full citizenship\n 	on consumer citizenship\, GW Bush after 9/11 asked how could be good citizens and he answered go shopping\n 	for DT\, observes that sounds like modern form of civic republicanism – volunteers coming in to do public service >these are more broadly conceptualised than citizen initiatives\n\n> DT possibly version of civic republicanism yes\, and finds that stop at level of volunteering and service\, rather than challenging institutional structures\nThemes in Political Community: Within and Beyond the State\nMartijn Koster “New spaces of brokerage: active citizens and the informalization of political communities in the Netherlands”\nAbstract:  While the state continues its retreat from welfare provision\, it deliberately leaves spaces in the political domain to citizens and their local communities. In the Netherlands\, the current government has coined the notion of the “participatory society” [participatiesamenleving]\, for which it needs a high level of voluntary citizen participation so as to guarantee a certain quality of welfare provision. Especially in underprivileged neighbourhoods\, where many residents rely upon public welfare\, people are summoned to participate in both policy-making and execution in domains that range from social housing to care for the elderly and from social work to health care. The participatory society has provided spaces to new and existing political brokers: active citizens who fill the gap between the retreating state and their fellow citizens. These brokers are\, in the Dutch context\, referred to as ‘active citizens’ or ‘best persons’. In this paper\, I like to explore how these brokers become part of new governmental assemblages\, in which public institutions\, corporate actors and volunteering citizens “co-function”. A central question is what kind of political communities these assemblages produce and what authority they (may) gain. I will discuss how a particular community rationale gains more ground in policy-making and implementation when the state summons citizens to take a more active part in it. Political domains that used to be highly formalized\, are now being infiltrated by a more informal community rationale. This community rationale centers upon local knowledge\, personal connections and an exchange of favors. Political brokers co-direct decision-making regarding public services\, while employing this community rationale. These brokers are in a privileged position. In specific\, they may have the personal phone numbers of aldermen or housing corporation managers and\, by contacting them\, ‘bypass’ formal procedures while making the policy-making more “community-based”\, more efficient and less costly. They are sought by organizational representatives (e.g. social workers\, nurses\, municipal officials\, housing corporation employees) for information\, advice and\, where possible\, for carrying out certain tasks. In this paper\, I will explore some answers to the next pressing questions: What will be the impact of new spaces of brokerage and informal community rationality on welfare provision? What political communities are formed in these new governmental assemblages and what authority will they have? What will be the impact of (new) informalized political communities on conceptualizations of citizenship?\n\nShows poster of “best person” police officer who started project in Hague with volunteers on crime prevention\, who says (in interview?) tension between what can do officially and what can do informally\n\nMK’s project: How do residents experience political community in Utrecht? And changing with retreating state and new spaces for brokers?\n\n> argues that leading to informalisation of political community\n\n“Participatory society”: King said recently that shift from welfare state to participatory\, in which people give value not just to own lives but to society as whole > looking for\n\n 	Active citizens\n 	Participation\n 	Self organization\n\nBrokers –\n\n 	invited to share local knowledge and special expertise > in between government and residents of underprivileged neighbours\, know how to speak both languages\n 	but also know how to get things moving\, so also known was “urban specialists”\, some are voluntary but others are street-level professionals\, and may also know how to bend the rules\n 	government has been funding this phenomenon of “best persons”: also known as policy entrepreneurs\, fixers\, fitters (looking for right fit)\, etc. [in Mexico known as “lideres sociales”]\n 	not connected to government though may be at later stage\n 	asked to persuade residents to eat healthily etc.\n 	government views in Durkheimian way – gap that needs to be filled to make society whole\n\nIn Brazilian context\, much talk of informality by researchers but usually confined to South > his colleagues in School of Governance struggle to see informality in Netherlands\n\n 	authority has face > person of mayor\, while in Netherlands often don’t know name of mayor; but this may be changing in Netherlands with brokers\n\nConclusion\n\n 	Informalisation of political community\n 	Durkheimian view obscures differences and conflicts – just seen as gaps needing filled\, though brokers also translate aspirations back to institutions\, which can be valuable\n 	Not sure whether multilayered political community\, or distinct overlapping\, entwined political communities\n\nKatinka Weber “‘Political Communities’ without States? Exploring Processes of State Expansion in the Amazon”\nAbstract: This paper suggests that we may shed further light on the notion of “political community” by considering it in the light of processes of state expansion. More specifically\, this paper focuses on the experiences of Amazonian peoples who have escaped the influence of colonial or republican state-building projects\, and who generally maintained less hierarchical forms of organisation. This is not to disregard that experiences of Amazonian peoples vary greatly\, and many peoples had contact with traders\, missionaries\, or those seeking to extract natural resources\, but nevertheless many Amazonian groups maintained more egalitarian authority structures and a ‘rhizomic model’ of self-other distinction which contrasts with the ‘Western’ ‘taproot model’ (hierarchical\, or state-like) organisational forms (Rosengreen\, 2003). However\, the increased interaction with “state” actors (Abrams 1988; Fried 1967; Scott 1998) especially since mid-twentieth century has meant that many Amazonian peoples have adopted “taproot” organisational forms\, reflected in the formation of their ethnic movements or governing bodies. Legal recognition of such organisations\, as well as indigenous communities\, has led to the formalisation of political authority and the expansion and multiplication of political communities. In this context\, the emergence of political communities is closely linked to processes of state expansion or rather\, the manipulation of spatial and social boundaries at different\, and nested\, scales (Rubenstein 2001).  In this context\, the paper debates whether “political communities” which are roughly defined as “one whose members feel somehow represented within its structures of authority” and within which “authority is exercised in the name of some kind of community of members” can only exist in relation to “states”.\n\nKey players in colonial world of nomadic egalitarian were Jesuits\, Dominicans and others\, who treats as state actors\, promoting ethnogenesis > Chiquitano come to share identity as such\, especially through mission system\n\n> groups found themselves articulating community boundaries in variety of ways\, including in relation to mestizo and white others\, using language of citizenship and indigenous rights\, for recognition of self determination\n\n> Bolivia recognises legal personality of indigenous communities and organisations\, as well as certain rights to land\, even though alien to Amazonian concept of self and other\n\nEven though subordinated in Constitution\, she argues that political community in own rights [which is precisely what these people are arguing for]\n\n…with “civil sociality” norms even though not enshrined in law\n\nBut also constitutes state as well as seeking autonomy for itself\n\n> though political communities typically allowed to exist to extent that facilitate state functions and development programmes e.g. only limited recognition as long as indigenous citizens fit into governmental agenda > typically passing resource allocation to private individuals\n\nNevertheless still identify these organisations as getting things for them from state\, representing them\n\nWe tend to talk of political communities as rigid whereas labour goes into creating them > leaders actively promote Chiquitano movement otherwise rumours that witchcraft or pocketing resources\, thus more fragile and temporary than may sometimes appear\n\nConclusions\n\n 	Nations may not be paramount political community (following Sian Lazar) and people may be part of multitude of overlapping political communities\n 	Though also likeness to state\, in furthering state project as well as more vertical structures\n\nRivke Jaffe “Between Ballots and Bullets: Electoral Politics and Political Community in and beyond the State”\nAbstract: This paper approaches elections as a site for negotiations of political community both in and beyond the state. Beyond established political institutions such as political parties\, other less formal structures of authority play an important role in mediating the relationship of citizens to the state. I focus on Jamaican “garrison politics”\, a type of electoral turf politics that is achieved through communal clientelism and that has historically relied on brokers known as “dons”. These dons\, area leaders who are often involved in criminal organizations\, have longstanding connections to Jamaica’s two political parties. However\, in recent decades they have become increasingly independent from politicians and have developed relationships with inner-city residents that are structured by notions of rights and responsibilities\, and by forms of political participation. In the “garrison communities” where dons’ authority is strongest\, voting behavior is affected by a mix of deeply felt party-political loyalty and the sometimes violent pressure exerted by dons and their organizations. Drawing on fieldwork in inner-city Kingston\, I discuss how different forms of political community are enacted and performed through the act of voting and electoral politics more broadly. Rather than understanding inner-city residents as belonging to multiple\, distinct political communities\, I focus on the entanglement of allegiances to the don\, the party and the nation-state. By focusing on the role of don-based structures of rule and belonging in mediating state-citizen relationships\, I explore the entangled nature of contemporary political communities that function across different levels of scale (the nation-state\, the neighborhood\, and transnational criminal networks) and that draw on different registers of formality and legality.\n\nAlso looking at overlapping political communities\n\nObserves in Jamaican elections\, flouting electoral code of conduct\, graffiti refers to parties and to gangs affiliated to them\n\n> can we understand elections as affirming more than citizens’ relations to nation-state?\n\nCitizenship can develop in and beyond nation-state:\n\n 	garrison politics – communal clientelism where criminal leaders known as dons\, who linked to political parties\n 	political tribalism – deeply held allegiances to parties\n\nMarshall et al. place voting at heart of political rights\, but Lazar (collective bargaining – offers space for negotiating with state)\, Banerjee (voting not for ideology but neither just votes-for-goods instrumental clientelism > seen as dignified means of asserting belonging to modern nation) etc. describe elections as performances\, which reflect reproduce and contest state-citizen elections\n\n> not just centrality to political rights but important symbolic momen\n\nHow hybrid governance don’t just connect citizens to state but also negotiation of political community beyond state\n\nAfter Independence\, political parties start building housing schemes for followers\, while dons are to deliver votes > garrison communities\n\nFrom 1980s less public resources while dons become more independent because of transnational drug trade\, thus now uneasy relationship more like colluding in government and maybe competing\n\n> parties not ethnic\, not class-based\, though JOP did once associate with US capitalism and PNP with Cubans\, getting guns to wage electoral warfare\n\nOne informant said better to be in battleground because parties then competing\, while diehard neighbourhood is taken for granted > when she suggests saying might vote for others\, they reply that impossible and would create division and repercussions – owe it to rest of community to not cause tension\, while owing also to leaders\n\nWhat can elections reveal beyond political rights? Finds that looking at community in and beyond the state > entangled governmental actors (she adds trade unions\,\n\n> “political collectives” implies horizontal within all-encompassing state\, trhefore\nDiscussion\nAlena to KW: is state only other source of political organisation or also collectives etc.?\n\n> KW agrees that others\, too\n\nMB to KW: wonders whether as well as engaging with state\, indigenous communities are also aware of taking to international level e.g. ILO conventions\, which railroad into development agenda of performing certain government functions (Decl of Rights of Ind Peoples mentions development 30 times) > logic of indigenous autonomy is that this is best way that developmental needs can be met\n\n> KW yes though understands NGOs to begin with as governmental actors since perpetuating state agenda; also acknowledges importance of ILO etc.\n\n(MK mentions that bureaucrats often disliked working with these “citizen leaders” because saw as unpredictable)\n\nRaul\n\n 	to MK: are brokers not just diffusing outright conflicts between communities and government? depoliticizing third sector?\n\n> MK yes\, harder to justify remaining outside government and government cannot justify leaving outside; also creates new politics in which\, for example\, rules get bent [how liberating is this?]\n\n 	to KW: read book on Jesuit missions as vanguard of modern state in centralising power\n\n> KW still maintain cabildo system though more complex than vanguard of modern state\n\n 	to RJ: she made people look rather passive\n\n> RJ they do draw on both political communities\, even though not democratic and not nice\, people brought into political community through extortion\, which is caused “taxes”\, people also saying that dons provide equal rights\n\nChuck: liked fact that juxtaposing Jamaica\, Bolivia and Netherlands\, and found what saying in Netherlands is\n\n 	for RJ\, is it that these other places don’t do democracy well\, or that also goes on in W Europe and US?\n\n> RJ not specific\, gives example of mining enclaves that are also corporations in own right\, etc. and in US politicians going to churches to get donations\n\n> KW democracy wasn’t working well for Chiquitano peoples\n\nShura for MK: do these include non-citizens?\n\n> MK not really – finds Chatterjee’s political community hard to apply to Netherlands because most do have access to range of services as citizens (and for this reason also feels that multilayered political community rather than multiple political communities)\n\nAndreea Undrea: For MK\, is brokerage not job of MPs or local councillors?\n\nAndrea Teti\n\n 	for MK: when combine increasing cuts and taxation\, tend to get decrease obligations > would be surprising if doesn’t make for patronage\, thus challenging government based on rule of law >> step toward undermining welfare and outsourcing welfare provision is what put Muslim Brotherhood in position of power\n\n> MK says that may be possible to combine rule of law with friendship; and patronage is everywhere (though AT – that is mafia)\n\n 	for JR\, agrees that nothing new in combination of state and private power\n\nGurpreet\n\n 	for MK\, surprised that referred to as participatory\, since surely participation is about deliberation etc. and not this kind of brokerage\n\n> MK participatory in ideal sense\, as King puts it\, should have collective dimension\n\n 	for KW\, surely inner compulsion toward association with land thus want to control who has access to this land (i.e. not just about state etc.)\n\n> KW yes though in process getting shaped\n\n 	for RJ\, what if group loses\, are there penalties imposed? In India understood that much of show on streets is for hire\n\n> RJ yes this might happen if lose elections\n\nAjay: For MK\, this is classic case of “political society” > brokerage\, even though Chatterjee argues that his model does not work in W Europe and US because lack communitarian traditions – so how to explain?\n\nDavid Thunder:\n\n 	For RJ dependency or clientelism in all contexts\n 	For KW could they do fine without being incorporated into state?\n 	For MK how are citizen initiatives funded?\n\n> MK can apply for funding to municipality
URL:https://cisrul.blog/event/political-community-authority-in-the-name-of-community/
CATEGORIES:Conference,Workshop
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BEGIN:VEVENT
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20140313T174500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20140313T193000
DTSTAMP:20260503T163442
CREATED:20211027T082319Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211027T094415Z
UID:10000095-1394732700-1394739000@cisrul.blog
SUMMARY:Whither Mexico?
DESCRIPTION:Forum hosted by CISRUL\n\n\n\non Thursday 13 March 5.45 – 7.30 pm\n\n\n\nTopic\n\n\n\nIn 2013 Mexico signed into law an important though controversial set of structural reforms\, one of which opens the way for foreign companies to profit from Mexico’s oil holdings. Articles in magazines such as The Economist have lauded Mexico’s reforms\, and economist Jim O’Neill tipped Mexico as one of the MINT countries to follow hard on the heels of the BRIC countries. Yet the same Mexican government is struggling to contain armed uprisings of self-defence (autodefensa) or vigilante groups\, which target the mafia organisations that the government has been unable to dismantle\, despite declaring in 2006 a “war on drug trafficking”. The situation bears comparison to Mexico twenty years ago when President Salinas signed NAFTA\, auguring Mexico’s entry into the First World\, on the day that the Zapatistas rose up in arms. \n\n\n\nThe forum sought to set the autodefensa (self-defence or vigilante) groups in the broader Mexican context\, asking for example: \n\n\n\nHow the autodefensas are related to other armed groups in Mexico\, including the “community police forces” (usually indigenous)\, guerrilla groups such as the Ejército Popular Revolucionario in the state of Guerrero\, paramilitary groups like Paz y Justicia in Chiapas\, private security firms (which have multiplied in recent years)\, Mexican law enforcement and security forces (including the Rural Defence Corps into which some autodefensas are now being incorporated)\, and the mafia groups themselves (not only are the mafia accused of financing or infiltrating the vigilantes\, but ex-mafia members have joined the autodefensas).How the autodefensas movement fit into the past\, present and future of Mexican politics. Are the autodefensas a novelty in Mexico\, or do they resemble groups such as the “rural guards” of the Mexican Revolution? While struggling against the mafias\, what posture do the autodefensas take toward local\, state and federal government\, and how has government responded to them? Is there evidence of links between political parties and autodefensas (as well as mafias)?  What is the immediate political fallout of the autodefensas uprisings\, and what might be the long-term consequences? Here it is important to ask not just whether the autodefensas might continue spreading to other states\, but whether they might expand their agenda beyond security to include broader social and political concerns.How best to understand the apparent paradox of an armed uprising at the moment when Mexico seems poised to enter the First World\, with promising growth and the passing of structural reforms. Is the conflict a distraction from the real story of Mexico’s bright economic prospects? Or can it shed light on the nature of Mexico’s economy as well as the international context? Analysts such as John Gledhill (University of Manchester) have linked the rise of mafias to\, on the one hand\, the collapse of peasant production in the face of agro-industry and US agricultural policy\, and on the other hand to infrastructural developments that facilitate illicit as well as licit global trade. There are more direct links: for example\, the mafia has been taxing exports of iron ore to China\, HSBC was fined a record $1.9 billion in 2012 for laundering cartel money\, and an ex-state prosecutor has claimed that 85% of businesses in the state of Michoacán have some links to the mafia. And could the conflict – including the issues of corruption and extortion that it targets – threaten Mexico’s growth?How the conflict fits into not just the national but the international context. To begin with\, some autodefensas have strong ties to the US. The Washington Post claimed recently\, for example\, that a significant proportion of the autodefensa members are returned or deported migrants. Social media have played an important role in the conflict\, and it appears that the Facebook page Valor por Michoacán\, a focal point for the autodefensas and their supporters\, is managed from the US. The mafias are all involved in smuggling people  and goods to the US\, as well as arms\, goods and money back from the US\, while distributing drugs and laundering money in the US. US security services have long been involved in trying to police mafias in Mexico\, which has often given rise to tensions with Mexican forces.\n\n\n\nSummary of presentations\n\n\n\nPeter Watt (U Sheffield) co-author of Drug War Mexico\n\n\n\nInstitutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) founded in 1929 (under different name) brought together socialist\, agrarian\, anarchist and other forces\, going on to govern for longer than any other political party in history\, and although it lost the presidency in 2000\, it retained power in many parts of the country\, which helps to explain how it won back the presidency in 2012. \n\n\n\nPRI developed a corrupt political and economic system\, but it combined this with progressive measures\, especially in 1930s\, that mitigated the worst excesses of capitalism to be found in other areas of Central America and Caribbean\, and it inscribed these in the 1917 Constitution\, even if this remained largely on paperThe PRI’s political legitimacy crumbled only gradually in last decades of 20th century\, rather than vanishing overnight as was the case of the military regimes of Brazil\, Chile Argentina and other Latin American countries.Although 2000 saw the advent of political democracy\, i.e. electoral competition\, it did not see economic democracy – the main 3 political parties represent similar economic interests\, such that it is hard for voters to choose between them.Government continues to use its influence over television media\, which substitutes spectacle for debate\, to control the population\, but there is still widespread cynicism about government.\n\n\n\nWhat is role on war on drugs in this? \n\n\n\nPresident Calderón effectively declared a war on drugs in 2006\, which has led to the militarisation of the country\, bringing about around 100\,000 murders and 30\,000 missing people in the years since then – this is a higher homicide rate than in countries whose leaders being charged for war crimes.Whatever the intention of the war on drugs\, part of the effect was to help dispel any spirit of rebellion in the country\, justifying what is arguably a “war on the people” in terms of reducing addictions and crime\, when both have increased dramatically since 2006.\n\n\n\nHow about the autodefensas? \n\n\n\nThe autodefensas are a response to the evident unwillingness of government to seriously tackle the cartels and to protect the population\, effectively abandoning the citizenry.They also reflect the decline in popular legitimacy of the army\, brought into fight the war on drugs\, in the face of citizens’ experience of abuse as well as the reports of organisations such as Human Rights Watch showing that government forces have committed massive human rights abuses.\n\n\n\nErnst Falko (U Essex) PhD in Sociology\, writing on Templar Knights cartel\n\n\n\nConducted fieldwork in 2012 on how organised crime engaged with civilian populations in the Tierra Caliente region of the west-central state of Michoacán\, which has seen a major upsurge of autodefensa groups in the past year\, as reported in national and international media. \n\n\n\nHe was working mainly with civil society organisations\, but then he interviewed members at all levels of the Knights Templar (KT) cartel.\n\n\n\nFound in 2012 that the KT were transforming from a mere drug cartel into what he characterised as an “illicit armed actor in pursuit of projects of alternative governance”: \n\n\n\nTheir activities were not merely extractive but also regulative – for example they were controlling price of marihuana and issuing licenses for growing it.They had co-opted government structures such as revenue-raising and local policing\, as well as range of organisations including political parties and social movements\, and organising public demonstrations against war on drugs.They were working hard to acquire degree of legitimacy\, such that civilians would not inform on them – for example:They claimed to act as a shield against “enemies of the people” seeking to loot Michoacan\, including corrupt elites\, as well as claiming a religious calling (the leader declared himself a Saint) and the mantle of Latin America’s revolutionary tradition (the same leader re-baptised himself as Ernesto Morelos Villa\, combining the names of the revolutionaries Che Guevara\, Father Morelos and Pancho Villa).They sought to regulate the consumption of crystal meth in the state\, while punishing a range of offences from domestic abuse to poor driving by taxis\, in diverse ways including public execution.\n\n\n\nHow did locals respond? \n\n\n\nLocals did protest\, for example\, that the KT were recruiting young boys\, but at the same time locals commonly said there was no alternative – “if you don’t mess with them\, they won’t mess with you”.The rise of autodefensas (which occurred after the end of his fieldwork) seems to have been a response to excesses committed by KT members – the KT leader admitted in 2012 that they could not control abuses by their “younger people”However\, it is important not to romanticize the autodefensas – some had simply switched sides from the KTs to the autodefensas\, for example. He also read out a communication last week from a local informant\, who deeply regretted the sight of mainly young people carrying heavy weapons driving past in convoy\, complaining that the autodefensas are a “farce” in which the current government is complicit.\n\n\n\nTrevor Stack (U Aberdeen) CISRUL Director and anthropologist of Mexico\n\n\n\nCartels are only the most dramatic example of the many kinds of predation that have proliferated in Mexico\, including government and the wider business community. \n\n\n\nCartels prey on the young people who work for them\, on the women whom they prostitute\, on undocumented migrants passing through Mexico\, on the massive informal sector who are “protected” from government crackdown\, and on usually petty businessmen unable to afford protection from the mushrooming private security industry.Officials in local\, state and federal government are complicit in these acts of predation\, while often preying in their own way on\, for example\, the street and market traders who make up the informal sector – for example\, before the cartels it was state and federal police officers who demanded protection money.What is true of government officials is just as true of supposedly licit\, established businesses. Many businesses effectively partner with cartels\, especially in the traditionally agricultural areas that have been hardest hit in recent years\, most obviously through massive money laundering\, which is rarely prosecuted or even detailed in media reports. One of the reasons that businesses partner with cartels is that so many businesses are predatory in their own way.Hence predation is far from the monopoly of cartels\, and that the cartels have thrived in good measure because many in government and business across Mexico share their predatory instincts.\n\n\n\nAutodefensas\, which are now to be found in several states and may well spread further\, are just one example of a particular response to predation –group or communities try to protect themselves by declaring some kind of autonomy. \n\n\n\nJust as the autodefensas expel the local police and instead form an armed militia to defend themselves against the cartels\, there are now many groups and communities across the country which declare a measure of “autonomy”\, for example in the face of mining (Guerrero\, Michoacán) or ranching (Chiapas) interests or in response to the manipulative behaviour in some political parties (Cherán). One could speak of a “thousand autonomies” across Mexico.\n\n\n\nCan Mexicans protect themselves from predation by staking out a thousand autonomies? In the case of the autodefensas: \n\n\n\nOn the one hand\, it is inspiring that many men and women have taken such risks in the hope of ridding themselves of the most predatory of businesses – the cartels.On the other hand\, as a response to predation across government and business:it is hard to believe that autodefensas can be more than a small stepthey could turn from prey into hunters\, especially if they are being sponsored by other cartels – or by licit businesses that are themselves predatory\, such as those that are offering “easy” credit to low-income households for the purchase of consumer goods.\n\n\n\nHow else can Mexicans protect themselves from predatory elements in business and government? There is much talk of “building institutions” and of “legislative reform”\, but what is crucial is building a real political will to ensure not just that legislation is designed to limit predation\, but also that legislation will be implemented effectively and properly adjudicated: \n\n\n\nThere is little reason to suppose that political parties constitute such a political will at present – not only have they done little or anything to limit predation in the broader business community and by government officials themselves\, but they have often been found complicit in the cartels’ extreme predation\, for example in the state of Michoacán (as detailed in the previous paper).There are calls for civil society to make its presence felt. However\, it is important to be specific about what civil society since it is a vague term and includes many professional NGOs who are too dependent on government contracts to have a critical voice. One important civil society actor and sponsor is the Catholic Church since it has the resources and infrastructure to act independently of government. The Church has played an important role in recent events in Michoacán (as it did in Chiapas in the 1990s) but elsewhere it has arguably avoided confronting the issues.Historically\, Mexico has inspired the world with examples of radical political action\, including the 1910-17 Mexican Revolution and the 1994 Zapatista rebellion – both of which combined autonomy claims with regional and national agendas. Is it possible in the present day to achieve similar goals by peaceful means?\n\n\n\nThe broader political question is: what kind of business do citizens accept and indeed welcome? \n\n\n\nThis question needs to be asked not just in relation to the cartels but\, for example\, in relation to Mexico’s energy sector\, for which secondary legislation is being prepared. The political Left has opposed the reform in the name of economic nationalism\, but it may be viewed as an opportunity to set a precedent for non-predatory business practices\, in a sector which has been massively corrupt and in its own way predatory. If the challenge is not taken up\, though\, the energy reform could make way for still more predatory practices\, of the kind that have been seen across Africa.\n\n\n\nBenjamin Smith (U Warwick) historian and writer on contemporary Mexico\n\n\n\nDuring the Independence wars\, villages often claimed “neutrality” and set up “self-defence forces”\, and during the Mexican Revolution\, villages formed fighting units which did not disappear after the Revolution\, and indeed were mobilised by President Cardenas to fight for the lands that they wanted. \n\n\n\nMany of these historic “self-defence forces”: \n\n\n\nhave been progressive\, fighting for land redistribution for example\, and have presented themselves as radically autonomous groupsbut have often been led by unpleasant caciques and have also often defended traditional hierarchies by which\, for example\, women are subject to “protection” by men.\n\n\n\nSome of these tendencies can be observed in the current autodefensa movement in Michoacán – for example\, in a recent interview with the autodefensa leader Dr Mireles: \n\n\n\non the one hand\, Dr Mireles took the egalitarian position that\, even though they are mainly white ranchers\, they have been inspired by the indigenous peasants of towns like Cheránon the other hand\, he took a traditionally moral stance\, complaining that the KTs had raped young girls in schools\, presenting the autodefensas as men “defending their women”.
URL:https://cisrul.blog/event/whither-mexico/
CATEGORIES:Seminar
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DTSTART;VALUE=DATE:20130625
DTEND;VALUE=DATE:20130627
DTSTAMP:20260503T163442
CREATED:20210819T170555Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20211027T094506Z
UID:10000045-1372118400-1372291199@cisrul.blog
SUMMARY:Political Community Workshop 2013
DESCRIPTION:Hosted by the \nCentre for Citizenship\, Civil Society and Rule of Law (CISRUL) \nat the \nUniversity of Aberdeen\, Scotland \nTuesday 25th – Wednesday 26th June 2013 \nAcademic coordinator: Trevor Stack (t.stack@abdn.ac.uk) \nClick on session titles below for summaries\nNotions of political community are implicit in many or most contemporary debates (academic and public) of citizenship\, civil society\, rule of law\, democracy\, multiculturalism and human rights. But they are seldom made explicit and subject to analysis and reflection. That has also been our experience at the inter-disciplinary Centre for Citizenship\, Civil Society and Rule of Law (CISRUL). Having debated aspects of citizenship\, civil society and rule of law since our founding in 2009\, we have identified political community as a topic that crosscuts the three but which we have yet to comprehend fully. This year we debated the role of valuable resources in political community in our public conference “Politics of Oil & Gas in a Changing UK: International Perspectives” and political community is also key to our current research project on “Schooling in Political Community”. In our draft proposal for that project\, we do offer a working definition of political community: one whose members have a real stake in political institutions and\, for that reason\, subject themselves to the decisions of those institutions. We are open to other ways of defining and approaching the topic\, though\, and we invite participants in our Political Community workshop to give their own answers to the following questions: \n1. When “political community” has been the explicit topic of debates\, in particular times and places\, what is meant by “political” and what is meant by “community”? What is not considered political and what is not community?  To give just two examples\, how is political community distinguished from religious community? And community from society? \n2. What notions of political community have been caught up in citizenship\, civil society and rule of law? Does citizenship\, for example\, always entail political community? \n3. Can we identify political community beyond citizenship\, civil society and rule of law? For example\, are universities political communities? How about families\, businesses and churches? Is multitude\, as Hardt and Negri suggest\, an emergent form of political community? What other emergent political communities might there be? \nTuesday 25th June\nIntroduction (click on title to see session summary)\n9.30                Introduction: Trevor Stack and Matyas Bodig \n10.10              Discussion \nPolitical community and constitution making (click on title to see session summary)\n10.40              Hanna Lerner “Constitution writing\, democracy and (a divided) political community” \nWhat role should constitutions play in defining the identity of a political community? The question is particularly difficult when the constitution is written under conditions of deep disagreements between conflicting political communities over core ideational questions such as the state’s religious and national character. This\, is the case in most\, if not all\, contemporary projects of constitutional drafting. \nThe advice commonly provided by constitutional experts under conditions of deep disagreements over the state’s basic norms and values is to draft a “thin” constitution. According to this approach\, constitution-making process is not expected to interfere in value-ridden conflicts or reflect the identity of a particular political community. Rather its role is to provide a legal framework within which conflict resolution can be advanced. Thus\, a constitution should be thin in the sense that it avoids making decisions on contentious identity questions and focus on establishing democratic institutions that allow further deliberation on divisive issues. \nThe paper criticizes this common constitutional advice and argues that a thin constitution fails to provide a relevant constitutional framework for contemporary societies in which the political community is divided. While the ideal of a thin constitution may be normatively and theoretically attractive\, the paper demonstrates how given the social\, political and institutional realities of societies riven by identity conflicts\, this recommendation appears less viable and is eventually rejected by constitutional drafters. Drawing on the constitutional experience of Israel\, Turkey and India\, the paper further explores the foundational role of constitutions and the extent to which constitutions represent\, or should represent\, the identity of the political community/ies in their state. Among various alternatives\, the paper will discuss the incrementalist approach to constitution writing. \n11                               Tamas Gyorfi “The Legal Construction of Political Communities \nThe purpose of this paper is to examine how constitutional law conceptualises and constructs political communities. The paper will use Carl Schmitt’s constitutional theory as its point of departure. Schmitt claimed that the term ‘people’ has three different senses in constitutional law: the people anterior to or above the constitution\, the people within the constitution and the people compared with the constitution. The paper will explore (1) how different constitutions define constituent power; and (2) to what extent they accommodate the people within the constitution. Finally\, (3) the paper will subject the Schmittian idea of ‘the people compared with the constitution’ to critical scrutiny. \n11.20              Discussion \nA historical view (click on title to see session summary)\n\n12.10              Michael Brown “When is a religious community a political community? Irish eighteenth-century reflections” \nThis paper will explore how far governmental authorities came to understand religious dissidents to the confessional state as political antagonists\, and highlight some resistance to this co-incidence of identity. By looking at the Irish anti-Catholic legislation (the penal laws) it will track the emergence of the ‘papist’ as a figure in the legal imagination. It will then turn to the issue of religious conversion to complicate the story\, before looking at the existence of Protestant Jacobites and Castle Catholics. Finally it will examine the nature of cross-community collaboration as a mode of ordinary resistance to the political caricatures provided by the Irish confessional state. \n12.30              Discussion \nPhilosophical approaches (click on title to see session summary)\n1.40                John Perry “Models of political community in recent theology: pirates (in Augustine)\, relish (in Locke)\, and parables (in the Bible)” \nThe past generation of theologians have engaged political community as part of a larger critique of modernity\, especially targeting three villains: Locke\, Kant\, and Hume. On their account\, the modern nation-state is a rival object of allegiance to the church\, offering toleration only in exchange for a weakened loyalty to one’s religious community. While I am sympathetic to aspects of that story\, I shall in this paper identify some points where it goes wrong\, and offer a different story. Although political liberalism cannot (as its founders hoped) avoid all possible conflicts of loyalty between one’s God and one’s city\, there are neglected trajectories within modernity that lead to more satisfactory accounts of the relation between religious and political community than others. The modernity critic’s story is premised upon all modern moral and political theories being proceduralist\, neutralist\, and anti-teleological. Some are\, but some aren’t. In fact\, it may turn out that some aspects of Christian ethics can contribute to how ethics and citizenship are conceived in modern\, pluralist democracies. Three such aspects are: the importance of conceiving of ethics within a particular historically-extended community or tradition\, the view that moral reasoning and moral persuasion are imaginative rather than rationalistic or legalistic endeavours\, and that the proper ground of ethics is wellbeing or flourishing (that is\, it is eudaimonist rather than either deontological or utilitarian). \n2                      Daniel Koltonski “Political obligation and political community” \nAn account of the democratic citizen’s duty to uphold the law must make use of the notion of political community: it is only when she is a citizen of a genuine democratic community—a polity whose citizens are motivated in their political choices by some liberal conception of justice—that she must recognize as part of citizenship a duty to uphold the law. Absent such a community\, then\, she will not have such a duty. Why is that? Consider the case of an engaged and conscientious citizen—a citizen whose main aim is to live justly—who is confronted by a law she reasonably thinks to be unjust. How can she have a duty to uphold that law\, a duty that overrides her usual prerogative\, as a free person\, to act on her own moral judgments? She has a moral duty to uphold that law when she may reasonably regard it as the result of her fellow citizens responsibly exercising their moral agency with regard to questions of justice\, for upholding that law is the way\, in the inevitable circumstances of reasonable disagreement about justice\, for her to respect their equal rights to such responsible exercise in deciding upon the laws governing their lives together. Her duty to uphold the law\, jointly with her fellows’ duties to uphold the law\, is the correlative of their rights to an equal say. The duty to uphold the law is a duty distinctive of citizenship in a democratic community whose citizens exercise their moral judgment responsibly—and are known to do so—in making their political choices. And so\, it is in a political community in which a kind of thick reciprocity of political concern for justice actually\, and not simply aspirationally\, characterizes both the relationship of citizenship and so also the democratic processes\, that upholding the law will be what respect for one’s fellows as free and equal citizens requires. This is a very demanding account of political obligation—few\, if any\, states come close to achieving this sort of democratic community—but it is the sort of account one is lead to when one takes seriously the citizen who reasonably demands a justification for the claim that her citizenship requires that she against her own judgments about justice. And a liberal account of justice must take this citizen’s demand seriously. \n2.20                Discussion \nBeyond the state? (click on title to see session summary)\n3                      Sian Lazar “Creating political community” \nI will argue that it is important to conceptually delink citizenship from an automatic identification with the nation-state as the only political community at stake. If citizenship is membership of a political community\, we might contend that individuals have multiple citizenships – that is to say\, memberships of multiple political communities. I draw on research with members of two trade unions of public sector employees\, for whom the nation-state of Argentina and the city of Buenos Aires are two important political communities of which they are citizens. However\, I focus in particular on the argument that they are also members of the political community of their union. Although it might sound jarring to call them citizens of their union\, it is possible to analyse their membership along the lines of how we analyse citizenship more conventionally defined. Thus\, we need to start from the now well-accepted premise that citizenship goes beyond legal status\, and its corollary – that the processes and practices that make someone into a full member of a given political community are at least as important as the end result itself. My ethnographic material explores these questions in relation to two educational projects run by the unions to train new delegates: the School for Trade Union Training (Escuela de Formación Sindical) run by the peronist Union Personal Civil de la Nación (UPCN\, Union of National Civil Servants)\, and a smaller scale workshop run by the Asociación de Trabajadores del Estado (Association of State Workers\, ATE). The two unions have contrasting and in many ways rival political projects of unionism\, and these are reflected both in their educational processes and their conceptualisations of political community. For UPCN activists\, the political community of their union is an organism\, while for ATE activists\, it is a political project located in a wider history of trade unionism in Argentina. One major way this is made evident is in the way that their training reflects different organisational philosophies of participation and of political action. \n3.20                Trevor Stack “Competing or complementary notions of political community in contemporary west Mexico” \nWe have proposed defining a “political community” as one whose members have a real stake in political institutions and\, for that reason\, subject themselves to the decisions of those institutions. During fieldwork in west Mexico in 2007-10\, I found that my informants often expressed a bifurcated notion of person (or citizen): they were persons “in the eyes of the law” but they were ultimately persons “living in society”. By “society” they meant a matrix of dense and inescapable inter-dependencies\, giving rise less to voluntary associations than involuntary obligations\, and serving to contain the wayward will of fallen Man. Is this a version of political community as we are defining it? And is it alternative or complementary to political community as defined in law? I argue that 1) “society” could provide an alternative ground to the obviously political community constituted by law; 2) “living in society” did nevertheless entail a relationship with institutions such as local government\, which could be termed political community; 3) to some extent “living in society” complemented and even enriched the political community defined in law. The broader point is that political communities are not only multiple in the sense that they are nested or overlapping\, but that there can be competing grounds for political community; alternatively\, political community is itself necessarily multi-dimensional and will never be reducible to a single dimension such as the legal. \n3.40                Discussion \n4.40                Silvia Pasquetti “The affective foundation of subordinated political communities: Lessons from a West Bank refugee camp and an Israeli ‘mixed’ city” \nEmotions are key components in the making and unmaking of political communities. The activation of solidarity facilitates the pursuit of collective political projects. By contrast\, mutual distrust discourages people from pursuing shared political identities. Drawing on fieldwork within and across a West Bank refugee camp and the Arab districts of an Israeli city\, this paper explores the affective foundation of political communities among subordinated populations—subjects and citizens alike—experiencing exclusion due to their ethnonational\, ethnoracial\, or ethnoreligious membership. The point of departure of this analysis is an empirical puzzle: stateless camp dwellers invest in their group solidarity and perceive themselves as members of a political community while urban minorities with Israeli citizenship experience mutual distrust and withdraw from the public sphere. My research traces this difference in the shape and intensity of group life among these two sets of Palestinians to the workings of different ruling agencies\, especially their distinct uses of law\, coercion\, and language. Specifically\, I study the emotional and political effects of the interplay between military repression and humanitarian aid in the camp and those of the convergence of policing and security interventions in the minority district. This paper aims to use these empirical materials and arguments to address two questions posed by the Political Community Workshop organizers: the question of political community beyond citizenship and the question of the interplay between political community and access to scarce resources. The case of the Palestinian urban minorities draws attention to how stigmatized segments of a citizenry\, which are excluded from the dominant body politic due to their ethnonational (or ethnoracial) identity\, might also be prevented from forming a thriving minority political community. Similarly\, the case of stateless camp dwellers offers some important insights on the role that military repression and humanitarian aid might play in the creation of subordinated political communities. The question of access to scarce material and symbolic resources is also central to the diverging affective and political trajectories of Palestinian refugees and minority citizens\, highlighting how for poor people the creation of political communities is inextricably linked to the available survival strategies. To sum up\, this paper argues that exploring how different coercive and humanitarian discourses and practices affect emotional relationships among subordinate people—for example\, shaping whom they trust or distrust and whom they feel threatened by or have confidence in—is a necessary step toward a better understanding of the link between survival strategies and political projects\, including the formation of political communities. \n5                      Discussion \n\nWednesday 26th June\n\nQuestioning ‘community’ (click on title to see session summary)\n9                      Tea\, coffee and biscuits \n9.30                Ajay Gudavarthy “Politicizing community and economizing culture” \nPost-colonial theory/subaltern studies have for long projected community as the missing/suppressed link within western political theory. Hegel`s tripartite distinction between family\, civil society and state suppresses community\, which is essential for the global spread of capital. The conflict seems to be one between capital versus community. However\, post-colonial theory has accorded the idea of community only a heuristic place in its theory and it has remained\, by far\, an `empty category`. It has never been historically or sociologically spelt out as to what exactly are the contours and practices that imbricate the workings of the idea of community. It has only positioned community as the other of State\, civil society\, nation and modernity itself. Post-colonial theory has moved between a thick and a thin idea of community. Thick idea of community refers to naturalised- kinship-based cultural groups such as religious\, ethnic\, and caste groups\, whose core practices are face-to-face interaction\, they are localised and live in heterogeneous time that is different from that of nation and capital; they are ascriptive in nature and content. However\, in course of explicating the workings of community they freely move towards a thin- cosmopolitan- idea of community that includes individuals from various locations. For instance\, Partha Chatterjee`s idea of `political society` is a congregation of differentiated social groups\, including immigrants from Bangladesh. The tension between the two versions of community is glossed over. \nThis paper\, in light of the unexplored idea of community in post-colonial societies such as India\, attempts to conceptualise\, based on an ongoing ethnography\, certain core practices of what community is and what it looks like in contemporary context. It further argues that communitarian practices cut across caste\, gender\, ethnicity and nationality and reproduce certain core ontological and epistemological practices. These practices are not bereft of power relations but could well be a different mode of structuring power\, in contrast but not necessarily in conflict with that of modernity. \n9.50                Sourayan Mookerjea “The politics of community and the community of politics: Athabaskan Tar Sands Development” \nThis paper explores how the crises and contradictions of tar sands mining development in Fort McMurray\, Alberta enable us to re-theorize the concept of community. How are we to assess and understand the prolixity of the rhetoric of community in this context? Does the incitement of discourses on community in this instance stand as a symptom of a governmental strategy by now\, in the endgame of neoliberal ascendency\, tried and true? Or is there something else at stake here? After the complications and critiques of the politics of identity and difference\, what lessons regarding class politics do we draw from the crisis of community in the northern boom-towns of Alberta? Especially in the past five years\, big and small environmental organizations\, activists from the First Nations of Athabasca Chipewyan\, Chipewyan Prairie\, Fort McKay\, Fort McMurray\, and Mikisew Cree\, the Alberta Federation of Labour\, the Council of Canadians\, to name only a few organizations\, have launched public campaigns to either reform\, slow\, scale back or stop tar sand mining. This mobilization has continued to burst back into flames in ever different situations\, beginning with the National Energy Board hearings regarding the Northern Gateway Pipeline proposal\, opposition to the broad legislative sweeps of the Harper government’s omnibus bills and most recently with the Idle No More movement. Given this diversity of social movement organizations and subject positions mobilized\, how do we understand the affinity or alliance that is emerging as a new kind of politics here\, the new form of subjectivity or becoming in common this development and its social crises brings to life? Bringing into critical juxtaposition the post-Gramscian and postcolonial theorization of subalternity with Hardt and Negri’s concept of the multitude\, this paper queries the historical content of the truth that binds political rhetoric enabling various social movements to act in solidarity in opposing tar sands development\, and interrogates the community of politics that this politics of community seems to promise. In doing\, I argue for the importance of a Utopian social poetics of mediation to what Boaventura de Sousa Santos has called the project of a “sociology of absences”. \n10.10              Discussion \n10.50              Tea\, coffee and biscuits \nToward global political community? (click on title to see session summary)\n11.10              Raul Acosta “Constructive hostilities: dissent\, transnational activism and the ethical imagination” \nAn aggregation of individuals does not constitute a community\, as this entails some level of intimacy among its members. In much of the literature focused on social collectives\, group solidarity is sought in shared ethnic or religious traits\, or perhaps a common heritage of life in a locality. Those focused on cosmopolitanism tend to focus on mechanisms through which differences among individuals may be bridged. Both logics appear to assume positive attitudes towards those included\, and negative to those who are not. The cosmopolitan effort is thus to extend the net of inclusion. This paper argues that the conflictive negotiations over what is shared among a community’s members render a collective political. Discords in political scenarios are usually portrayed as power struggles\, with the class struggle as the best example. Although such disparities are clear breeding grounds for conflicts\, apparently calm situations among members of a similar status may also originate strong disagreements. It is open dissent over public affairs that creates a sense of community. The processes of negotiation over what is shared\, either in physical form (such as territory or goods) or in intangible form (e.g. ideas or symbols)\, are thus essential in the making of the community. The form in which dissent is performed and dealt with in turn shapes the collective. It is a becoming of the political dimension of social relations within it. Political anthropology has sought to examine the many forms through which people resolve such matters. Various ceremonial strategies to channel commotions have been documented in valuable ethnographies. As contrasting cultural traditions have travelled and are increasingly interpreted and assimilated\, a new political landscape is emerging. The methodological nationalism that pervades most political analyses is no longer useful to understand the processes of construction of collectives. Some identities\, as many considered indigenous in Latin America\, have become reinforced and used in political struggles without negating external influences. What these appear to show is an exercise of an extended ethical imagination\, seeking to reinvent local political communities while at the same time collaborating across borders. \n11.30              Gal Levy “An end to political community: the global social protest and the future of citizenship” \nIn the last decade or so\, it has become more and more prevalent in citizenship studies that the notion of citizenship is much more encompassing than is the idea of citizen as a right-bearing member in a political community\, namely the nation-state. The study of citizenship has long left its formal\, legal confines and even the mere investigation of ‘who is a citizen?’. It has thus grown from a legal concept to a rich sociological and political concept\, depicting not only ideological regimes and discourses\, but also the power of citizenship as it is enacted by citizens and non-citizens alike. In this context\, the idea of citizenship as merely as a prerogative of the state\, and as a manifestation of state power\, has been replaced by new understanding of ‘citizenship beyond the state’ (Gordon and Stack 2007). \nOn a different level\, the notion of community has also taken various faces. More importantly\, with the rise of neo-liberalism and globalisation\, and against the erosion of the notion of national\, territorially-bounded societies\, ‘community’ rose as an alternative ‘spatialisation of government’ (Rose 1996). This\, to cite Rose further\, had had several implications not only on the territory of the political\, but also gave rise to ‘anti-political motifs’ (Rose 1996: 352). Consequently\, the notion of community\, which was partly born against the ills of modernising societies\, turned into another means of government\, and an expression of the weakening of ‘the hold of “the social” over our political imagination’ (Rose 1996: 353). \nAgainst this backdrop\, and in light of the social protest that swept the world after the ‘Arab Spring’ and against the 2008 Global Financial Crisis\, it is timely to ask what does it mean to have or to build a political community at these times\, and what it entails to the future of citizenship in the aftermath of the World Social Protest. \n11.50              Discussion \n12.50              Sandwich lunch \nInternational political community? (click on title to see session summary)\n1.40                Matyas Bodig “States\, peoples\, communities: the problems of the construction of collective subjectivity in international law” \nI take the state to be an institutional entity that delivers governance over a population on a designated territory. This governance presupposes a certain normative capacity\, and for this reason\, it comes with a claim of sovereign political authority. Naturally\, this capacity has conditions of legitimacy. These conditions are\, of course\, manifold. In my paper\, I focus on the conditions of legitimacy that have taken the form of international norms. What enables international norms to play this role is that participation in international cooperation for a government is dependent on recognition by fellow governments\, and\, over the last few decades\, international law has channelled the conditions of recognition more and more through the norms of Charter international law (the UN Charter itself\, the norms of international human rights law\, etc.). I argue that the relevant norms fit into a conceptual framework that came to define the conceptual parameters of statehood. Most importantly for my own analysis\, at the heart of that conceptual framework\, we find the idea that a putative state can only be compliant with the foundational norms of international law if it is in a representational relationship with a ‘people.’ In my paper\, I use the concept of ‘political community’ to reveal the dynamics of this association between ‘peoples’ and statehood. My analysis is profoundly determined by a conceptual claim: political communities (‘peoples’) only exist in reflective contrast with political institutions. I argue that\, as our ideas of statehood became more and more settled around a uniform set of criteria for ‘good governance’\, the idea of political community became more and more closely associated with certain attributes of statehood: most importantly its particularism\, territoriality and exclusivity. In the paper\, I analyse the problematic implications of this conceptual dynamics: the difficulties of even making sense of transnational political communities\, the difficulties of constructing effective statehood where the territorial and normative space is shared by several overlapping political communities (exacerbating political conflicts about\, e.g.\, the status of minority groups and indigenous peoples)\, and the difficulties of addressing the political challenges of limited statehood (in places like Kosovo\, Somalia or Afghanistan). \n2                      Nigel Dower “Global\, international and national political community compared” \nThe particular character of political community within a nation-state can partly be illumined by a comparison with the idea of international political community whose members are nation- states\, and the idea of global political community whose members are politically engaged global citizens. The tensions within domestic politics between realist (power)\, public order and common good conceptions are reflected in conflicting accounts of international politics between realism\, internationalism and cosmopolitanism. The idea of global political community reflects cosmopolitan perspectives\, and either complements accounts of international community or clashes with realist accounts of international relations that deny the real existence of international political community. \n2.20                Discussion \n3                      Tea\, coffee and biscuits \n3.20                Small group discussion \n4.10                Plenary discussion \n5                      End of session
URL:https://cisrul.blog/event/political-community-workshop-2013/
CATEGORIES:Conference,Workshop
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DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20120627T235959
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SUMMARY:What Civil? What Society?
DESCRIPTION:What Civil? What Society?\n\n\n\n\n\nInter-disciplinary workshop \n\n\n\nWe propose to examine the workings of the concept of ‘civil society’ not just in contemporary Europe and North America but historically and in contexts across the world as well as across academic disciplines. We will seek not to define ‘civil society’ but to identify the consequences – political\, legal\, social\, moral\, epistemological – of particular ways in which ‘civil’ and ‘society’ have been defined in different times and places. In so doing we will pose five overarching questions: \n\n\n\n1. What has been held (in different times and places) to make a society (or part of it) civil as opposed to uncivil (or barbarous)? What have been the consequences of such a distinction? \n\n\n\n2. How and to what effect has civil society been distinguished as a domain or sphere of society from domains considered non-civil (if not necessarily uncivil) such as politics\, the economy\, the ecclesiastical or religious\, the military\, family and law? \n\n\n\n3. What distinctions have been made between civil and civic\, and to what effect? \n\n\n\n4. What notions of society lie behind or are associated with notions of civil society? How have notions of society shifted from the medieval and early modern periods to the 19th-century birth of social sciences to contemporary debates about whether society exists or not? \n\n\n\n5. Have notions of civil society (and society) been defined by law or by some other means\, and what is the difference in practice? In what other ways does civil society get linked to law? \n\n\n\nSpeakers\n\n\n\nRaul Acosta\, Centre for the Study of Applied Ethics\, Deusto University\, Bilbao\, has been working on orderly dissent in the contexts of the Brazilian Amazon\, west Mexico and the Mediterranean.Jeffrey Alexander\, Professor of Sociology at Yale\, is the author of The Civil Sphere which begins with a history of the civil society concept in scholarship and then goes on to identify a ‘civil sphere’ of organisations in US society that have pursued a set of values through\, for example\, the incorporation of the Jews into post-war US society and the Civil Rights struggle.Matyas Bodig\, Senior Lecturer in Law at Aberdeen\, is a legal theorist who has worked on a range of issues concerning rule of law and the nature of the modern state.Michael Brown\, Lecturer in History at Aberdeen\, has written extensively on the Scottish and Irish Enlightenments\, with a focus on civil society.Karin Friedrich\, co-director of the Centre for Early Modern Studies and Senior Lecturer in History at Aberdeen\, is working on the contribution of pre-modern civil society\, especially in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth\, to reform and modernisation\, the development of the rule of law\, and modern forms of political engagement.Dmitry Goncharov\, Professor of Political Science\, National Research University Higher School of Economics\, has published extensively on civic community in post-Communist society.Ajay Gudavarthy\, Assistant Professor of Political Sciences at Jawaharlal Nehru University\, has published on the history of human rights movements in India\, as well as affirmative action programs and subsistence governmental benefits\, and is concluding a critical volume on Chatterjee’s notion of ‘political society’.Philip Oxhorn\, director of the Institute for the Study of International Development at McGill University\, has published a number of books including Sustaining Civil Society: Economic Change\, Democracy and the Social Construction of Citizenship in Latin America and Organizing Civil Society: The Popular Sectors and the Struggle for Democracy in Chile.Trevor Stack\, director of CISRUL and Lecturer in Hispanic Studies\, Aberdeen\, is writing on how people in Mexico and California distinguish between law and what could be termed ‘civil sociality’.Andrea Teti\, Lecturer in Politics & IR at Aberdeen\, works on democratization in the Middle East and has published on the concept of civil society in the democratization literature.Ekow Yankah\, Associate Professor at Cardoso Law School\,  is working on the appropriate role of virtue in law generally and criminal law particularly\, including in relation to harms-to-self\, prostitution decriminalization and moral agreement as well exploring new relationships between profiling under the threat of terrorist attacks\, liberalism and government obligations.\n\n\n\nSchedule\n\n\n\nMonday 25TH June\n\n\n\nSession 1\n\n\n\nJeffrey Alexander “Boundary Crossing: How Recent Social Crises Are Constructed as Endangering Civil Spheres”\n\n\n\nHow are sphere-specific strains translated into problems for society as whole? \n\n\n\nCivil Society I: civil understood as broadest range of associations incl. small businesses\, churches etc. \n\n\n\nbut little scope for addressing class conflict > failed to discriminate among sphere\n\n\n\nCivil Society 2: associates w selfishness of property and injustices; vertical rather than horizontal—repair by regulatory states; until late 20th cent when welfare state had largely resolved social question and then falling of totalitarian socialists\, seems that return to umbrella concept \n\n\n\nNow Civil Society 3: does not reduce to private property or to everything outside state\, but community of autonomous yet mutually obligated people who simultaneously experience solidarity and respect for each other \n\n\n\nbinaries: pollutes qualities that thought to endanger civil society e.g. secrecy etc. but also through public opinion\, law\, office and electoral processes allow to reward those deemed civil and stigmatize those who notcivil sphere can be seen as aspirational\, setting up narratives that allow people to speculate on what others’ responses will be: real civil spheres project utopian possibilities with one hand and take back with the other; civil spheres are restless and boundaries always moving\, hence practices that acceptable at one point in time\, at other time seems repugnant\, e.g. separation of gender\n\n\n\nEvery sphere experiences strains but with steady state\, these are introduced internally to spheres e.g. issues within church; but at certain point\, outrages broader society and mechanisms that bring back to steady state \n\n\n\nTwo examples: \n\n\n\n1. Church pedophilia\n\n\n\nPractices w pre/pubescent inside church for centuries; revealed that church had been concerned for decades\, mainly to conceal from broader world \n\n\n\nconsidered unavoidable fact of life > Catholic doctrine understood not as violating universal standards but evidence of fallen nature of man\, for which confession and contrition is answeras institution concerned to maintain functioning\, esp since shortage of priestsfocus on priests and counselling for them\, rather than victims\, and commending work of many priestsalso Pope praises bishop who risks prison rather than hand over priest to civil courts; Ratzinger responds to discussions in US Confs of Bishops by saying Confs had no theological basis >sealing internal religious from external: argues that othrs wld have tried to take advantage of us\n\n\n\nSince 2002 media scandals\, reported not just as news but as moral judgements intended to disturb readers\, evoking moral criteria of civil sphere\, arguing that shocking rather than just cause for regret \n\n\n\nnot so much paedophilia as fact than as mediatisation; people didn’t know that justified to condemn until civil spherealso police and legal power: Grand Juries of citizens to which DAs as legal officials of civil sphere present evidence; abuse vicitms bring 1000s of civil cases\n\n\n\nChurch worried about effects of publicizing sex abuses\, arguing media for self interest\, lawyers for pursuing money\, Jews\, Communists and Protestants \n\n\n\nChurch’s struggle not to extend statute for limitations revealed; foot-dragging over implementation and not always local\, public support that required in US for law enforcement\, e.g. where parish mobilisation in towns\, juries don’t convict so many plea bargained instead of publicly tried\n\n\n\nNYT church 2008 pitted against society… using language of civil sphere: openness\, accountability etc. \n\n\n\n+ only just first priest convicted in US \n\n\n\n2. Financial crisis\n\n\n\nEconomy is another non-civil sphere \n\n\n\nBelieved that economic destabilization was past; deregulation from public control inspired by confidence in economic self-regulation\, incl. repealing New Deal law not allowing securities to be mixed with bank deposits\, to protect citizens from market; but because markets seem to be tamed \n\n\n\nAt point of crisis\, crisis within sector becomes mediatised > not controlled internally by elected representatives of civil sphere \n\n\n\nResistance of economic sphere; managers wld accept bailouts but then engine still working so can go back to internal regulation\n\n\n\nMedia accuses of being \n\n\n\nhedonists\, which is opposite of civil sphere\, condemns as gambling casinoarrogance\n\n\n\nLaws passed etc. \n\n\n\nFor neither side is ever enough: standoff is always inevitable? \n\n\n\nDiscussion\n\n\n\nEkow Yankah: not clear in that civil pushing in on non-civil in sex scandals > not clear that priests abuse more than general public: media not looking beyond church\, any more than does in case of Penn State trainer > seems more like indicting institutions or persons\, rather than addressing broader problems > about humiliating \n\n\n\nmedia reps are personalised etc.; true that pictured as immoral but in fact acting by morality of own sphere e.g. prudence and caution in Lehmann Brothers > portraying as amoral is what gives leverage; does dehumanize them\n\n\n\nKarin Friedrich: binary constructions—w financial\, construction of we and them but how about people who took out mortgages etc. \n\n\n\nmodernity has thought through compexification and growing autonomy of different spheres; individual is member of several and pulled between these\, but logics are independent of each othertakes binaries from L-S\, Saussure etc. which say classification and turns into classifications which can be terrible; but civil sphere promises to overcome and bring us together as community\, even though itself rests on binary distinctionsas opposed to? Thank God we’re American and not French etc.; says workin class invluded through fighting in wars against X\n\n\n\nAndrea Teti: how can apply civil sphere when have multiple civil spheres\, and also where no scandals e.g. in Italy where all these things happen but no scandal \n\n\n\ndegrees of polarisation\, but does happen e.g. in Nixon scandal when Demos and Repubs join to agree even though damaged them\, but no crisis is ever shared by society as such e.g. left has its crisis and right has its and will not agree on them\n\n\n\nDanielle: media has galvanising effect\, leading to crescendo and dimuendo of scandals \n\n\n\nstandards of journalism are quite civil e.g. fairness\, objectivity etc.law also organised around civil responsibility\n\n\n\nNigel Dower: if ethical consumer\, trying to influence economic activity in particular way > not just multiple identities; also not just church but also charities e.g. Oxfam that resist transparency even though presumably are civil sphere\, too \n\n\n\nethical consumer is taking into role as economic actor but reflects binary\n\n\n\nHilary Homans: why was 2002 tipping point for church scandals? Need to distinguish The Church as faith-based organisations etc. e.g. can find Holy See negotiating with countries in events…. \n\n\n\nyes distinctions e.g. dioceses often wanted to move more quickly; also Catholic abusers organisatios that are civil society but\n\n\n\nAjay Gudavarthy: underlying assumption that maintaining social order + residual—what left out of non-civil spheres; being open can also be idea of market contractual relations—what point does it play each role? \n\n\n\nThinks no way of understanding what happens when system stalls and how repairs than civil sphere—so not just about social orderAlso that about justice rather than social order; actually disruptive to social order—can legitimate injustice in other spheres but not entirelyTrying to make not residual category by defining as own systemConflicts w gender\, working class etc. doesn’t happen without civil sphere: where do unions appeal for sense of justice?\n\n\n\nPhil Oxhorn: two cases v different bc no one trusts business and supposed to trust church\, which supposed to define moral order; Murdoch in US has Fox Media which has bigger sway on voting \n\n\n\nNot true that no one trusts business people\, or that everyone trusts Catholic church esp since Prot demonization in USViolation of Milly Dowler’s voicemail was what triggered phone hacking scandal > brings society together when seemed fragmented\n\n\n\nAndrea Teti: on binaries\, signifiying chain although visualised as binaries bc border always has outside; how identifies logic of exposure? \n\n\n\nTensions btw boundaries—attempt to make meaning undermines boundary\n\n\n\nPhilip Oxhorn “Civil Society and the Evolution of Citizenship in Latin America”\n\n\n\nRecent crises more severe than past ones in Latin America which brought out military \n\n\n\nCivil society: resist subordination to state and demand inclusion into national political structures \n\n\n\nEsp.important where states coopt or absorb civil society for political ends\n\n\n\nWhere civil society strong\, dispersal of power; but in LA\, obstacle to civil society is inequality; and civil society is realm of conflict \n\n\n\n+ people get involved bc realize that does mean something\, not just wasting time \n\n\n\nMinimal consensus for defining civil society: often too high\, which assumes consensus that arguavly renders participation unnecessary\, if already agreeing; so better to set lower\, esp when more collective tradition and when trust is low as in Latin America; lack of civil society not bc lack of trust but what causes lack of trust \n\n\n\nFor any reasons\, in it w another group of people: need to define what public is in order to define public good; typically nation-stateAgree to coexist with other people > non-violent; civility is important\n\n\n\nParadox: cant understand indepde of relation w state > transnational dubious bc no supranational state \n\n\n\nAutonomy just means capacity of organisations to define and defend interests in competition w actors incl state i.e. not that reciving aid from state but that receiving w no strings attached [defining value]State-society synergy: achieving public good e.g. finding cure for river blindness in Senegal > not enough hospitals and ppl don’t go to them: villages select representatives to ensure ppl take medicines in exchange for meal etc… have legitimacy as representatives and from civil society\, and delivered at minimal cost\n\n\n\nSocial construction of citixenship: \n\n\n\nMarshall: starts w property w capitalism\, but to make meaningful need to expand w political rights etc. and as capitalism flourishes\, added social rights which legitimates inequalities produced by capitalism: necessary for capitalism to flourish > he is right for Britain but not bc capitalists’ foresight but synergy w stateIn Latin America\, ability of workers to organise autonomously and then later demand political rights and eventually social rights [chimes w advanced working rights in Mex Constit]Even if we think we agree on what should be right\, in fact radically different in practice\, incl. how to be effected: struggle over what citizen rights do and do not exclude—not inevitable process as Marshall seems to suggestStrength of civil society can be measured in rights of citizenship e.g. US civil rights movement\, which mobilises around what rights; women’s movement\n\n\n\nThree diff kinds of citizenship developed in L.A. though also in other developing countries \n\n\n\nCitizenship as cooptation: criterion is political\, included if toe the line although even then limits to inclusion > controlled inclusion—civil rights precarious if cross lines; political rights contingent—democratic politics is means t/w ends rather than end in itself; social rights unequal esp. between formal and informal sectors>>reinforces rather than reduces structural inequality: mechanism for social stability\, divide and conquer; working class struggles e.g. in Argentina were meaningful but limited and ultimately to accept status quo that only bit better than what previouslyCitizenship as agency: role of multiple actors in construction of what means to be citizen e.g. Morales: redefining what meant to be Bolivian vs. shame of children in school who recent migrants from Andes; but problems of poverty etc. prove difficult to rectify; but reflects weak civil society which means polarisation btw haves have-nots and diff movements etc.; self-limiting radicalism in which polit democracy b/c end in itselfCitizenship as consumption: have votes as well as economic resources but used to accessorize: universal polit rights but limited civil and eroding social; in btw elections few checks on power of elected leaders > few checks; real decisions made outside democra institutions >> economic rsoureces determine quality of healthcare etc.; high level of impunity\, and poor seen as suspects; education which key to success which now has universal access but public education so low quality and also little promise of higher income > low social mobility\n\n\n\nBut citizenship as consumption not exclusive to others e.g. using US consumer groups to put pressure on + elections can bring in more inclusionary form of citizenship \n\n\n\nBolivia: Law of Popular Participation—transforms munitipcalities and creates more > decentralises incl budget fixing quota for municipalities; ensured participation not just in electoral but also territorial organisations\, which were mostly indigenous organisations > hybrid democracy btw indi forms of collective govt and elections; But didn’t work bc \n\n\n\nDominated by presidentTerritorial basis to avoid functionally based incl. unions and chambers of commerce (deemed too conservative) despite being main proponents of decentralisationSuspicion of state\n\n\n\nWent through but since only way to get coparticipation funds: so ends up citixzenship as cooptation \n\n\n\nLegal representation didn’t mean that socially recognized > captred by elites; and no effort to mobilise civil society… and many organisations excluded e.g. women’s organisations\, irrigation committees etc. although later recognised that problem in that women’s participation decreased\, seemingly bc men interested in funds being channelled through municipalities which not before \n\n\n\nWeakness of committees etc. partly bc seen as created by state and not by civil society; also relying on munci govts for transparency \n\n\n\n>> v far from citizenship as agency; leads to massive protests culminating in Morales’ victory \n\n\n\nVs. Porto Alegre\, where civil society allowed to take initiative \n\n\n\nDiscussion\n\n\n\nHilary: what happens when citizens and civil society are displaced? \n\n\n\nConcentration of power makes difficult for civil society\, although civil society mobilises to challenge inequality—disadvantage groups are first to mobiliseDiffic w Occupy Movement that didn’t articulate what wanted; similarly\, objects to labelling as neoliberal anything that don’t like\, when much that is progressive e.g. opening to state working w civil societyRights achieved by collective movements even if most rights but not all individual\n\n\n\nDmitri: what effect of prolifer of citix on informal institutions? \n\n\n\nIn Bolivia yes informal but still important and social legitimacyIn LA informal usually about creating impunity\, undermining rule of law > regressive: e.g. study in Mexico City that people asked to pay bribes were poor who seemed vulnerable\n\n\n\nIna: top-down process? \n\n\n\nPorto Alegre comes out of Constituent Assembly rather than from LPP style; legitimates experimentation\, opening door for bottom up processesSome of old indigenous traditions resurfacing incl blocing highways etc. which can also be problem if step threshold of civilityDemonstrations in favour of democracy but also feeling that not to rock boat in case end up back in authoritarianism; although easier to mobilise against authoritarian regimes-once got\, then have to define and defend interests: new skillsBeen in meetings when first half is about how important to be here\, which suggests that not going to be much substance\n\n\n\nKaren: supranational e.g. in Haiti; and how labour comes in \n\n\n\nStill reliant on government to have wherewithal to distribute aidOrganised labour is key in UK and also in Latin America; but women’s movements often founded by women who found excluded from organised labour > trigger other projects\n\n\n\nRaul: finds in Mex meetings that low tolerance for dissent—don’t like it when someone has different opinion \n\n\n\nDistrust can lead to participation but can also be problem esp when fearGiuliani held up as model bc of zero tolerance but neglect his community policing which can be effective as conflict resolutionWhen communities allowed to influence what taught in schools\, level goes up\n\n\n\nBerlin: what is civility and where comes from? \n\n\n\nCivility in European history came at huge cost incl. genocide; qu of how to achieve other than homogenization of nation-stateMexico: values civility bc seen what happens when lose it; also non-violence bc know that police provoke violence as pretext for using itCivil society has been dependent variable and goal is to make independent variable\n\n\n\nKarin: in republics as he said for LA\, lack of trust stimulates civic participation \n\n\n\nSession 2\n\n\n\nAndrea Teti “The Politics of ‘Civil Society’ in the Middle East”\n\n\n\nCivil society in democratis literature often not constructed as site of struggle; practical effects do exact opposite of what supposed to do > undermining democratic transitions; civil society treated by EU as sweets given out > holding parties at embassies etc. to promote \n\n\n\nVs. Unions etc. who involved in Arab Spring \n\n\n\nOrientalism in democrati studies: ‘impossibility of democracy’ \n\n\n\nBefore 1979 argued that nothing independent of state in Oriental state: argued that possible to have emancipation but not in conditions; state not powerful enough to control emancipator movement\n\n\n\nStresses that his argument fits not with morning’s papres but with democrati literature \n\n\n\nRelat with stateSpace of good manners\n\n\n\nSets up impasse that excludes \n\n\n\nIslamist movementsLabour movements\n\n\n\n…and hostility t/w them antagonises these movements\, which tends to polarise \n\n\n\nFunding follows model of what civil society; opposite organisations start to describe selves as civil society—space resisting authoritarian practices of state; states then themselves flood civil sphere w CSOs that then fund; understood that “slow transformation” \n\n\n\nOpposes democratising other and democratised self\, but at same time smuggle in Orientalist assumptions of alterity—introduces goals but in way that makes impossible > and not just failure but allows ways of delegitimating and arguing that failed to democratise e.g. Hamas election\, as well as AK party in Turkey \n\n\n\nAjay Gudavarthy “Post-Civil Society”\n\n\n\nCivil society theory argues that tensions between CS practices  and that these are productive\, but he argues that tensions cancel out democra potential of each practice\, congealing democratic space rather than leading to its expansion \n\n\n\nDalit movement\n\n\n\nPrivileges practices of universal citizenship etc. but also celebration of cultural differences; dalit movement marginalised bc claims of universal citizenship—accused of being particularistic\, sectarian and stigmatised as such; dalit movement pushed out of civil society \n\n\n\nTo defend its claim to civil society\, takes identarian claim\, essentializing by claiming to represent themselves bc have “lived experience”; CS responds by arguing on one hand that inward looking while allows entry point in name of politics of difference > discourse of tolerance or multiculturalism\, which also tends to natrualise social hierarchies\, also turning difference into distance \n\n\n\nCivil Rights movement\n\n\n\nArgument that civl society part of state but others outside state; attempt to resolve by arguing that inside when democratic\, outside when authoritarian> but AG argues that works simultaneously\, entrapping opostional movements \n\n\n\nOver emphasis on legality\, on one handOn other hand\, argument of civil society as pure realm of freedom (making constit democracies more free) but undermining negotiations with hierarchies\n\n\n\nTwo arguments get locked into each other (end up hyper-legislating) \n\n\n\nFeminist movement\n\n\n\nHere two arguments \n\n\n\nCS as space for legislationCS as autonomous political action\n\n\n\n…although supposed to moderate each other\, in fact congeal: autonomous action begins to be read as withdrawl of state e.g. microcredit self-resposibility vs. Hyper-legislation e.g. having to care for parents \n\n\n\nInstead of moderating\, creates two extreme forms\n\n\n\nNew turns in political movements\n\n\n\nIdentify ways of breaking deadlock of congealing into polarised camps that block each other \n\n\n\ne.g. RoL: usually polarised dichotomy of either law/dialogue or anarchy/violence\, but principle of RoL used to mean more than just order\, allowing for coexistence of modalities of violence with law\, creating processes of dialogue\, giving for peace and order but peace and justice \n\n\n\n> resignifying to avoid getting caught in binary logic civil society \n\n\n\nDiscussion\n\n\n\nAjay all kinds of violence equalised in order to eliminate any and every groups like Taleban\, Maoists etc. > post-civil society: instead of taking moral approach\, accepts possibility \n\n\n\ne.g. peace talks with Maoists: state govt of Andra Pradesh changes position to make for dialogue even though arms—not possible w/i sanitised space of civil society \n\n\n\nEkow: Rawls: can’t impose on people particular views but public reason\, distinguishing between comprehensive schemes and public frameworks\, making complicated distinction arguing that should ultimately be possible to justify in non-comprehensive terms \n\n\n\nAjay: already problem in Rawls distinction of public and culture\n\n\n\nJeff: Andrea and Ajay agree in that see discourse of civil society as bad\, claiming that leads into anti-democratic processes: is Orientalism inherent to discourse of civil society? seems Islamic movement embracing civil society; not sure that violence accepted as form of dialogue just bc state govt accepts as long as put guns away + in fact most movements have moved away from Maoism as way of redistribution thru violent distribution \n\n\n\nAndrea: Orientalism not inherent; particular concept of civil society and democracy which excludes social and economic rights etc. thus not seeing e.g. in Egypt that union movement demanding economic rights—blindness built into way democracy understoodAjay: shift from moral take on violence to political take is what makes post-civil\n\n\n\nKaren: watches media report that shows women saying not to vote for Islamists bc wld have to veil again > she asks whether this is just media discourse or what pl saying; in Polish-Lithuania\, law that allowed rebellion which even king could join—violence as part of politics that not illegal \n\n\n\nAjay: wld need to look at specificitis to see whether moral take on violence etc.\n\n\n\nPhil: right to take up arms in US constitution which can be problematic; first qu is what actors themselves intending\, incl whether compatible w democracy or not e.g. MB keeps away from April 6 bc don’t want to get involved; are groups opprtunitstically getting invovled? And different when trying to end armed conflict and pursuing variety of goals; many issues raised by Ajay engaged w/i civil society literature e.g. whether working within or outside system \n\n\n\nAjay: another aspect of post-civil is that going beyond systemic vs. non-systemic\, so feminists movement undermining law but still using law\, unlike Maoist movement\n\n\n\nBerlin civil disobedeicen already poses question of when uncivil means allowed for civil ends \n\n\n\n+ JA tradition of just war etc. and other old ways of justifying violence\, such as exhaustion of other channels \n\n\n\nAjay: India claiming modern\, liberal state with civil society that doesn’t allow justification for violence\, but these movements are finding new justification\n\n\n\nJA In order to justify violence\, need to argue that not civil society and that violence is therefore appropriate and only means open to them \n\n\n\nSession 3: Responses to first day\n\n\n\nMatyas Bodig\n\n\n\nAgrees that no civil society w/o state or at least authoritative institutions \n\n\n\nRelation of ppl who treat themselves as duty bound to observe norms of civility t/w others: doesn’t have to be everyone and ready to form strong political ties w them \n\n\n\n…though idea of community not built into norms of civility; need political process\, institutional scaffolding > authorities generate normative space in which ppl come to recognise each other; civility is normative baseline\, can then add specific moral ties that make particular community \n\n\n\nMany types of authorities e.g. local\, global\, if authoritative institutions… but only authorities that claim representational relation over those over whom exercise authority \n\n\n\nStates do  not necessarily establish represent relation w subjects but increasingly hard for modern states not to\, not least bc international legal norms that require them to do soSeek legitimation on part of citizens\n\n\n\nPossible that no normative space opened up for civil society e.g. Stalinist state \n\n\n\nPolitical integration which necessary for authority; civil society offers one way of achieving political integration—becomes active part of legitimating process for polit institutions: gets chance to become active agent for determining normative identity of political community etc. i.e. terms of political integration \n\n\n\n+ other way of legitimating is law \n\n\n\nConstitutional democracy is form of government that balances civil society and law > constitution is mechanism\, typically bc civil society made constitutive through election process\, linking that legitimacy w legal validity: law provides normative parameters foc civil society but makes civil society constitutive of its own legitimacy \n\n\n\nBut has dark side: bc civil society created in nprmative space by state\, state shapes and will be inherently limiting\, favouring organised groups\, rewarding social capital\, limits access of minority; nowhere near free of oppression\, laden w ideology\, develops mechanisms of exclusion \n\n\n\nEngagement w civil society comes at a cost: accept represent relationship w state and not all states are worthy of that; accepting civility including renouncing violence which can be diff if fellowmembers who want to repress you; accepting law as proxy to civility\n\n\n\nThere is politics outside civil society > can engage in revolutionary politics \n\n\n\nBut civil society is more inclusive than anything that can reasonably imagine\, and always open to further inclusion \n\n\n\n+ in absence\, not clear how else would achieve political community \n\n\n\nEven when state is unpalatable\, he would argue that societies need modern state; would ask Ajay how else would envisage political institutions\, what would be mechanism \n\n\n\nNigel Dower\n\n\n\nAjay not offering post-civil society but neo-civil society\, just as possible to question development paradigm without dismissing \n\n\n\nMay be sense in global civil society just as ND interested in global citizenship though often argued that can’t be w/o state: gloval citizenship is liberating concept for many people—asserts moral claim that one belongs to global community \n\n\n\n+ relation to global institutions: if concern w public good and commitment to non-violent\, apply equally to global level \n\n\n\nQuestion of means and ends: much discussion has been about what means are consistent w civil society as well as range of goals \n\n\n\nnon-violence for Quakers like himself not just as tactical means but also as endalso qu of body that uses democratic means for something quite differentis cooperation a tactic to be discarded when achieved what want?\n\n\n\nFollowing model of civil disobedience\, possible to see violence used to create conditions in which desirable political order may be possible \n\n\n\nHilary Homans\n\n\n\nFeels homogenous concept of civil society this afternoon vs. gender etc. \n\n\n\nmen and women’s relation to civil society as state is v different\n\n\n\nAsked women and men if wld sacrifice freedoms for human security: found that women wld sacrifice none\, men made one \n\n\n\nOther responses\n\n\n\nKaren: Russina nationalist movement combining swastika and Conf flag is kind of global civil society\, looking for representation \n\n\n\nMarieke: worked in Syria where no space but ppl work horizonally e.g. against global company or despite state \n\n\n\nDitte? Will talk about Danish idea of co-citizens\, responsibility towards those who enjoy less rights \n\n\n\n+ in some context violence is civil: locally defined thing \n\n\n\nAnael: law is proxy of civility—but society-centered model of civility as culture? Or formal institutions that can export elsewhere \n\n\n\nEkow: surprised to find model of civil society so deeply constituted by law \n\n\n\nhe feels that great thing is that don’t need structure\, authority; example wld be associative nonvoluntary obligations to each other as academics e.g. reading each other’s papers\n\n\n\nKarin: missing background Viroli wld have given of Aristotelian sociability etc. incl natural law rather than positive \n\n\n\nAndrea: where does the state come from? \n\n\n\nMB diff ways incl people taking over territory\n\n\n\nMatyas: agrees w ND on global civil society…UN creates normative space that sucks in activism > can’t explain ICC etc. that wld not have been possible w/o civil society activism \n\n\n\n+ Norms of civility are universal that allow regulation w those who don’t have think normative ties \n\n\n\n+ w respect to Ekow\, wld deny that positivist: relatedness to autyority e.g. in marking boundaries of society \n\n\n\nAndrea: is cooperation only tactical etc.\, does this not get us into mental states? \n\n\n\n+ question of violence seems to equate GBH— \n\n\n\nReply of day’s speakers\n\n\n\nPhil: ICC major achievement but bc got national governments to support it > nation-states still key; UNDHR wouldn’t be passed today… \n\n\n\n+ also transntional actors such as organised crime\, Catholic Church etc. \n\n\n\n+ LT developed idea of structural violence which Pope accepted but rejected violent means to justify struggle against structural violence \n\n\n\n+ diff kinds of rules of law: depends on who is involved in constructing them [but not precisely rule of law?] \n\n\n\nAjay: problem w way civil is distinguished from political i.e. moral=non-negotiable w/i political field \n\n\n\n+ rarely in working do civil society and law actually balance out each other \n\n\n\n+ need to study points of intersection between law\, civil society etc. how inflected onto each other \n\n\n\nMB no way to see differences btw movements unless look at attitude to fellow members wherher\n\n\n\nJA: wants to see civil society as thicker structure of feeling\, one of which is civility but also criticsm—not just about having good manners \n\n\n\n+not just about states: institutions and their laws precede civil spheres by 1000s of years; utopian vision of civil sphere used to democratise law as well as using lobbying\, elections etc. \n\n\n\nBut global can’t be full civil society since no elections etc.: mainly anarchy\, violence etc. \n\n\n\nTuesday 26th June\n\n\n\nSession 1\n\n\n\nKarin Friedrich “The Consequences of Being Civic: The Concept of Citizen Society in early modern Poland-Lithuania”\n\n\n\n16th century nobleman: \n\n\n\nNobles required faith\, trust and freedom; follows Ciceronian concept of man as free and not easily corrupted by money \n\n\n\nCitizens synonomous with nobles\, who v numerous—20% in some areas \n\n\n\nLegislation is consensual activity\, goal as common good\n\n\n\nPolish citizenship on daily practice: ideal citizen was perfect public orator\, participation in civic life was essence of nobility \n\n\n\nVs. contrast to Hobbes—defines liberty negatively as absence of interference by state \n\n\n\nAnd natural law not absorbed as elsewhere \n\n\n\nFredro: do not call our liberty license because license doesn’t exist where law exists \n\n\n\nPrivileges and liberties \n\n\n\n1431habeas corpus: no nobleman imprisoned without legal processs \n\n\n\n1490 Sejm with two chambers \n\n\n\n1505 no new laws w/o unanimous consent of both chambers \n\n\n\n1578 higher courts of peer elected judges \n\n\n\nRepublic could only be preserved by strong and virtuous civic society \n\n\n\nFortescue 14th century: dominium politicum et regale \n\n\n\nImportant element was extension of noble liberties to non-citizens; once citizens of X district given privileges said that “previously lived like donkeys in the field” \n\n\n\nLater: issue of place of king resolved when agreed 3 estates of king nobility and commoners \n\n\n\n+ movement to extend civic rights to nobles in other nations in commonwealth \n\n\n\n+ sovereignty transferred from monarch to commonwealth\, which gives sense of exception and superiority from rest of Europe where greater monarchic sovereigtny \n\n\n\nFocus on 3 attempts–Jews\, Cossacks and Prussians claim citizenship by practicing it \n\n\n\nPrussian diet sets up and devolved authority; include urban members in their diet \n\n\n\nOrthodox Cossacks: failure of integration into citizenship \n\n\n\nhad tried to attain noble status since defending P-L from Ottomans\, but not trusted to uphold liberties of free republic\, identifying with foreign elements alien to P-L culture;rebellion when appeal to Muscovite Tsar to defend as Orthodox; lost eastern lands to Moscow\n\n\n\nJews signing names as Jews and citizens in one area\, and seems recognised as such\, with recourse to 1558 Law Statute which gives access to law courts \n\n\n\nThen end of 18th century: introduction of property franchise disenfranchises poor noblemen\, reducing political participation\, also with greater influence of natural law \n\n\n\nPower from above vs. power from below often misleading \n\n\n\nJA: power of non-civil spheres has overwhelmed universalistic aspirations of civil sphere; but other times relative autonomy has maintained possibility of justice\n\n\n\nMichael Brown “From Civic to Civil: Civil Society as Enlightenment Category”\n\n\n\nQuestions assumption that healthy democracy connected to healthy civil society \n\n\n\nGellner: given choice btw democracy and civil society\, better civil society \n\n\n\nPutnam:  bc of intellectual inheritance of northern city states\, northern Italy more successful \n\n\n\nSkocol: America’s active traditions have fostered democracy \n\n\n\nLeaving aside issue of activity a la Skinner: need for active engagement w politics \n\n\n\nOrigins of civil (vs civic) society commonly located in 18th century \n\n\n\ne.g. Ferguson 1767—but problematic father figure for this tradition \n\n\n\nAspects of civil society coming into focus 1680-1720 \n\n\n\nCivility: language of politeness in Earl of Shaftersbury as relational virtue—exchange btw individuals: need to temper sensibilities and passionsPublic sphere as locale of these polite conversations and everyone had to be able to participate >link to democracyClubs and societies: participation w/o financial constraints etc.\n\n\n\n…so three different aspects: language\, location\, outcome of shared decision-making—voluntary associations seen as outcome of polite discourse in public sphere \n\n\n\nNot unlike Michael Edwards: civil society as good society/public sphere/associational life \n\n\n\nHowever\, scholars are falsely linking democracy to civil society \n\n\n\nNumerous groups unable to participate: women\, children\, slaves etc.Self-generating\, consciously apolitical\, limited in scopeCivic virtue of active\, positive liberty is different to civil virtue of courtesy etc. conduct of individuals in immediate presence of each other\, sensibilities of others and their idea of be esteemed: virtue of holding back rather than setting forwardNot game of power but of negotiation; regulate discussion of controversial subjects so dialogue doesn’t break down: mediating ontological differences over moral viewpointsReally about moving past wars of religion: point not to share moral outlook but mediating their differences\, neutralising religion as source of social conflictPoint therefore to depoliticize\, repositioning outside the realms of state—no longer state’s concern what you believe\, as long as don’t commit crimes on each other\n\n\n\nCivic society being replaced by civil society in this period: no longer need for active political virtue\, what is now needed is constraint \n\n\n\nFerguson: attack on failure of political activism of contemporaries—he remains part of tradition of civic politics and not of civil societyAlso leads to Smith’s argument that state not to interfere in domains such as marketPreparing ground for secular state as identified by C TaylorCivil society disconnected from state\, removing certain actions from state’s remit: hence failure of Gellner etc. healthy civil society may imply disregard for political democracy\, but akin to big society/small state (shared by Marx on withering away of state; Oakeshott on disintegration of state)\n\n\n\nDiscussion\n\n\n\nAndrea M: Societas in Latin was alliance btw peple e.g. to commit crime\, but also used societas for human species: linkage—man could not live alone \n\n\n\nVs. for Greeks\, animals were social but only humans were political requiring speech and practice… \n\n\n\nRomans bring domain of oikos into public sphere under civitas \n\n\n\nAquinas: combines man as political and social which identifies contemplative\, akin to civility—i.e. sees A’s sociality as akin to civility \n\n\n\nKarin: civility was part of civic virtue in P-LMichael: question is less about how treat each other in club\, but how treat those in other clubs—e.g. in Ireland at time\, civility comes into relations btw Anglicans\, etc.\n\n\n\nJeff: agrees that apolitical aspect that emerging\, but seems positive if don’t think that it by itself should be normative core of political\, a la Putnam: being civil is enough; but Skocpol etc. bring in active virtues in what they call civil\, not old ideas of tolerance\, but to Greek polis\, public as Arendt terms it \n\n\n\nMB explains that opposing welding of active participation in politics w civil activism in neo-Roman work of Skinner\, Pocock etc.: two traditions that lock together and not sure that fit well + not sure that tolrrance about democractic procedures\, instead living in plural society > can be tolerant of ppl w/o giving political privilege: pluralist and democractic virtues are not the same>tolerance is consequence of plural society\, not of democratic society (JA adds that authoritarian societies can be v tolerant)\n\n\n\nAnael: why strictly separating where people meet with goals etc.? civility was thinking like a citizen\, before it became private norms of civility etc. and tody now has become ideals of universalising community\, rather than just private realm \n\n\n\nMB Not that say these ppl to live just like us but that recognize living in plural society\, rather than being about democracy; and no coincidence that this is period when shift from wars of religion to fighting empire > not universalising but actually dealing with difference\n\n\n\nMatyas: to KF\, P-L fascinating experiment though failure\, ended on backfoot against absolutist monarchs; to MB\, can agree w claim that went too far in associating political motives with civility\, but otherwise of story is that civil society is constitutive of modern democracy\, linked with law under constitution > democracy requires participation which requires political ties and only limited possibility of building those ties; alternatives are family\, business collusion\, tribes as in Kenya (whereby election looks like census\, institutionalises rule of one tribe over another) etc. though civil society\, inherently political\, leads to legislative change e.g. Sarah’s Law in Scotland \n\n\n\nKF most absolute monarchies also failed; in terms of political participation yes exclusion but typical of most periods elsewhere; but what important is that large parts of Polish society felt includedMB Matyas argues democracy>participation>ties>social capital\, but ties required not of social capital but of political capital—social capital about pursuit of private good\, while political capital is pursuit of public good\, which is what democractic theorists are anxious to support e.g. chess club generates social capital and not political > not interested in public good\n\n\n\nPhil O Skopcol and Putnam v different but agree that need active citizenry bc people disagree: civility gives you way of relating when disagree \n\n\n\nMB utopian ideal of politics based on social capital is utopian e.g. in Ireland when getting clubs like Orange Order that then become political divisive (PO adds that social capital also made for fascism)\n\n\n\nTamas still point of civil society > changes conditions of legitimacy: tension btw civic and civil between constitutional and liberal elements of democracy > civility tames or moderates the civil virtue [presumably civic=constitutional\, liberal=civil] \n\n\n\nEnligtnemnt thinkers start to generate utopias but tools not in place\n\n\n\nDanielle Counter-culture if by 18th century artistocratic principles of land emerge as principles of government \n\n\n\nBut feeling that in fact this version of liberalism only offers illusions of freedom\, or only little glimpses of it\, while arguably removing freedom in every other way\, a la Foucault \n\n\n\nSession 2\n\n\n\nEkow Yankah “What Civil? What Society? The Borders of Civic Virtue and What We Owe to Others”\n\n\n\nTrevor Stack “Catholic-Scholastic Notions of (Civil) Society in Contemporary West Mexico”\n\n\n\nIntroduction\n\n\n\n1. Focus on “what society?” part of workshop topic \n\n\n\n> which has received less attention in debates on civil society in spite of parallel debates on society \n\n\n\n2. Focus on notion of society that which identified in anthropolo fieldwork in contemp west Mexico \n\n\n\na. which I usually call “loosely scholastic” because developed by medieval Catholic writers such as Aquinas\, not unique to Catholics in contemporary world \n\n\n\n> indeed\, my own discipline of anthropology partakes of them\, as does sociology perhaps especially in French tradition \n\n\n\nb. although in this paper will discuss Catholic church in contemporary Mexico\, which strangely neglected by social and political scientists—tends to treat churches as relics; whereas in fact have crucial \n\n\n\ni. not just in relation to old notion of society but to revamped notion of “civil society” of recent decades\, which Church played decisive role in sponsoring \n\n\n\nii. if time will say something about how revamped “civil society” of recent decades \n\n\n\n3. Loosely ethnographic approach \n\n\n\na. take as starting point particular context \n\n\n\ni. town of 8000 in pine-forest highlands of west Mexico \n\n\n\nii. as such \n\n\n\n–          visited by thousands of weekenders from nearby metropolis of Guadalajara \n\n\n\n–          in fact closely tied into orbit of Guadalajara and broader region \n\n\n\niii. including through structures of church \n\n\n\n> relevant that central-west Mexico famed as region in which church retains much power \n\n\n\nb. my fieldwork has focused on \n\n\n\ni. my informants’ notions of citizenship\, civil society and so on \n\n\n\ne.g. key question: what does it mean to you to be a citizen? \n\n\n\nii. revealing because \n\n\n\n–          what happens locally shaped by those understandings \n\n\n\nfollowed large number of cases\n\n\n\n–          local notions can throw up new theoretical insights \n\n\n\nin this case\, pushed me to reflect on notions of society\n\n\n\nc. although ethnographic – approach not essentially different to other speakers \n\n\n\ne.g. while JA looks to contemporary US for what notions and institutions of the civil\, extrapolating from there\, AG to India\, with unsurprisingly different results \n\n\n\n4. In paper \n\n\n\na. going to trace notions of sociedad \n\n\n\nb. say where come from historically \n\n\n\nc. what does—still struggling somewhat with this \n\n\n\nd. if time something about revamped notion of civil society \n\n\n\n> fairly descriptive paper but hope makes for some discussion \n\n\n\nB. What notions of sociedad\n\n\n\n1. In 2007 interviewed Claudia in 50s\, 3 children\, extended peasant family\, active in church lay organisations\, including cooperative groups\, husband bricklayer: \n\n\n\n+ when asked her my question—what does it mean to be a citizen?—CF began by replying: For me [citizen] means a person who enjoys all of his or her rights and carries out their duties. I don’t agree that you are a citizen when you are 18 years old\, when you have your voting card. I associate citizenship with the rights you have as a person and the duties you have with respect to society. Or the people you live with. \n\n\n\na. As many informants did\, Claudia uses law to set in relief her understanding of citizenship in the eyes of society – it was not legal adulthood or a voting card that made for a citizen. \n\n\n\nb. She stresses rights to a greater degree than most informants—for reasons we will discuss—and immediately followed by referring to duties \n\n\n\nc. what want to emphasize: speaks of duties with respect to society\, which glosses here as “people you live with” \n\n\n\n> “society” is key figure on which focusing \n\n\n\n2. Found in many other interviews and conversations over 18 months of fieldwork that \n\n\n\na. sociedad figures firstly as kind of membership or commitment; an entity to which one contributes or in which one participates\, more or less actively \n\n\n\ne.g. Claudia goes on to say that that a child might not be a citizen in the eyes of the law but might still be one if exercising duties or responsibilities to others: “if a child of seven or eight years old finds out that there is a garbage recycling programme\, which is a benefit for everyone\, and he joins it and starts to promote it\, he is already living as a citizen because he is getting involved in something that is about everyone\, everyone’s well-being\, and he feels the responsibility of collaborating.” \n\n\n\nb. sociedad also figures as subject (or institution) that passes judgement \n\n\n\ni. in this case\, implicit in what Claudia says (and explicit in other informants) is that sociedad can decide whether or not someone is a citizen\, as well as law can \n\n\n\nii. sociedad often disapproves of what people doing \n\n\n\ne.g. protesting in disorderly ways \n\n\n\nc. finally\, sociedad figures as medium or inescapable condition of life itself \n\n\n\n> this sense of “living in society” is what I found most distinctive \n\n\n\ni. found in Anglo interviewees in California talked of “community” which \n\n\n\n– something external to oneself \n\n\n\n– service to it was \n\n\n\nvoluntarymeasured in portions of time and money\n\n\n\nii. by contrast in Mexico: less voluntaristic notion of living in sociedad as condition that only the hermit could escape \n\n\n\n3. This sociedad included but went beyond institutions of law and government \n\n\n\na. obeying law was part of what made for good citizens\, but \n\n\n\ni. just as Claudia like many informants: law defines citizenship as X but ultimately about contributing to society or living in it… \n\n\n\nii. more broadly\, sociedad went beyond and could be at odds with institutions \n\n\n\n> indeed\, judicial institutions often considered inimical to sociedad \n\n\n\nb. government or autoridad was \n\n\n\ni. needed because living in sociedad inevitably produced differences and required organisation (sounding like Rousseau) \n\n\n\nii. for example\, Municipal President expected\, as part of office\, to give audience to citizens and address issues \n\n\n\neven though recently often try to channel issues through govt depts.\n\n\n\niii. at same time\, government always at risk of “losing ground” in sociedad \n\n\n\ne.g. often heard people complain of those who “lose their ground” \n\n\n\ne.g. in general\, politicians dismissed en masse as being terrible citizens \n\n\n\n4. …and as such\, they were examples of individuals shaking loose from sociedad \n\n\n\na. my informants often discussed this in terms of libertad and libertinaje \n\n\n\ni. libertad was the liberty or freedom of free will that makes humans human\, essential to life in sociedad \n\n\n\nii. libertinaje or license was the result of free will going astray\, as it was apt to do\, making sociedad the uneasy\, stressful condition it was considered to be\, whether in the case of: \n\n\n\nreckless driving\,  perhaps the most common examplealmost-inevitable abuse of power through corruption and exploitation\n\n\n\n5. So – \n\n\n\na. sociedad figures as membership\, as judgement and as medium \n\n\n\nb. embraces but goes beyond state institutions\, and can even offer alternative ground to them \n\n\n\n> which hints at where church comes in \n\n\n\nc. concerned to rein in—never successfully—wilful libertinaje that also part of human condition \n\n\n\n> sociedad was matrix in which will was held at bay\, at least \n\n\n\n> before say more about what sociedad does\, say something about… \n\n\n\nC. Where comes from (which also gives clues about something of things it does)\n\n\n\n> still very much sketch: \n\n\n\nSpanish colonists and esp. missionaries took to New World notion of sociedad that they took from scholastics who drew part of it from ancient Greeks and esp. Aristotlein that colonial notion\, sociedad was itself civil and identified with the urban: to quote influential manual of 1647\n\n\n\nAristotle and Cicero themselves defined the city as a perfect congregation of man\, who previously scattered in huts in jungles and forests\, came together\, through which they managed to achieve many desirable ends\, which in sociable and political life are possible\, and is without a doubt much better than solitary life\, as Saint Thomas [Aquinas] teaches us… \n\n\n\nb. no mere political theory but blueprint for empire \n\n\n\ni. native population resettled from the sixteenth century into civilized towns\, which named republics\, although often accused of slipping back out of sociedad into hills… \n\n\n\nii. …especially by Spanish missionaries who had exclusive access to Indian republics\, whose urban layout—literally a matrix—centred on mission and later parish church \n\n\n\n2. Into nineteenth century \n\n\n\na. push from post-independence governments to nationalise sociedad \n\n\n\ni. by trying to create idea of Mexican nation \n\n\n\nii. sweeping away colonial status including official distinctions between Indian and Spanish republics \n\n\n\niii. in 2nd half of century \n\n\n\n–          complaining that  Mexico was still sociedad de sociedades: by sociedades meant especially municipalities that heirs of the old republicas\, which strove to undermine \n\n\n\n–          sometimes use radical liberal language of individual autonomy that would seem to undermine emphasis on sociality \n\n\n\nb. however \n\n\n\ni. limited power to transform \n\n\n\n–          until late 19th century priority was building strong state \n\n\n\n–          church continues to reproduce and uses in polemic against radical liberals \n\n\n\nii. at least in early years\, state itself ends up teaching older notions of sociedad \n\n\n\ne.g. introduces civic catechisms in which man is defined as social being \n\n\n\n3. Mexican Revolution of 1910-17 brings to power regime that \n\n\n\na. introduces unprecedented range of entitlements in Mexican Constitution \n\n\n\nb. mobilises major “cultural revolution” by which Mexicans come to see themselves as mestizos and indeed as Mexican \n\n\n\ni. not least through truly effective network of schools \n\n\n\nii. allowing to contain role of church\, which no longer officially allowed to run schools \n\n\n\nc. retains and vastly expands Civic education of previous century; in spirit of what Matyas—states trying to create normative framework for civil society \n\n\n\ni. sets out basic constitutional rights as Mexicans and\, in some periods\, stresses entitlement as Mexicans to many things that clearly did not have\, which fuelled local struggles \n\n\n\nii. but still has as key chapter\, to present day\, the same “Individual in Society” \n\n\n\n– clearly one source of what my interviewees said \n\n\n\n– but clear from informants: sociedad still not monopoly of state far from it \n\n\n\nD. What figure of sociedad (that contains willful license) does\n\n\n\n> still hard to pin down; not unlike revamped civil society\, depends on how precisely deployed \n\n\n\n1. Can be \n\n\n\na. particularistic and hierarchical \n\n\n\ni. sociedad did often mean town or municipality\, not unlike colonial times \n\n\n\n> never fully nationalised \n\n\n\nii. tacit hierarchies\, for example of city or townfolk over rural\, not unlike colonial times \n\n\n\nb. but also has inclusive and cosmopolitan face \n\n\n\ne.g. considering not only children but committed non-Mexicans to be citizens in the eyes of society \n\n\n\n2. Can motivate sense of duty although not necessarily through collective action \n\n\n\na. inspires a sense of commitment\, just as US volunteerism \n\n\n\nb. but like it\, often consists of personal actions\, e.g. picking up trash \n\n\n\n> maybe that revamped civil society has more to offer \n\n\n\n3. Can expand reach of state institutions although can also offer alternative ground to them \n\n\n\na. govt use of sociedad in Civics textbooks designed to harness sense of sociedad \n\n\n\n> participation was keyword of recent textbooks through 1990s \n\n\n\nb. however: seen that can offer alternatives \n\n\n\ni. which can be oppressive \n\n\n\ne.g. sociedad frowns on disorderly protest \n\n\n\ne.g. groups of highschool pupils: sociedad stigmatizes children of single mothers\, even when law protects them \n\n\n\nii. but can be turned around \n\n\n\ne.g. protestors defend selves in eyes of sociedad when govt tries to use law against them \n\n\n\n4. As alternative\, can provide space for \n\n\n\na. critique of persons or institutions \n\n\n\ne.g. accusing municipal president of shaking loose from sociedad \n\n\n\nb. wholesale dismissal \n\n\n\ni. of institutions and whole sphere of politics \n\n\n\nii. of fellow citizens: often said that \n\n\n\n– drive like animals \n\n\n\n– otherwise unworthy of trust \n\n\n\nc. until recently excepting church \n\n\n\n> though hard hit by sex scandals \n\n\n\n5. Finally \n\n\n\na. although not inconducive to rights > as can see in quote from Claudia \n\n\n\nb. may well be inhospitable for classically liberal Rechtstaat whose raison d’etre is to guarantee basic rights of citizens as individuals \n\n\n\nE. What has to do with revamped “sociedad civil”?\n\n\n\n> chose Claudia because not only does she speak of sociedad but she is part of local group that embodies revamped notions of civil society and citizenship: \n\n\n\n1. Local group of 2-15 members \n\n\n\na. formed in 1990s as Human Rights Group \n\n\n\nb. affiliates in 2000 to newly-formed organisation Citizen Power \n\n\n\ni. government had governed through Institution Revolutionary Party which conglomerate of organisations through which resources were channelled in return for support including votes in one-party elections that worked as plebiscites \n\n\n\nii. from 1970s\, range of organisations excluded converge on goal of creating conditions for victory of opposition parties in elections\, under sign of citizens \n\n\n\n>organised citizenry and civil society were synonomous \n\n\n\niii. since 2000 election\, civil society defined as beyond political parties \n\n\n\n> although CP stages debate between municipal candidates \n\n\n\n2. Subplot: as many or most such organisations\, significant that main sponsor is the Church \n\n\n\na. PC \n\n\n\ni. parish group originally \n\n\n\nii. PC run out of Jesuit Univ and sponsored by LT diocese \n\n\n\nb. Church had \n\n\n\ni. long identified with civil society as sphere of associations that not natural—unlike family—and yet indispensable\, and which retain bulwark against totalitarian state\, whether socialist\, fascist or liberal\, as well as agents of subversion that fought against \n\n\n\nii. faced with weakening of regime and increasing radicality of protest\, seeks to cultivate—not unlike in 1890s—certain kind of organization of which PC is good example \n\n\n\n3. Many varieties of revamped civil society in contemp Mexico but detect trace of sociedad in it \n\n\n\na. Focus on rights but also duty to sociedad \n\n\n\nb. claim of sociedad civil to be independent of state \n\n\n\nE. Conclusions\n\n\n\n1. Looking at notions is revealing of what happens locally but also throws up broader theoretical insights \n\n\n\na. locally \n\n\n\nb. theoretical… \n\n\n\n2. Draws attention to\, among other things \n\n\n\na. institutional contexts for civil society–and including  churches \n\n\n\nb. queries whether contemporary civil society are all that voluntaristic \n\n\n\n3. Normatively\, though\, not to assume that is desirable \n\n\n\n>  I have some sympathy for arguments of those like: \n\n\n\na. Aguilar Rivera: cites lynch mobs etc. as examples of excess of solidarity which shows up how state fails to secure basic rights of citizens \n\n\n\nb. or indeed\, scholars like Turner who place faith in state to which people relate as private citizens and which makes good on their entitlements… \n\n\n\nDiscussion\n\n\n\nHenry: metaphysical basis? Also question about apartment: \n\n\n\nFor Aristotle\, sees as reading empirically out of nature; instead metaethical in that empiricallyInter-connectedness is subverted by market\,\n\n\n\nKarin: liberty vs. license \n\n\n\nWhat is defense against license? Cites Polish noble saying that not just license but liberty is defined in old customary lawCivil vs civic (which Michael argued against) social capital is defence against overbearing state—civil essence of organisations could turn into civic task of defending liberty against overbearing states >otherwise might lose liberty in civil society: so merger of civil and civic is important for civil to pursue liberty\n\n\n\nEkow: liberty of citizen is as citizen—but Millian liberalism takes any trade-off in liberty to be justified e.g. by cost-benefit\, such as in stop light\, but for Aristotle: community may have no choice but to banish people who have put themselves above law—this is terrifying thing \n\n\n\nAjay: discourse on virtue is too moral\, Catholic in nature > takes into realm of intention—intangibility of intention in modern democracy is made good in law; exceptional laws against terrorism etc. worked on basis of intention—link between law and virtue \n\n\n\n+ end up w moral minimum\, even in Kymlicka on multiculturalism—moral minimum for immigrants\, which is standard for civility: link between civility\, morality and legality in notion of social order \n\n\n\nE Resists link btw virtue and law: making distinction between civic virtue and virtue generally>this has been lost from Aristotle: virtue was in his Ethics and not in his Politics\, in which virtue features much less and only in relation to civic obligations: not about being good person—here best person is person who treats others with justiceThere is A justification for law of exception but for those who attack civic polity as such: this is related to intention—whether offending morality as mass murderer or civic polity itself\, though true that v dangerousAgrees danger w moral minimum of civility that excludes that those not civic: short-sighted community can be miserly t/w those who learn to includeAmericans have political rights to treat undoc workers as want\, but that is realm of politics\, though agrees that least attractive part of argument\n\n\n\nPhil O intent is certainly dealt with in law; but also debates about law enforcing morality e.g. addiction\, abortion etc. which brings into play moral values; one thing about Aristotle is that citizens have obligations—qu whether relevant today; if social life etc. doesn’t live up\, incentive to get out there and be more active > imperative for dissonance btw expectations and reality\, less in A’s account; aristocracy and democracy don’t mix \n\n\n\nMy answer: not clear whether sociedad actually motivates people to promote and be more active or dissuades them from itEkow Modern American: rights against the state vs. Aristotelian: rights in return for duties\n\n\n\nEkow religion—freedom of religion wasn’t issue in ancient Athens but yes in Aquinas whereby religion\, civic virtue and law come together > if Catholic\, can punish you but Church should not impose religion on others\, bc those outside church could not be imposed upon as matter of conscience; but how plays out with so much of education etc. controlled by church \n\n\n\nEkow for Aristotle polity can yes be unbalanced but not outright exploitation of one group over another\, even of slaves—are we treating undoc workers worse than slaves? \n\n\n\nTamas if saying diff normative principles apply to citizens and non-citizens\, what dis relation of justice and civic virtue? \n\n\n\nAndrea license can be taken or given—can be granting permission\, freedoms to which entitled i.e. is license taking freedom to which not entitled \n\n\n\nDifferent concepts of freedom: libertad that opposed to libertinaje is more natural freedom of human will\, rather than something to which entitled > freedom as a condition but also as a problemBut yes\, other sense of freedom given in law e.g. free expression\n\n\n\nSession 3\n\n\n\nRaul Acosta “Civil Society as the Aspiration for Orderly Dissent: Differential Attitudes towards Social Movements\, NGOs and Advocacy Networks”\n\n\n\nCivil society can mean orderly dissent but gets polluted by progress as moral improvement \n\n\n\nBrazilian Amazon: protected area of indigen groups \n\n\n\nMeeting btw indig groups w soya export producers mediated by NGO\, intended to force govt to make plan for area before road was paved which wld facilitate trucks and deforestationQuotes one leader “If you have a polarised debate radical elements dominate > need to separate reasonable from unreaonsable people” but also goes on to say that there are differences within NGO\, which are legitimate\, and which can handle itThus trying to bring orderly dissent in arena of civil society\n\n\n\nDissent: Basic disagreements\, taboos\, cultural configuration\, taboos\, conflicts\, social dramas etc. > all are necessary for change \n\n\n\nBook combining social solidarity and anthropological gift: gift entails reciprocity of exchange in relations; division of labor > need to rely on each other\, lifeworld as interconnected experience \n\n\n\nSociality is one option > understand that rights earned through demands and actions—understand that result of previous conflicts: shows perpetual state of becoming\n\n\n\nPublic order: \n\n\n\n1. coercive society: censorship\, restricted rights etc. \n\n\n\n2. self-policiing: democratic authority\, minim policing\, collective rights\, empowerment of individuals \n\n\n\nBook on solidarity: social change through revolution vs. evolution \n\n\n\nRelation btw advocates and activists \n\n\n\nOrganic analogy: society as ecosystem\, sum of organizations in world \n\n\n\nVs. evolution as linear progress \n\n\n\nCivil ecosystems? Links state power configurations to civil society arrangements\n\n\n\nActivism and advocacy \n\n\n\nDmitry Goncharov “Postcommunist Civil Society: Uncivil Limitations and Uncivic Constraints”\n\n\n\nCommunist govt tries to destroy any form of autonomous social or private life \n\n\n\n+ attempt to change culturally by developing utopian collectivism instead of bourgeois individulalism\, which quite successful \n\n\n\nBut also how need to rely on each other just to survive; political patronage etc. > these were solidarity networks but not civil \n\n\n\nAt some point anti-Communists realize this struggle against rule not possible bc of overwhelming power of state\, after Prague Spring \n\n\n\nPitched in terms of repair of solidarity in Communist society but of politics; courage prized as civic \n\n\n\nPostcommunist agenda: to create civil forms of solidarity \n\n\n\nProblem w democratization theory: lack of attention to solidarity beyond “civil society”\, regarded as problem or survival \n\n\n\nAnti-civic civil society: govt does not support anti-civic civil society that challenges image of regime: drawing boundaries between these two—civically versus socially active organisations \n\n\n\nDiscussion\n\n\n\nHenry question \n\n\n\nRaul importance of emotional links that motivate people; rubber tappers and other groups develop in contrast to ciudadania florestania\, which is right to live in forest\, out of modernity\, as opposed to city\n\n\n\nMatyas: 1956 Revolution was socialist\, 1968\, in 1970s arguing for human rights bc argued that same alienation as in West\, only in 1980s becomes transition to Wes; But since then: living under Communism creates distrust of competition\, believe that only fair protection from competition is state\, which creates condition in which civil society cannot flourish; Democracy becomes autocracy of your kind of people \n\n\n\nHilary in 2005 Russian govt starts to close international civil society organisatoins incl. British Council \n\n\n\nStrategy of building authoritarian regimes\n\n\n\nAjay can’t discuss civil society as space of bonhomie > comes about through social configuration of power; priest is civil/moral authority of this kind of centrism\, which Communist state fought with violently with centralisation \n\n\n\nJeff haven’t talked about nation in conference\, complex relation between civil sphere; long tradition of contrasting civic and primordial nationalism… how important that new Russia sees itself as alternative kind of nation? \n\n\n\nAndrey disagrees that attempt to replace uncivil solidarity of Soviet replaced by civil society afterwards\, since various manifestations of civic ideal under Soviets; why did these virtues not travel to post-Soviety? \n\n\n\nPhil O: in Amazon hard to organise bc vulnerability and soy farms so big and so much inequality\, even if extreme form in Russia; how to explain reaction to fires? \n\n\n\nSession 4: Responses and general discussion\n\n\n\nKaren: whose civil? Whose society? \n\n\n\nuniversalizing rhetoric has hidden some of that historye.g. Hedonism I/II commoditised noncivil behaviour in this space\, even if other spaces not permitted\, and not coincidental that in Caribbean; disaster pornMarcus Wood Horrible Gift of Freedom enslavers decide that wrong to do so\, now offer freedom to ppl that previously bought; can pay people who formerly enslaved\, or make apprentices for long time; not experienced as right but offered as gift and slave needs to react in particular way to itGift of civility: wouldn’t want to see civility being introduced as gift\n\n\n\nMarieke: setting up Centre for Civil Society at American Univ of Beirut \n\n\n\nInterested in media even though often said that been privatised; civil society about distrust\, scandal etc. even though in Arab World thought that this is a problemSyria has tried to copy Soviet model and also has strong ties of religion\, tribe\, nepotism etc.PO transitional strong governmentAnael Hezbollah civil society organisationFor Dmitiry Hezb or Hamas are good exa of uncivil structures of solidarity\, but these don’t provide basis for institution building\, universal public efficient institutions of particularistic structures > lessons to be learned about how manage people and enthuse them\n\n\n\nHilary: anxiety about definitions—she was thinking whose law etc. e.g. apartheid South Africa; Chandoke—concept of civil society that everyone agrees is a good thing>must be good thing…asks where are grey areas? Marxian exploitation? When are ppl so excluded that never part of civil society e.g. Roma person who told doesn’t exist bc no ID… but NC civil society what inhabitants make of them> nothing automatically assures victory of democratic projects\, just provides actors w values\, space to battle for democracy \n\n\n\nMichael B: question of publicity\, being in public—privilege of getting access to the public; finds shift in boundaries around private\, and also how private life; state-sponsored fun that he abhors; politics of advocacy needs to be accompanied by politics of privacy\, which is not to be intruded on; what is reach of civil society\, not just state\, into private lives of individuals\, e.g. phone hacking; civil society can corrode \n\n\n\nAnna: main interest is exclusion and inclusion—mainly society versus state being discussed but not society versus nation; NGOization of both civic and civil; social economy; migration—work in Helsinki thinktank taht focusing on legal reforms but found v unproductive \n\n\n\nJames: recently looking at defining civil society—is it the complement of the state? Or replacing? Virtues in relation of civic which seems adjective for state and law; i.e. not in antagonism \n\n\n\nGostav: work on colonial cities—does civil society have concrete spatial terms? And can be multiple civl societies e.g.in urban neighbourhoods in 19th century Indian city where community around neighbourhood w local regulations; when someone insults from other neighbourhoods\, have right to go and beat up person in other neighbourhood upholding honour; who is defining civil society?is there hegemony built into way cs defined? How to work w each other dissent? \n\n\n\nMin: in Nepal support from international community for supporting civil society etc. but organisations had to pay tax on funding from internat organs > becomes business for govt when not paying tax before; millionaires corrupting process; how big advocacy networks \n\n\n\nRamola: not much said on gender but also multiple identities; 44% vote against independence\, conflicting loyalties; asking how impacts on strength of civil society movements; what space is made for women? Strong religious lobby esp Church w Muslim orgniastoins against pro-abortion law which passed last week\, but was division which allowed to \n\n\n\nUlisses: how state and non-state violence impacts activists/advocates? Any perception of state being obliged to protect them? \n\n\n\nCaroline? Just returned from fieldwork in Sierra Leone; found ppl continusly saying that British civilized us—resonances of civil; finds that civil society is tick in box \n\n\n\nAndrea: political is missing—what is political project behind notions of civil society? and whether ends up doing exactly opposite? For him something that affects constituton of society is political \n\n\n\nJeff civil society comes up w decline of communism as utopia—now no conference on socialism; v little empirical theory about civil society; at conference mostly worked w CSI and instead about what not civil society—no one agrees what it is which creates much confusion; but can list things such as non coercive\, etc. but though some dispute role of law\, law is part of it\, as is media; is idea of face to face society from ancient world relevant now? Tendency in empirical discussion to argue that discourse of civil society is crippled by claim to perfection. Wld have to argue that feminist\, ecological movements are all within civil sphere\, on behalf of some of ideals\, pushing on state \n\n\n\nPhil O civil society is ideal in search of reality and there are several ideals which haven’t separated out; Murdoch scandal—legitimacy of system will be confirmed in process of how it works out; civil society also decides what is public and what is private; even Michael agreed that civil society resolved religious conflict which is major political achievement \n\n\n\nEkow liked civility as gift > Aristotle says duty bound to treat others such\, not a gift; even human impulse of belonging can be pathological if end up demonizing others (beating up is mild); immigration is area in US where widespread massive law breaking—that legal obligration is drained of civic virtue; likes barrier btw civic and civil—stg for neighbourhoods\, families\, churches to solve problems\, can’t always be state \n\n\n\nKaren: though believes in emancipator of humans also v sceptical of them; civil society used in context of places that have been messed up for long time\, and v poor states \n\n\n\nMatyas: we agree on structures but not on worth bc our politics is different; civil vs. civic can agree on conceptual level; in case of Roma\, there are many such organisations that have had major successes even if not individuals\, incl through Euro institutions\, courts etc. though is constantly falling short bc not enough solidarity thru racism to tackle problems (Hilary disagrees bc not many in official orgaisations); surprised that v little on human rights which complement \n\n\n\nAjay: there are societies in which people don’t agree that civil society is ideal for them; need to critique category in name of civil society rather than alterantive ways of critiquing e.g. discomfort of notion of populism in Ltin America\, where populism a la Laclau is politics; for some of us civl society full of moralities of exclusion; proble is not with ideas of civil society as stand on own e.g. dialogue but ordering they get into > What is prioritised over what at particular times\, intersections between them e.g. nothing wrong w being civil\, problem is context/ordering; prob not w civic virtue but how gets inflected into law\, how morality gets into law\, how converts into moral minimum>tend to discuss independently of each other rather than looking at how relate to each other \n\n\n\nAlena: \n\n\n\ncivil society supposed to be about change but considered success if nothing changes—conflict can be about maintaining status quoconnection with democracy should not be taken for granted e.g. vibrant civil society in China but not necessarily through democracy\, e.g. critical news reportsin Ghana civil society only used as tool for donor funding; when look at those groups\, would not characterise as such if measured them against the language of civility bc partisan etc.; but still civil in that legitimate through own orders of authorisation\n\n\n\nAndrea: \n\n\n\nMarxist tradition of civil society as domain of struggleCivil society closed and built on boundariesMultitude: spontaneous organisationubuntu—not about inclusion/exclusion\n\n\n\nHenry: \n\n\n\nNGOization/professionalizationCivil society empty of meaning\n\n\n\nHilary: \n\n\n\nUse of civil society by government since 1980s to neutralise protests of 1960s e.g. civil rights\n\n\n\nGostav \n\n\n\nAna Hazare movement in India: those who don’t see movement in terms of civil society\n\n\n\nAndrea: member of society \n\n\n\nJames: what does civil society grow out of? Human society? \n\n\n\nDanielle: is unethical to call group civil society when not called themselves such? Since strong linguistic meaning \n\n\n\nAndrea: civil society used by journalists and academics vs. spontaneity \n\n\n\n+ Liberalism was getting emancipated from church and corporations; but also tradition of spontaneous mobilisation which Hobbes distinguishes from people \n\n\n\nAndrea: both civil society like nation can be counter-hegemonic
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